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THE MARXIST VIEW OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY AND REVOLUTION

By KARL A. WITTFOGEL

I

"THE victory of communism is inevitable." This claim has been made since the consolidation of the Soviet Union, and it has been restated with relish by the Kremlin's supreme spokesman during his recent visits abroad. It rests on the argument that Russian society, in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, has advanced from feudalism to capitalism and socialism, blazing a trail along which all other countries are bound to go. Thus the superiority of the Communist regime is asserted not merely on the basis of operational successes, but with reference to historical considerations which are ascribed to the "classics" of communism, and ultimately to Marx and Engels.

How legitimate is this claim? How did the fathers of "scientific socialism"—and the Russian Marxists, including the pre-1917 Lenin—view the developmental position of Russia? A critical study of the facts reveals Marxist concepts of Russian society and revolution that are far more complex than, and profoundly different from, the socio-historical views offered by the Soviet ideologists.

Marx and Engels drew for their ideas upon many philosophical and socio-economic concepts whose political intent was by no means uniform. Some are actually or potentially totalitarian; some are politically indifferent; and some are actually or potentially anti-totalitarian. This last group of ideas played a decisive role in creating the "manure of contradictions" (*Dünger der Widersprüche*)[1] that characterizes original Marxism.

Immensely significant in this respect is the contradiction between the goal of a total managerial socialist order envisaged by Marx and Engels and their insight into the atomizing and self-perpetuating quality of uncontrolled despotic power. They gained this insight as a by-product of a multilinear concept of development which they arrived at under the influence of the classical economists[2] in the early 1850's. This multi-

[1] Marx used this formula to characterize what he considered the stimulating confusion in the ideas of Ricardo (Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, 3 vols., Stuttgart, 1921, III, p. 94).

[2] See Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn., 1957, pp. 372ff. (hereafter cited as Wittfogel 1957).

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linear concept led them to doubt a necessary progress from ancient ("slaveholding") to medieval ("feudal") society,[3] the first step in the allegedly Marxist unilinear scheme. It led them to consider "Asiatic" or "Oriental" society as a self-perpetuating order headed by a peculiar type of absolutism, Oriental despotism. And it led them to class Tsarist Russia as a semi-Asiatic country dominated by an Orientally despotic state.

Before taking this position, Marx and Engels had fitted Russia into a concept of universal development built primarily upon Fourier's sequence of social epochs: savagery, patriarchalism, barbarism, and civilization.[4] In 1848 Engels described Russia as a "patriarchal-feudal barbarism,"[5] and Germany as a "civilized" nation at an early stage of bourgeois prominence.[6] Both countries were dominated by a "patriarchal-feudal absolutism."[7] Engels obviously considered such a regime compatible with a predominantly agrarian as well as with a predominantly "bourgeois" society, the former eventually evolving into the latter. At the close of 1848 Marx viewed the "West" as representing "civilization" and the "East" (mainly Russia) as representing "barbarism."[8] In February 1849 Engels invoked the concept of "different stages of culture" as the criterion for judging the relation between Russia and the Western Slavs.[9] In the same context he declared that the historical position of a nation was determined by "the stage of its societal development" (*gesellschaftliche Entwicklungstufe*).[10] This unilinear approach explains why, despite Russia's suppression of the Hungarian revolution (in 1849), Engels in 1851 considered Russia more progressive than Poland: "There is not a single moment when Poland, even compared with Russia, successfully represents progress."[11]

[3] Engels saw the classes of medieval Europe emerge not from the "swamp" of the decaying slaveholding society of antiquity, but from a barbarian tribal "gens" society, which, avoiding any elaborate system of slavery, advanced directly toward medieval society with its relatively mild form of servitude (Friedrich Engels, *Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigenthums und des Staats*, Stuttgart, 1921, pp. 160-62). See also Karl Marx, *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*, Berlin, 1953, pp. 382f. (hereafter cited as Marx 1953); cf. Wittfogel 1957, p. 416, note d.

[4] In 1846 Engels praised this sequence as far superior to Hegel's four *Weltreiche*, "to say nothing of the post-Hegelian constructs" (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, Werke-Schriften-Briefe, Marx-Engels-[Lenin] Institute, Berlin-Moscow, 1927, I, 4, p. 450 [hereafter cited as MEGA]; cf. also p. 413). For instances of Marx's and Engels' use of Fourier's categories, see Wittfogel 1957, p. 385, note d.

[5] MEGA, I, 7, p. 302. [6] *Ibid.*, p. 342. [7] *Ibid.*, pp. 302f.

[8] *Aus dem literarischen Nachlass von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Ferdinand Lasalle*, ed. by Franz Mehring, 4 vols., Stuttgart, 1902, II, p. 231.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 248; cf. p. 251. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[11] MEGA, III, 1, p. 206. For Engels, Russia's civilizing quality was due largely to its "more developed bourgeois elements" (*ibid.*, p. 207).

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Thus, during their Continental period and for some years thereafter,[12] Marx and Engels appraised Russia's historical position within the framework of a unilinear concept of development. But in 1853 their position underwent a radical change. Marx, who since the summer of 1851 had intensely reread the classical economists,[13] figured prominently in this development. But Engels, who was devoting most of his spare time to the study of military matters,[14] was in close communication with his friend through letters and visits.[15] He shared significantly in this reorientation, which determined Marx's and Engels' view of Asiatic society and Russia for the rest of their lives.

II

It was probably Engels who, in an article published in the *New York Daily Tribune* on April 19, 1853, first called Russia "semi-Asiatic." But although he was thinking of Russia's "condition, manners, traditions and institutions,"[16] he did not specify their Asiatic peculiarities. In an article published two days later, he described Russia's regime, "wherever it is not mixed up with feudal institutions," as representing "a military occupation, in which the civil and judicial hierarchy are organized in a military manner, and where the people have to pay for the whole."[17]

The new Asiatic concept that Engels was groping for emerged in a discourse that occurred during the summer of 1853. It crystallized in three letters (two by Marx and one by Engels) and in three articles (all by Marx).

On June 2, 1853, Marx, commenting on remarks of Engels on Oriental cities and religion,[18] called the absence of landed property "the real

[12] Cf. Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Revolution und Konterrevolution in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1953, p. 81. This series of articles, which appeared in the *New York Daily Tribune* from September 1851 to December 1852 under the name of Marx, was actually written by Engels (MEGA, III, 1, pp. 241f., 244, 259f., and *passim*). The above-cited juxtaposition of the "civilized West" and the "barbarian East" was dated February 1852.

[13] See Wittfogel 1957, p. 373, note b.

[14] MEGA, III, 1, pp. 169, 177, 180, 184.

[15] Engels, who was then living in Manchester, and Marx, who was living in London, met frequently and sometimes were together for weeks at a time: ca. November 5-15, 1851; December 20, 1851, to January 4, 1852; April 11-13, 1852; ca. May 26 to June 26, 1852; ca. December 23, 1852, to January 10, 1853; and ca. April 30 to May 16, 1853 (*Karl Marx Chronik seines Lebens in Einzeldaten*, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, 1934, pp. 114-39 [hereafter cited as KMCL]).

[16] The article was sent to the *New York Daily Tribune* by Marx, but again was written by Engels (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Gesammelte Schriften 1852 bis 1862*, ed. by N. Rjasanoff, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1920, 1, p. 475 [hereafter cited as Marx and Engels 1920]).

[17] *New York Daily Tribune*, April 21, 1853.

[18] Engels' letter of May (ca. 18th) 1853 (MEGA, III, 1, pp. 471f.).

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key even to the Oriental heaven."[19] In his answer on June 6, Engels stated approvingly that "the Orientals did not arrive at landed property, *not even in its feudal form.*"[20] In his opinion this was due to the "desert"-like conditions prevailing "from the Sahara across Arabia, Persia, India, and Tartary and the most elevated Asiatic highland. Here artificial irrigation is the first condition of agriculture, and this is a matter either for the communes, the provinces, or the central government." Hence the Oriental governments always had a department of public works.[21]

In an article dated London, June 10, 1853, Marx included Engels' ideas on the relation of aridity to irrigation and public works in the Orient. But he went further. He mentioned two "circumstances" as characteristic of Oriental society: "the Hindoo, on the one hand, leaving, like all Oriental peoples, to the central government the care of the great public works, the prime condition of his agriculture and commerce," and the population "dispersed, on the other hand, over the surface of the country, and agglomerated in small centers by the domestic union of agricultural and manufacturing pursuits." The resulting village communities had "*always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism.*"[22]

In his letter of June 14 to Engels, Marx restated the two "circumstances": "The public works the business of the central government" and "besides them the whole realm, not counting a few large cities, dissolved into *villages* which have a completely separate organization."[23] Commenting on the role of these villages, he added: "I think one cannot imagine a more *solid foundation for the stagnation of Asiatic despotism.*"[24] In these formulations Marx was shifting his emphasis from the property aspect (he had noted that private landownership probably existed in certain regions of Asia[25]) to the isolation of the villages as the decisive reason for the "stagnation of Asiatic despotism."

In an article dated July 19, 1853, and devoted to international aspects of the "Eastern question," Marx contrasted certain "semi-Eastern" developments that involved Russia and certain "completely Eastern" de-

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 477. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 480; italics added.

[21] *Ibid.* Engels' argument suggests his familiarity with the pertinent ideas of at least one classical economist, Richard Jones, whom Marx had studied as early as June 1851 (KMCL, p. 107). In a pioneer work on Asiatic society written in 1831, Jones pointed to the significance of "that great tract of sandy desert" that stretches across the "old world." His list of these desert areas begins with the Sahara, Egypt, Syria, Persia, India, and ends with "Tartary" and northernmost China. It concludes with the sentence: "This soil can be made fruitful only by irrigation" (Richard Jones, *An Essay on the Distribution of Wealth, and on the Sources of Taxation*, London, 1831, pp. 119ff.).

[22] *New York Daily Tribune*, June 25, 1853; italics added.

[23] MEGA, III, 1, p. 486; italics in original.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 487; italics added. [25] *Ibid.*

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velopments that involved China.[26] In view of the two circumstances which Marx on June 10 and 14 had called characteristic of "all Oriental peoples," the conclusion seems warranted that he considered Russia "semi-Eastern" because, unlike China, where both circumstances were present, Russia knew only the second. This conclusion is confirmed by Marx's and Engels' continuing insistence that the dispersed village communities were the solid foundation of Oriental despotism. Obviously, in their opinion, the second circumstance did not *create* the specific order called "Asiatic society"—this was the function of the hydraulic factor—but it was sufficient to *perpetuate* its dominant institution, Oriental despotism.

In a third article, dated July 22, 1853,[27] Marx again discussed India as a representative of the "old Asiatic society." Speaking of "village isolation," he mentioned "the absence of roads," which left the individual rural community "almost without intercourse with other villages." Such a situation meant "the dissolution of society into stereotype and disconnected atoms." In 1854 Marx further elaborated upon the organizational atomization of the Asiatic peoples by stating that the Asiatic forms of domination differed from European absolutism in that they prevented "the growth of common interests" among their subjects. "Oriental despotism" tolerated municipal self-government only insofar as it was convenient and not opposed to the regime's direct interests.[28]

From 1853 on, Marx and Engels interpreted the Tsarist regime as an Oriental despotism. In 1855 they began to consider its possible origin. The hydraulic factor being absent in Russia—they do not even mention it—introduction from outside was suggested as the likely explanation. In 1855 Engels referred to Moscow's "Russian-Mongol barbarism."[29] In February 1856 Marx contemplated writing on the foreign policy of eighteenth-century Russia;[30] and this he did in a series of articles entitled "Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century," the first appearing in *The Free Press*, London, in August 1856,[31] and the last four on February 4, 18, 25, and April 1, 1857. These final installments, which drew on Engels' views of Peter the Great,[32] presented Marx's "preliminary remarks on the general history of Russian politics." In 1899 the entire series was republished in book form as *The Secret*

[26] *New York Daily Tribune*, August 5, 1853.
[27] *Ibid.*, August 8, 1853.
[28] Marx's article was published in the *New York Daily Tribune*, September 9, 1854 (Marx and Engels 1920, II, p. 417). This politically irrelevant form of self-government, which is typical of Oriental society, I have called a "Beggars' Democracy" (Wittfogel 1957, pp. 125f.).
[29] Marx and Engels 1920, II, p. 231. [30] MEGA, III, 2, p. 109.
[31] Cf. KMCL, p. 159. [32] MEGA, III, 2, p. 183.

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Diplomatic History of the Eighteenth Century. In consistence with the Soviet endeavor to hide Marx's "Asiatic" interpretation of Tsarist Russia, this series, which constitutes his only sketch of Russian history, has not been included in the official Soviet edition of Marx's and Engels' works.[33]

Marx's analysis ran as follows: The Mongol conquest destroyed Russia's proto-feudal society by compelling the Muscovite Tsars to *"tartarize"* Muscovy.[34] The Tatar Khans and their Russian agents combined the ruthless expansion of despotic power with an internal system of "enslavement."[35] According to this interpretation, the Mongols introduced the two-pronged policy;[36] the early Tsars implemented it in Muscovy;[37] Peter the Great "generalized" it.[38] And in Marx's time Russia's political attitude was in substance still what it had been at the end of the Mongol period: "A simple substitution of names and dates will prove to evidence [*sic*] that between the policy of Ivan III and that of modern Russia, there exists not similarity, but sameness."[39]

In these "preliminary remarks" Marx treated certain aspects of a "marginal" Oriental society[40] that have great relevance for the study of Russian history and total power. Recent investigations confirm that among the three major Oriental influences—Byzantium, the Mongols, and Ottoman Turkey—it was the second that imposed on Russia a non-Western, absolutistic service state.[41] Early Chinese, Mongol, and Russian sources permit us to identify the methods of Chinese statecraft with which the Mongols were familiar when they conquered and reorganized Russia.[42]

For some years after 1857 Marx concentrated on the analysis of Western industrial society, but in the first volume of *Das Kapital* (1867) he again called the self-sufficient village communities "the key to the secret

[33] This is the case in the first edition (1923-1948) and in the second (1955-1958). Cf. also Maximilien Rubel, *Bibliographie des Oeuvres de Karl Marx*, Paris, 1956, p. 131.

[34] *The Free Press*, April 1, 1857.

[35] Marx used this term as connoting not the private slavery of antiquity, but a system of state-imposed political slavery. In 1857-1858 in the first draft of *Das Kapital*, he referred to the traditional Eastern pattern of subordination as "the general slavery of the Orient" (Marx 1953, p. 395; cf. Wittfogel 1957, p. 377).

[36] *The Free Press*, February 4, 1857.

[37] *Ibid.*, February 4 and 18, 1857.

[38] *Ibid.*, February 25 and April 1, 1857.

[39] *Ibid.*, February 25, 1857.

[40] For this concept and its application to Russia, see Wittfogel 1957, pp. 173ff., 219ff.

[41] The idea of a service state was outlined by Kliuchevsky and conceptualized by Sumner (see Wittfogel 1957, pp. 220ff.).

[42] Because of the growing interest in Russia's Orientalization, I have elaborated this point in the third printing of *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Conn., 1959), p. 220, note *j-bis*.

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of the unchangeability (*Unveränderlichkeit*) of Asiatic societies." "The structure," he continued, "of the economic key elements (*der ökonomischen Grundelemente*) remains untouched by the storms in the political sky."[43] And in the 1870's the two friends, who had closely followed the Russian Emancipation, commented with growing frequency on Russia's societal order. In 1875 in an article, "Soziales aus Russland," which criticized the Russian revolutionist Tkachev, Engels repeated the key Marxian thesis that "the complete isolation of the individual village communities from each other [was] the natural foundation of *Oriental despotism*." He continued: "From India to Russia this societal form, where it prevailed, has always produced it, and has always supplemented it."[44] In the *Anti-Dühring*, which Engels wrote from 1876 to 1878 and which he read in full to Marx,[45] he again asserted that the old (tribal and rural) communities had been "over millennia the foundation of the crudest type of state, Oriental despotism, from India to Russia."[46]

Thus Russia was part of the Eastern and not the Western world. In 1877 in a letter to the editors of the magazine *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, Marx admonished his Russian readers to remember that the socio-historical development described in *Das Kapital* pertained only to Western Europe. He warned them against attempting "to transform my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the *marche générale* imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself."[47]

In 1881 Marx repeated this warning in a letter to Vera Zasulich. He again described the isolated village communities as "always" constituting the basis for a "centralized despotism."[48] And he remarked that in pre-Mongol Russia such communities were already present, apparently "imposed by the vast extension of the land," but, he added, they were "largely consolidated by the political fate Russia had to endure after the Mongol invasion."[49]

[43] Karl Marx, *Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie*, 3 vols., Hamburg, 1919, I, p. 323 (hereafter cited as Marx 1919).

[44] Friedrich Engels, "Soziales aus Russland (Volksstaat, 1875)," in *Internationales aus den Volksstaat (1871-75)*, Berlin, 1894, p. 56 (hereafter cited as Engels 1894); italics in original.

[45] See Friedrich Engels, *Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft. Dialektik der Natur, 1873-1882*, Moscow, 1935, p. 9.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[47] Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels, *Ausgewählte Briefe*, Berlin, 1953, p. 367 (hereafter cited as Marx-Engels 1953).

[48] *Marx-Engels Archiv*, Zeitschrift des Marx-Engels-Instituts, ed. by D. Rjazanov, I, Frankfurt, 1927, pp. 324, 333.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 324.

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After Marx's death Engels continued to equate Russian and Indian Oriental despotism. He did so on February 16, 1884, in a letter to Kautsky in which he first expressed his desire to popularize Morgan's *Ancient Society*.[50] And he did so again in a passage he inserted in the third volume of *Das Kapital*, published in 1894.[51] In this same year he republished his 1875 article on Russia with a new postscript which cited Marx's letter of 1877 and repeated his warning against identifying the social history of Russia with that of Western Europe.[52]

III

The ideas of Marx and Engels on Russian society entered Russia through various channels. Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), which in the preface distinguished the "Asiatic" from the "ancient," "feudal," and "bourgeois" modes of production, was known from 1860.[53] *Das Kapital*, Volume I, which called the isolated village community "the key to the secret of the changelessness of Asiatic societies," appeared in a Russian translation in 1872.[54] Plekhanov's translation of the *Communist Manifesto*, with a special preface by Marx and Engels which contained a crucially important statement on Russia's socio-historical perspective, was published in 1882. Engels' 1875 article, "Soziales aus Russland," with the 1894 postscript, was translated into Russian by Vera Zasulich and published with a preface by Plekhanov in 1894, one year before the young Lenin visited these two famous revolutionaries in Switzerland. Marx's letter of 1877 circulated in Russian, first in handwritten copies and then in printed form.[55] From it Plekhanov cited Marx's warning against universalizing the Western European experience in his book, *The Development of the Monist View of History*,[56] which first appeared in 1895 and which, Lenin approvingly noted, "helped to educate a whole generation of Russian Marxists."[57] Engels' *Anti-Dühring* was soon known to the Rus-

[50] Marx-Engels 1953, p. 437. Manifestly Engels did not abandon his multilinear view of development or the concept of Asiatic society when he wrote *The Origin of the Family* in 1884. For further evidence on this point, see Wittfogel 1957, pp. 383ff., 398.

[51] Marx 1919, III, 2, p. 259.

[52] Engels 1894, pp. 68f.

[53] W. N. Kotow, *Eindringen und Verbreitung der Ideen von Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels in Russland*, Berlin, 1956, p. 16.

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[55] Engels 1894, p. 68. In 1893 Engels expected every Russian visitor to question him on this letter ("A. Voden, Talks with Engels," *Reminiscences of Marx and Engels*, Moscow, n.d., p. 329).

[56] G. Plekhanov, *The Development of the Monist View of History*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 298ff. (hereafter cited as Plekhanov 1956).

[57] Vladimir Ilych Lenin, *Sochinenia*, 4th ed., 35 vols., Moscow, 1941-1950, x, p. 58 (hereafter cited as Lenin, S).

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sian Marxists;[58] Lenin quoted it from 1894 on. From the late 1890's he also quoted *Das Kapital*, Volume III, which was translated into Russian in 1896 and which, in addition to numerous observations on the "Asiatic" state, includes Engels' comments on the fiscal oppression of the Russian and Indian village communities by the despotic state. In 1913 Lenin studied Marx's and Engels' correspondence. In his abstracts from Marx's 1853 letters on India, he reproduced Marx's thesis on the lack of private landed property as the key to the "Oriental order," and he paraphrased the two "circumstances" as follows: "The Asiatic villages closed and self-sufficient (natural economy)—the *basis* of the Asiatic order + public works of the central government."[59]

The dean of Russian Marxism, Plekhanov, readily accepted the Marxian concept of an Asiatic society and its application to Russia.[60] And although Marx's letter of 1877 somewhat embarrassed him and his comrades, because the *narodniki* used it to bolster their thesis that in Russia, unlike the West, a primitive agrarian communism might directly evolve into modern socialism,[61] he steadfastly adhered to the idea that the economic order of Muscovy resembled that of "all great Oriental despotisms"[62] and that Petrinean Russia "completed and systematized what Muscovy began."[63] The Russian counterpart of the feudal survivals that shaped the restoration after the French Revolution he took to be "our old attachment (*krepost*) of land and peasants to the state."[64] Under such conditions, Plekhanov said, citing Kliuchevsky, the landowners were essentially a group of "serving" men,[65] and as long as these conditions were unshaken[66] social upheavals only led to the restoration of the old political and economic order.[67]

[58] In 1889 a résumé and excerpts were published by N. Ziber in the magazine *Slovo*. A full translation by V. J. Yakovenko appeared in 1904.

[59] M. Trush, "Lenin's Abstract of Marx's and Engels' Correspondence," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 2 (1960), p. 50; italics in original. Professor Leonard Schapiro of London kindly drew my attention to this passage, which shows that Lenin, if he was not familiar with it earlier, at least by 1913 knew Marx's most precise formulation concerning the managerial functions of the Asiatic state (see Wittfogel 1957, p. 389).

[60] An illuminating study of his discussion of Russia's Oriental despotism has been made by Samuel H. Baron in "Plekhanov's Russia: The Impact of the West upon an 'Oriental' Society," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XIX, No. 3 (June 1958), pp. 388-404.

[61] See Plekhanov's 1894 Preface to Engels' "Soziales aus Russland," in G. Plekhanov, *Sochinenia*, IX, Moscow, 1923, pp. 30f.; *idem*, 1956, pp. 361ff.

[62] G. V. Plekhanov, "On the Agrarian Question in Russia," *Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata* (Diary of a Social Democrat), No. 5 (March 1906), p. 12 (hereafter cited as Plekhanov 1906).

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[64] Plekhanov in *Protokoly Obydinitelnago Syezda Rossyskoi Sotsialdemokraticheskoi Rabochei Partii* (Protocols of the Unification Congress of the R.S.D.R.P, held in Stockholm in 1906), Moscow, 1907, p. 116 (hereafter cited as Protocols).

[65] Plekhanov 1906, p. 14.

[66] According to Plekhanov (*ibid.*, p. 12), these conditions were increasingly undermined in nineteenth-century Russia.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

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In the same context as that in which Plekhanov propounded these ideas, the Menshevik leader, Martinov, declared that Russia's peculiar economic order, including the nationalization of the land, was "the foundation of our Asiatic despotic order of society."[68]

Parvus' views of Russia's semi-Asiatic conditions became conspicuous on the eve of the 1905 Russian revolution.[69] In 1906 Trotsky began to speak of Russia's "semi-Asiatic societal conditions," of a state that seemed closer to Asiatic despotism than to Western absolutism, and of the cities of old Russia that resembled "the cities of Asiatic despotism."[70]

Lenin cited Marx's four antagonistic modes of production—the first among them being the Asiatic—when he entered upon his career as a Marxist in 1894,[71] and he again cited them when he wrote his biography of Marx in 1914.[72] During these twenty-one years Lenin expressed his awareness of Russia's "Asiatic system" (the *Aziatchina*) with varying consistency and usually in connection with his criticism of Tsarist "absolutism." After a somewhat vague beginning, he sharply stressed the Orientally despotic character of Tsarism. He pointed to the "Asiatic" quality of Russia's institutions.[73] He denounced Russia's rural order as representing a state of "bondage" (*krepostnichestvo*); and he warned against calling this order "feudal."[74] It was at this time that Lenin applied to Russia such designations as "political slavery,"[75] the "politically enslaved state,"[76] and the "monster" government.[77] These were designations that Marx had used in his "Diplomatic History."

After the 1906 discussion of the dangers of an "Asiatic restoration," Lenin employed the "Asiatic" concept more sparingly, but he did not discard it.[78] In February 1914, debating the problem of national self-determination with Rosa Luxemburg, he defined the "Asiatic despotism" of contemporary Tsarism as a "totality of traits" with specific

[68] Protocols, p. 90.

[69] Parvus called "the Russian state system . . . an Asiatic kind of absolutism supported by an army of the European type" (Parvus, "War and Revolution, II: The Fall of Autocracy," *Iskra*, No. 61, March 5, 1904).

[70] L. Trotzki, *Die Russische Revolution 1905*, Berlin, 1923, pp. 18 and 38 (hereafter cited as Trotsky 1923).

[71] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, 12 vols., New York, 1943, XI, p. 418 (hereafter cited as Lenin, SW).

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[73] W. I. Lenin, *Sämtliche Werke*, Wien-Berlin (later Moscow-Leningrad) 25 vols., IV, 1, p. 74, cf. pp. 14, 65, 197, 212; IV, 2, pp. 16, 67, 155f. (hereafter cited as Lenin, SWG).

[74] *Ibid.*, IV, 1, p. 212. In this and many other instances, the Comintern translators mislead the reader by frequently rendering *krepostnichestvo* as "feudalism," instead of "bondage" or "serfdom" (cf. Wittfogel 1957, pp. 378f. and note i).

[75] Lenin, SWG, I, 1, p. 14; IV, 2, pp. 155f.

[76] *Ibid.*, IV, 2, p. 149, note. [77] *Ibid.*, V, p. 32.

[78] Wittfogel 1957, pp. 394f.

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"economic, political, and sociological characteristics." And he added: "As everybody knows, such a type of state shows great persistence where the economy of the country in question is entirely patriarchal and where there is almost no commodity economy and class differentiation."[79]

IV

Obviously then, and contrary to the official Soviet claim, Marx, Engels, and the prewar Lenin did not view Russia as having the same socio-historical background as the West. Nor did they equate the Russian "bourgeois" revolution with the bourgeois revolutions of Western Europe. On the eve of a Western bourgeois revolution, as Marx saw it, the dominant contradiction was the conflict between the ruling, but decaying, feudal-absolutistic order and the rising bourgeoisie. In contrast, the dominant contradiction in Tsarist Russia was the conflict between the ruling, but decaying, Orientally despotic order and its enemies: oppositional nobles, the peasants, and the incipient bourgeoisie.

In this sense, Engels in 1875 described Russia as "held together by an Oriental despotism whose arbitrariness we in the West simply cannot imagine," and which "from day to day comes into more glaring contradiction with the views of the new enlightened classes."[80] Ten years later he spoke of the "contradictions" in Russian society as "forcibly held together by an unexampled despotism."[81]

When Engels in 1875 pointed to these contradictions, he believed that the anti-despotic forces were gaining strength and that Russia was moving toward a social revolution. How could this happen in an institutional order that, according to Engels and Marx, was stationary, "the structure of the economic key elements" remaining untouched by any political revolution? As a matter of fact, neither Marx nor Engels conceptualized his thoughts on this extremely important problem; but their comments on India and Russia (and Turkey) imply that such a "diversive revolution"[82] might result from the impact of outside forces. With regard to India, Marx saw the Asiatic order as loosened by a non-Asiatic type of foreign rule—British colonialism. "English interference . . . produced the greatest, and to speak the truth, the only *social* revolution ever heard of in Asia."[83]

In Marx's and Engels' opinion, Russia's advance to a social (in con-

[79] Lenin, SWG, XVII, p. 548.
[80] Engels 1894, p. 49.
[81] Marx-Engels 1953, p. 460.
[82] For this concept, see Wittfogel 1957, p. 419.
[83] *New York Daily Tribune*, June 25, 1853; italics in original.

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trast to a purely political) revolution would be initiated by two factors: a catastrophic military defeat and the proximity of the West. When, after the Crimean War, both factors were combined, the frightened Tsarist bureaucracy introduced far-reaching technical changes (an increase in railroad building and an intensification of industrialization) and equally far-reaching social reforms (pre-eminently, the emancipation of the serfs).[84]

In 1859 and 1860 Marx listed as revolutionary forces the peasants and the oppositional nobles who wanted a constitution.[85] He expected—and his analysis proved correct—that the Emancipation would strengthen both the autocratic state and peasant hostility to it.[86] In 1875 Engels found the revolutionary spirit growing among the peasants and the young bourgeoisie, and from this time on both he and Marx were convinced that the Russian revolution was in the making.[87] He was not certain in 1875 whether the Russian anti-despotic or the Western socialist revolution would break out first.[88] But in 1877 Marx felt that the Russian revolution was imminent;[89] and from then on the two friends argued that the trail-blazing Eastern revolution might spark the Western proletarian revolution, and that the latter might lead to the preservation—and communist development—of the Russian village community. In 1882, in their preface to the Russian edition of the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels put it this way: "If the Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that each complements the other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist revolution."[90]

In 1894, when the village community was disintegrating rapidly, Engels again voiced the hope that "the overthrow of Tsarist despotism" would stimulate "the victory of the modern industrial proletariat" in the West.[91] He expected the victorious socialist West to show the Russians *wie man's macht* (how to do it)—that is, how to use the remnants

[84] Engels 1894, p. 67; cf. also Engels' "The Foreign Policy of Russian Czarism" (1890), in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, Glencoe, Ill., 1952, p. 51.

[85] MEGA, III, 2, pp. 448 and 453.

[86] Karl Marx, *Herr Vogt*, Berlin, 1953, p. 144.

[87] Engels 1894 [1875], pp. 58ff.; Marx [1876], MEGA, III, 4, p. 435.

[88] Engels 1894, pp. 57f., 59f.

[89] Marx's letter to Sorge, September 27, 1877 (Marx-Engels 1953, p. 363); Marx's letter to Engels, September 24, 1878 (MEGA, III, 4, p. 484).

[90] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Ausgewählte Schriften*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1958, I, p. 18 (hereafter cited as Marx and Engels 1958). The idea that the Western socialist revolution might accomplish such a development in the Russian countryside had already been expressed by Engels in his 1875 article (Engels 1894, pp. 57f.).

[91] Engels 1894, p. 72.

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of the old communal property "greatly to abbreviate the development toward a socialist society."[92]

This then is the original Marxian model (Model I) of the Russian revolution. Because the Tsarist regime was increasingly weak and increasingly oppressive, the Russian anti-despotic revolution would probably precede the Western socialist revolution. Unfolding its strength, it might give the signal to the Western revolutionists, who in turn might show the Russians *wie man's macht*. To repeat: the outbreak of the Russian revolution did not depend on a preceding Western revolution. And although a subsequent ("complementary") Western revolution would be highly desirable, it was not a necessary condition for the success of Russia's anti-despotic bourgeois revolution.

V

The role of Tsarism has been recognized by most historians of the Russian revolution.[93] Tsarist absolutism shaped the character of the entire revolutionary movement; in a peculiar way it affected its Bolshevik wing, which emerged under Lenin's leadership in 1903. Thought and action going hand in hand, the advance toward a Bolshevik policy expressed itself in significant "Leninist" modifications of the Marxist doctrine.

These modifications ought to be the concern of any immanent critique of Marxism-Leninism. Hence we turn eagerly to Herbert Marcuse's study of Soviet Marxism, which includes the rise of Leninism and which, as the author tells us, proceeds by means of an immanent critique in that it "employs the conceptual instruments of its object, namely, Marxism."[94] It hardly needs saying that any analysis of Soviet society and ideology which restricts itself to the method of the immanent critique is inconclusive. Nevertheless, such an approach can provide extremely valuable insights. It is for this reason that *Soviet Marxism* is so disappointing. Although Marcuse recognizes history as the core of the Marxist position,[95] he fails to use, as his conceptual instruments,

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 72.

[93] Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution*, New York, 1948, pp. 20f. (hereafter cited as Wolfe 1948); cf. also pp. 161, 366; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, New York, 1952, pp. 12f.; *idem, From Lenin to Malenkov*, New York, 1953, pp. 6f.; Leopold H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, pp. 4f.; Donald W. Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals*, New York, 1955, pp. 5, 15; Leonard Schapiro, *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, pp. 3, 7, 9; Alan Moorehead, *The Russian Revolution*, New York, 1958, pp. 10f.

[94] Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, New York, 1958, p. 1 (hereafter cited as Marcuse 1958).

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

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the socio-historical ideas of original Marxism. Instead, and without enlightening his readers on this point, he employs the altered concepts by which the Soviet ideocrats are hiding Marx's, Engels', and the prewar Lenin's views of Russian society and revolution.

Marcuse's supposedly Marxist formula of "consecutive social systems" suggests a unilinear scheme of development,[96] and his three examples—capitalism, the feudal system, and the Roman Empire[97]—all happen to be Western types of societies. In keeping with this conceptual framework, he describes pre-1917 Russia as "backward" without qualifying this term.[98] To him, Russia's backwardness was what decisively differentiated it from the modern industrial West. And he discusses the problems of the Russian bourgeois revolution in terms of Marx's critique of the Gotha Program of the German Social Democrats[99]—that is, in terms of a developmental pattern (a capitalist society with a feudal past)[100] which, according to Marx and Engels, was not Russia's pattern.

Having thus misrepresented the Marxist socio-historical tenets, Marcuse goes on to claim that Lenin made the first step toward Leninism in 1902 (by means of a new concept of the revolutionary party) and the second step in 1905 (by means of a new peasant strategy) because the rise of monopoly capitalism and imperialism had brought about a "decline in the revolutionary potential in the Western world."[101] This explanation fits Stalin's thesis that Leninism, as the "Marxism of the eve of imperialism and the proletarian revolution," arose during the "period of undivided domination of the opportunism of the Second International."[102] But it does not fit either Lenin's original concept of the Russian revolution—which was that of Marx and Engels—or his appraisal of the Western proletariat, which until 1914, and despite certain reformist-revisionist tendencies, he admired for its proper political attitude.[103]

By 1900, and continuing earlier trends,[104] the Russian Social Democratic Party had turned from a predominantly economic struggle for

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 3. [97] *Ibid.*, pp. 3f. [98] *Ibid.*, p. 35; cf. pp. 29, 44.
[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 20off. [100] Marx and Engels 1958, II, pp. 18f. and 25.
[101] Marcuse 1958, pp. 7, 27ff.
[102] J. Stalin, *Works*, 13 vols., Moscow, 1952-1955, VI, pp. 73f.
[103] See Lenin's perspective of the coming Western proletarian revolution of August 1901 (Lenin, SWG, IV, 1, pp. 204ff.), his opinion that the Western European comrades were combating the reformists better than were the Russian socialists (*ibid.*, IV, 2, pp. 70f.; cf. also pp. 155, 264), and his respectful remarks about the German Social Democrats in 1906 (*ibid.*, VIII, p. 91, notes 314 and 318f.). In 1917 Lenin stated retrospectively that, although in 1903 imperialism already existed, it did not as yet appear in the arguments of the Party (*ibid.*, XX, 1, p. 369).
[104] See Plekhanov's Preface to Engels' "Soziales aus Russland" (Plekhanov, *Sochinenia*, IX, p. 32); cf. also Lenin, SW, 1, pp. 371ff. (1897), p. 396 (1899).

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day-to-day improvements to an essentially political struggle against the Tsarist regime.[105] From then on, and for definitely internal reasons, Lenin began agitating for the creation of a vanguard party in which an elite of professional militants would stand above the proletariat.[106]

Lenin was in line with the Marxian concept of Russian society when he distinguished between the most oppressive Western government and Tsarist absolutism.[107] And he was in line with the Marxian concept of the Russian revolution when he expected it to give the "signal" to the Western workers,[108] who then might show the Russians *wie man's macht*.[109] In these matters Lenin and most of his orthodox Marxist comrades were in agreement. But he parted company with many of them when, to justify his proposals for an authoritarian party organization, he stressed the peculiarity of Tsarist despotism[110] and demanded that the party operate under a quasi-military discipline and a bureaucratic centralism.[111] He thus was recommending the organizational methods of the very despotic regime that he and his comrades were combating.

VI

Lenin's innovations of 1902-1903 did not involve a change in the original Marxist model of the Russian revolution. But such a change did occur in 1905-1906, during and immediately after the first Russian revolution.

Russia's defeat by Japan and the revolution of 1905 weakened the Tsarist regime profoundly, without, however, causing its collapse. Lenin, who early in 1905 had re-emphasized Russia's "virginal" Asiatic despotism,[112] at the close of the year found Russia's "purely capitalistic contradictions still to a very large extent covered by the contradiction between 'culture' and the Aziatchina, between Europeanism and the Tatarshchina, capitalism and bondage."[113] And early in 1906 he saw "the autocracy entirely restored."[114]

But while the revolution failed to attain its goal, it revealed explosive tensions in the villages. And the possibility of uniting the small, but organized, proletarian forces and the potentially revolutionary peasantry led Lenin and Trotsky to present new schemes for revolutionary procedure.

[105] For the details of this development, see Wolfe 1948, pp. 148ff.
[106] Lenin, SWG, IV, 2, pp. 159f., 170, 250ff. [107] *Ibid.*, IV, 2, pp. 155f.
[108] *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 382; cf. pp. 81, 110f., 466. [109] *Ibid.*, VIII, p. 573.
[110] *Ibid.*, IV, 2, pp. 264, 267, 280, 284f.; VI, p. 24.
[111] *Ibid.*, VI, pp. 380f., 412f., 416, 418, 423, 427.
[112] *Ibid.*, VII, p. 249. [113] Lenin, S, X, p. 58.
[114] *Ibid.*, X, p. 75.

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Trotsky's starting point, like Lenin's, was the recognition of Russia's semi-Asiatic background. Trotsky specifically followed Parvus, who, early in 1905, had "shed light on those social peculiarities of backward Russia, which, true enough, were already well known, but from which no one before him had drawn all the necessary inferences."[115] In precapitalist Russia, Parvus argued, the "cities developed on the Chinese rather than on the European model." They constituted "administrative centers, purely official and bureaucratic in character." Hence the Russian middle class was weak, and the workers could and should take the lead in the revolution, ultimately establishing "a workers' democracy."[116] Trotsky, who wholeheartedly accepted Parvus' Asiatic interpretation of the Russian state and city,[117] went beyond his friend politically when he proposed that under these conditions the Russian workers, supported by the peasants, could and should advance from the democratic to the socialist revolution. However, he held that when this was done, they could avoid being overwhelmed by the peasants only if their forces were joined "with the forces of the socialist proletariat of Western Europe."[118] It was in this context, which involved the interpretation of the Russian state as "semi-Asiatic" and of Russia's precapitalist cities as entirely "Asiatic," that Trotsky introduced his version of the concept of the "permanent revolution."[119]

Lenin likewise became convinced of the necessity of the Western revolution, but he arrived at his conclusion in a different way. He urged that the revolutionary peasants be made the "allies" of the small Russian working class in a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution which would lead to the establishment of a "revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry."[120] To attract, and control, the peasants, Lenin from 1906 on advocated a revolutionary land distribution based on state ownership—that is, he advocated the nationalization of the land.

Supported by the Mensheviks, Plekhanov strongly objected to this program. Lenin's new policy, he believed, would create an untenable revolutionary position, and the nationalization of the land would again

[115] Leon Trotsky, *Stalin*, ed. and tr. by Charles Malamuth, New York and London, 1951, p. 430 (hereafter cited as Trotsky 1941). According to Trotsky, the preface to Trotsky's pamphlet "Until the Ninth of January," in which Parvus expressed these ideas, "entered permanently into the history of the Russian Revolution" (*ibid.*, pp. 429f.). Cf. Lenin's respectful reference to this preface in April 1905 (Lenin, SWG, VII, p. 265).

[116] Parvus, "Preface to Trotsky's 'Until the Ninth of January,'" dated München, January 31, 1905 (N. Trotsky, *Do deviatavo yanvarya*, Geneva, 1905), pp. vi f.; cf. Trotsky 1941, pp. 430f.

[117] Trotsky 1923, p. 38. [118] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[119] *Ibid.* [120] Lenin, SWG, VIII, p. 80.

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make the state the master of the rural economy as it had been in the heyday of Russia's "old semi-Asiatic order."[121] Thus, if the Western revolution did not take place—and only a stupid general would base his plans on a coincidence of all favorable conditions[122]—there would surely be a restoration of Russia's old order. Such a catastrophe, Plekhanov stated at the Stockholm Party Congress, could be avoided only if the land, instead of being nationalized, were entrusted to self-governing "municipal" bodies.[123]

Lenin tried to minimize the threat of the "Asiatic restoration."[124] But reluctantly he admitted its existence: "Does the word 'nationalisation' facilitate the restoration of the semi-Asiatic conditions, or is this done by certain economic changes?" And he added: "It is precisely nationalisation that far more radically eliminates the economic foundations of Asiatic despotism [the *Aziatchina*]."[125]

Pressed by Plekhanov, Lenin admitted the danger inherent in his new strategy, but he was willing to take the risk to gain his end—a revolutionary dictatorship controlled by his party. He contended that a restoration could be held off temporarily by the *relative* guarantee of a radical democracy that tolerated no bureaucracy and no standing army.[126] There existed, however, only one *absolute* guarantee against the restoration: the Western revolution that would follow and aid the aimed-at Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution. "A socialist revolution in the West . . . is the only absolute guarantee against restoration in Russia."[127]

Thus, alongside the Marxian model (Model I) of the Russian revolution, which fundamentally was upheld by Plekhanov and the Mensheviks, there emerged in 1905-1906 a new model (Model II) of the Russian revolution. Its two main variants, one presented by Lenin and one by Trotsky, differed in important details, but both sought the creation of a dictatorial regime, which for its ultimate success depended on a victorious Western socialist revolution. If this "absolute guarantee" failed to materialize, then the restoration was inevitable.

In the October revolution of 1917 the Bolsheviks established a dictatorial regime. They immediately nationalized the land; and soon they also gained control of industry. They quickly nullified Lenin's *relative* guarantees by introducing a bureaucracy, a standing army, and

[121] Protocols, p. 116. [122] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[123] *Ibid.* See Wolfe 1948, pp. 365f.; Wittfogel 1957, pp. 392ff.
[124] For an analysis of Lenin's erratic argument, see Wittfogel 1957, pp. 391-94.
[125] Lenin, SW, III, p. 240.
[126] *Ibid.*, p. 260.
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

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a police.[128] And they failed to stimulate Lenin's only *absolute* guarantee: the socialist revolution in the West. According to Lenin's premises of 1906-1907, such a situation could result only in a restoration. And according to the Marxist analysis of Russian history which Lenin had upheld for over twenty years, this restoration could be only an "Asiatic" restoration.

VII

From 1906 to 1914 Lenin was embarrassed by certain implications of the Asiatic concept; hence he employed it hesitatingly. With the rapidly increasing chances for a revolution in Russia and Europe as World War I advanced, he abandoned this concept, which tended to dampen the revolutionary ardor of his followers. In *State and Revolution* (1916-1917) he discussed "the revolution" in terms of Marx's Gotha comments as if Russia had had no (semi-) Asiatic past and was not threatened with an "Asiatic" future. In fact, this book, which had the avowed purpose of presenting "all the most essential passages in the works of Marx and Engels on the subject of the state,"[129] contains no references to the type of state that Lenin for over twenty years had denounced and combated in Russia: Oriental despotism. Consequently *State and Revolution* does not once cite Marx's main work, *Das Kapital*, or *The Theories on Surplus Value*, both of which analyze aspects of Asiatic society, Asiatic production, and the Asiatic state. After the Bolshevik victory of October 1917, Lenin did not openly reject Marx's ideas on "Asia," but in his 1919 lecture on "The State" he listed not four, but three, exploitative class societies, "slavery, feudalism, and capitalism."[130]

Manifestly, for Lenin the implementation of a new policy (new compared with the previously professed principles of a popularly controlled democracy) necessitated this break with his earlier Marxist position. But in Russia, where the writings of Marx and Engels and the prewar Lenin were widely known, such an about-face was more easily initiated than completed. Objections by veteran Marxists had to be silenced. This was done effectively by a conference on the Asiatic mode

[128] Lenin's 1906 rejection of the bureaucracy probably also included the police. In 1916-1917, without referring to his earlier argument on the restoration but in conformity with Marx's 1871 comment on the Paris Commune, Lenin expressly listed the police among the institutions that should not be present in the aimed-for revolutionary state. While Lenin's proposals for establishing popular control over the state were as unrealistic as were those of Marx and Engels, they did underline the critical importance of popular control. In 1876-1878 Engels emphasized this point in his *Anti-Dühring*, which Marx read before its publication: the ineffectively controlled government, instead of being the "servant" of society, becomes its "master" (Engels 1935, p. 183).

[129] Lenin, SWG, xxi, p. 468; SW, vii, p. 8.

[130] Lenin, SW, xi, p. 646.

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of production held in Leningrad in 1931. At this conference the main spokesman of the Stalin-controlled Politburo bluntly declared: "What is really important is to unmask it politically, and not to establish the 'pure truth' as to whether the 'Asiatic mode of production' existed or not."[131]

In 1938 Stalin settled the disconcerting problem in a somewhat unusual manner. In Chapter IV of *The History of the CPSU* he cited Marx's "famous" preface to his *Critique of Political Economy*. But instead of reproducing the core passage in full, he stopped just before the sentence in which Marx lists the Asiatic mode of production as the first of his four major antagonistic societal conformations.[132] The new *Outline of Marxist Philosophy* (1958) follows the post-October Lenin and the 1938 Stalin by speaking of only three antagonistic class societies: slavery, feudalism, and capitalism.[133]

The Soviet ideologists have not stated openly that their appraisal of Russia's developmental position differs from the one given by Marx, Engels, Plekhanov, and the prewar Lenin. Rather they create the impression that here as elsewhere they are adhering in an orthodox fashion to the Marxist position. Basing our argument on the doctrinal standards to which they pay lip service, we may say that the masters of the USSR are forging their socio-historical pedigree. According to the original Marxian views, the Soviet Union did not advance from a feudal to a capitalistic order; and according to the 1906 elaboration of these views, the Russia of 1917 did not move progressively toward socialism, but retrogressively, from a weakened semi-Asiatic society and an ephemeral capitalism to a reinvigorated system of Oriental despotism.

Furthermore it is improper to assert with reference to Marxism—as the professedly immanent critics, Deutscher[134] and Marcuse,[135] have

[131] *Diskussia ob Aziatskom Sposobe Proizvodstva* (Discussion of the Asiatic Mode of Production), Moscow and Leningrad, 1931, p. 89.

[132] J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 745.

[133] J. M. Bochenski, *Die Dogmatischen Grundlagen der Sowjetischen Philosophie*, Dordrecht, 1959, pp. 37, 44f.

[134] According to Trotsky, the Soviet bureaucracy, being neither homogeneous nor secure, was not yet a ruling class (Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed*, New York, 1937, pp. 139f.). After having temporarily played a progressive role (*ibid.*, p. 275), it became increasingly reactionary (*The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Hearings on the Charges Made Against Him in the Moscow Trials*, by the Preliminary Commission of Inquiry, New York, 1937, p. 440). Deutscher follows Trotsky part of the way in maintaining that the Soviet bureaucracy, being neither unified nor secure, was only a "privileged and ruling minority" (Isaac Deutscher, *Heretics and Renegades*, London, 1955, p. 203), but he insists that its special privileges "coincided with a broader national interest" (*ibid.*, p. 204). "The primitive magic of Stalinism," he writes, despite its nauseating features, had a definitely progressive function (*ibid.*, pp. 213f.); and "the economic progress made during the Stalin era" should make possible "a gradual

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done—that in the USSR technical improvements compel democratization. Marx and Engels established their correlation of technical and socio-political change essentially for the multicentered societies of the West. Although they cannot have been unaware of the many technical innovations in Asiatic society, they maintained that, under Oriental despotism, the people were economically and politically atomized, and therefore incapable of overthrowing this type of power structure from within.

VIII

The fact that I have reviewed here in some detail the Marxist analysis of Asiatic society and Russia does not mean that I consider it sufficient for the purposes of today's research. True, the developmental concept of the classical economists, which Marx and Engels adopted, ranked among the greatest ideas of the nineteenth century; but it was crude and deficient, and it remained so in the Marxist version, which elaborated several of its economic features but shied away from its class aspect. Marx's two "circumstances"—especially the second, the dispersed villages—do not adequately define the core institutions of Oriental (or, as I call it, "hydraulic") society; and the notions of Marx and Engels regarding the "semi-Asiatic" variant of this conformation sense rather than describe the underlying problem. Their discussions of the transition of both "Asiatic" and "semi-Asiatic" society to a multicentered (Western) society are suggestive but unsatisfactory. And their deterministic position obscures the existence of a genuine choice in such open historical situations as that presented by Russia's democratic revolution in 1917. Even the idea of an Asiatic restoration, which Plekhanov and Lenin quite legitimately derived from their Marxist premises, is valuable only to the degree to which we realize that the contemplated restoration was bound to result in a modern, industry-based, totalitarian order which was more than a replica of Oriental despotism. As we know now, this new order shares several essential features with the old institutional conformation, especially the despotic state and the ruling bureaucracy. But the new regime with its total managerial economy

democratic evolution" (Isaac Deutscher, *Russia: What Next?*, New York, 1953, p. 221).

[135] Marcuse uses his own type of dialectical argument; yet his conclusions closely approach those of the Neo-Trotskyites. He calls the Soviet bureaucracy "a separate class," but avoids calling it a ruling class—it is neither homogeneous nor secure (Marcuse 1958, p. 111) and it "represents the social interest in a hypostatized form" (*ibid.*, p. 118). Soviet theory has a "magic" quality; it thus assumes "a new rationality" (*ibid.*, p. 90); eventually "technical progress will overtake the repressive restrictions imposed at earlier stages" (*ibid.*, p. 188).

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involves patterns of social, personal, and ideological control that are qualitatively different from, and operationally far more oppressive than, the old semi-managerial despotism.[136]

But whatever their deficiencies, we must become familiar with the Marxist concepts of Asiatic society and Russia's Oriental despotism. Contrary to a widely held view, Marx's and Engels' comments on these matters are much fuller and much more numerous than their comments on the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. And contrary to the cynical opinion that these comments are meaningless—anyone can prove anything with quotations from Marx and Engels—there is a definite pattern in the Marxist ideas on Russia and Asia, a clearer and more consistent pattern in fact than the one that underlies Marxist ideas on the transition to socialism.

Adequate knowledge of the "Asiatic" aspects of the Marxist doctrine enables us to make a truly critical appraisal of the socio-historical claims of the Communist ideologists. It also enables us to recognize significant contradictions in the views of Lenin and Trotsky. Not a few Aesopian utterances of the post-October Lenin indicate his awareness of an approaching "Asiatic restoration": after Kronstadt he described the new Soviet economy in terms almost identical with those he had used in 1914 to characterize Russia's Asiatic despotism.[137] These utterances give a Dostoevskian meaning to Lenin's efforts to uphold at all costs the totalitarian order which had come into being under his guidance.

Trotsky's case is even more pathetic. In 1930 and as late as 1940 Trotsky repeated his earlier views on Russia's Asiatic background,[138] but he refrained from applying the Asiatic argument to Stalin's regime because, obviously, he was afraid that it might hit not only his immedi-

[136] See Wittfogel 1957, p. 440. Cf. also *idem*, "A Stronger Oriental Despotism" (the editors' title; I would have preferred "Beyond Oriental Despotism"), *China Quarterly* 1, No. 1 (January-March 1960), pp. 29ff.

[137] Lenin's argument runs as follows: "Socialism is better than capitalism, but capitalism is better than medievalism, small production, and a *bureaucracy connected with the dispersed character of the small producers*" (Lenin, S, xxxii, p. 329; italics added). The economic root of this bureaucracy was "the fragmented and dispersed character of small production, its poverty, lack of culture, absence of roads, illiteracy, absence of *exchange* between agriculture and industry, the absence of connection and interaction between them" (Lenin, SW, ix, pp. 187f.; italics in original).

[138] In his last book, Trotsky still spoke of the Russian peasantry as "dispersed over the surface of an immense country"; and after a description of the futile character of the peasant revolutions in old China, which represented nothing but "hopeless rotations" in an unchanging society, he concluded: "Such was the basis of ancient Asiatic, including ancient Russian, history" (Trotsky 1941, p. 425). But when he referred to Lenin's thesis that without the aid of the proletarian revolution in the West restoration was unavoidable in Russia, he added: "He was not mistaken: the Stalinist bureaucracy is nothing else than the first stage of *bourgeois* restoration" (*ibid.*, p. 429; italics added).

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ate target, but the whole power system which he had helped to create and which, until his death, he hoped to rejoin.

There were moments of ambivalence in the careers of Lenin and Trotsky when, for the sake of power, they avoided or discarded the "Asiatic" concept they had upheld for so long. The present masters of the USSR, unhampered by any such memories, see in it nothing but a nightmarish threat to the central myth of their "progressive" state and destiny.

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INTRA-PARTY POLITICS AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN COMMUNIST CHINA

By HAROLD C. HINTON

FEW if any Communist movements have been more energetic and successful than the Communist Party of China (CPC) in disproving Karl Marx's belief in the primacy of economics over politics. An adequate analysis of economic policy and development in Communist China therefore requires a consideration of their political dimension, which in turn is closely bound up with the problem of leadership and power within the largest political party and the most populous country on earth.

I. Factions and Policy Differences in the CPC

The figure of Mao Tse-tung has dominated the Chinese Communist movement for the past twenty-five years. He has been its leading political and military strategist, its only genuine theorist, and its elder statesman. He has also shown himself to be an extremely skillful defender of his own position. With somewhat less success he has tried since 1949 to play the additional role of father of his people.

Below him stand two other figures of major importance, each of whom has his own coterie of supporters and one or the other of whom, assuming his survival, seems likely to emerge as more equal than the others in the "collective leadership" which will presumably follow Mao's death or incapacitation.[1] The relations, and differences of outlook, if any, between these men cannot be determined with certainty and are the subject of considerable disagreement among specialists. The following interpretation is based on what appears to the writer to be the general tenor of the rather meager available evidence.

One of these two men is Liu Shao-ch'i, who ranks second to Mao in the CPC's Politburo, and whose following is often called the "domestic" faction.[2] In its outlook on foreign affairs this group, although of course not anti-Soviet in any significant way, seems willing when neces-

[1] For a fuller discussion of these two groups, see the writer's analysis in George McT. Kahin, ed., *Major Governments of Asia*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958, pp. 71-73. See also Chang Kuo-tao, "Mao—A New Portrait by an Old Colleague," *New York Times Magazine*, August 2, 1953.

[2] It is termed "the sloganeers" by Roderick MacFarquhar, in "Communist China's Intra-Party Dispute," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXI, No. 4 (December 1958), p. 324.

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sary to give priority to Chinese interests over those of the Soviet bloc as a whole. In domestic affairs it stresses the ideological mobilization of the populace, the primacy of manpower over technology, the advantages of small local industries as against large ones, and in short the view that "men, and not things, are decisive."[3] Liu's career has been pre-eminently that of the specialist in Party organization, and his strength accordingly lies mainly within the Party apparatus.

Chou En-lai, the third-ranking member of the Politburo, is the leader of the other faction, which is often known as the "international" faction.[4] In foreign affairs it appears to favor smoother co-operation with the Soviet Union and a less obvious assertion of distinctively Chinese interests. In domestic affairs it prefers a more orthodox Stalinist program of development emphasizing technology, large industries, and organizational controls.[5] Chou finds his support mainly within the governmental apparatus, over which he presides as premier, and the armed forces.

Perhaps partly because of Mao's restraining influence, these two factions do not seem to be at daggers drawn. Although not exactly harmonious, they are in a sense complementary, and the Party has generally attempted to preserve a rough balance between them, with the scales usually tipped noticeably but not excessively in favor of the domestic faction.

The superior position of the domestic faction seems to derive not only from Liu's greater strength within the Party but from Mao's attitude. The two men are fellow-Hunanese, and although Mao probably considers Liu rather too doctrinaire, he has fostered Liu's career for some twenty years. Mao's own views appear to approximate those of the domestic faction more closely than they do those of the international faction, although they are somewhat more liberal than either. Mao probably regards Chou as rather too clever and flexible, and he undoubtedly remembers that Chou opposed him on a number of important issues during the 1930's. It is therefore not surprising that Mao seems to intend that, in the "collective leadership" following his own exit, it will be Liu who does the collecting.[6]

[3] T'an Chen-lin in the *People's Daily* (Peking), August 11, 1958. T'an is the main spokesman for the domestic faction on agricultural affairs.

[4] MacFarquhar, *loc.cit.*, calls them "the pragmatists."

[5] An excellent example of Chou's thinking is his speech of January 14, 1956, on the intellectuals (Chinese Home Service dispatch, Peking, January 29, 1956).

[6] In the 7th Central Committee, elected in 1945, Liu ranked third (after Mao and Chu Teh), but in all probability he already outweighed Chu in actual influence within the Party. Liu's rise to this position seems to have been due largely to Mao's favor.

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II. The Origins of the Great Leap Forward

Since coming to power in 1949, the CPC has been adhering to a broad economic timetable calling for three years (1950-1952) of recovery and "democratic reforms," followed by three Five-Year Plans in the course of which the country is to be socialized, industrialized to a degree, and rendered roughly self-sufficient. By about the end of the twentieth century, China is to be an industrial power of the first rank.[7]

There is no space here for a consideration of the feasibility of these goals or for even a summary of steps which the CPC took before 1957 in pursuit of them. During the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) China's gross national product grew at an annual rate of 7 or 8 per cent and approximated 110 billion yuan in 1957.[8] Population grew from 1.5 to 2.5 per cent per year, the actual rate probably being closer to the lower than to the upper of these limits, and approximated 650 million by the end of 1957.[9]

During the second and third quarters of 1957 the CPC passed through what it regarded as a major crisis, having both domestic and international aspects. The "Hundred Flowers" and "rectification" campaigns sponsored by Mao Tse-tung backfired in the spring by bringing to light the political unreliability of large sections not only of the adult intelligentsia, but, what was even more serious, of the students, in addition to other elements of the population as well. Mao was undoubtedly saddened, and perhaps weakened politically, by this fiasco. He gave some indications of wanting to retire, and the succession question thereby became enhanced in importance and intertwined more closely than ever with problems of basic policy.

Chou En-lai ranked only twenty-third on the Central Committee in 1945. Soon after 1949, Liu and Chou came to rank second and third respectively in the Politburo and, informally at least, in the Central Committee as well. It was Liu who made the major speeches at the first (September 1956) and second (May 1958) sessions of the CPC's 8th National Congress. At the first session the post of honorary chairman of the Central Committee was created. If and when Mao retires to it, Liu will automatically become chairman—unless there is some reshuffling of the present order of precedence within the Politburo, which seems unlikely.

[7] This was the timetable laid down in the First Five-Year Plan, published in July 1955.

[8] See Choh-ming Li, *Economic Development of Communist China: An Appraisal of the First Five Years of Industrialization*, Berkeley, Calif., 1959; A. Doak Barnett, *Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China*, Washington, D.C., 1959; United Nations, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1957*, Bangkok, 1958, ch. 4; Richard Moorsteen, "Economic Prospects for Communist China," *World Politics*, XI, No. 2 (January 1959), pp. 192-220. One yuan equals approximately US $0.42 at the official Communist Chinese exchange rate.

[9] Cf. Lawrence Krader and John S. Aird, "Sources of Demographic Data on Mainland China," *American Sociological Review*, XXIV, No. 5 (October 1959), pp. 623-30; Lawrence Krader, *The Economic Status of Communist China, 1965-1970*, Santa Barbara, Calif., General Electric Company, Technical Military Planning Operation, 1958, p. 2.

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The CPC leadership received a forcible reminder in the second half of June 1957, in the form of the narrow defeat of the "anti-Party group" in the Soviet Union by Khrushchev, of the difficulty of securing a smooth and predictable transfer of power under a totalitarian regime. Malenkov, one of the "anti-Party group," had evidently been Stalin's preferred successor,[10] and the CPC had chosen to treat him, in public at least, as though he were the real power in the Soviet Union until about the time of his removal from the premiership in February 1955. It has been said[11] that the CPC actually supported the "anti-Party group" against Khrushchev, and in any case it certainly showed little enthusiasm for the group's defeat.

Among the other domestic difficulties then confronting the CPC may be mentioned the failure of its birth control campaign to make any significant dent in the rural birth rate, and the inability of the collective farms to fulfill the functions in agriculture and water conservancy assigned to them by the CPC.

Abroad, the Soviet Union was proving itself a stingy partner; only $10 million in Soviet credits was received in 1957, and none was expected in 1958. Worse still, the Soviet Union proceeded to show that it was widening its already impressive economic and technological lead over Communist China. The launching of the first Sputnik on October 4, 1957, came as a traumatic shock to the CPC and produced two rather divergent effects on it. On the one hand, it felt compelled to proclaim more loudly than ever the principle of Soviet primacy in the Soviet bloc and, on the other hand, it felt tempted to adopt desperate measures in an effort not to fall hopelessly behind in its march toward superpower status.

The United States for its part had alarmed the CPC by announcing in the spring of 1957 that it was stationing missiles with nuclear capability in Taiwan and South Korea. On the other hand, the United States also seemed to be showing signs of being in fact a "paper tiger." Indications of a forthcoming recession were discernible in the American machine tools industry as early as the summer of 1957 and became obvious by the following autumn. Contradictions in the ranks of the enemy seemed to be proved by the visit of forty-one American students to the mainland of China in August-October 1957, in defiance of official American policy, and by the abolition of the "China differential" by Great Britain and Japan a few months earlier.

[10] It was Malenkov who reported to the CPSU's 19th Congress (October 1952), its last before Stalin's death, on the work of the Central Committee.

[11] Isaac Deutscher, "Khrushchev, Mao, and Stalin's Ghost," *The Reporter*, February 19, 1959.

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In view of these trends at home and abroad, a drastic program of self-strengthening naturally tended to commend itself to a regime which furthermore seemed to regard a Third World War as rather likely and as a possible opportunity for improving its relative standing among nations.[12]

III. Preparations for the Great Leap

It seems very likely that these issues, or a similar list of issues, were among those discussed at the 3rd Plenary Session of the CPC's Central Committee (September 20-October 9, 1957), which bracketed the launching of the first Sputnik.[13] At this time and during the next few months there appeared a number of portents of stern days to come. The highly doctrinaire Twelve-Year Plan for agriculture, which had been formulated early in 1956 and then largely abandoned, was revived in revised form. The budgetary retrenchment which had marked the first half of 1957 came to a halt, and the level of state investment resumed its upward climb. The surviving concessions from the de-Stalinization period (April 1956-May 1957), such as free markets for the peasants in certain commodities, were largely abolished. There began to be talk of catching up with Great Britain in gross industrial output by 1972. The army, whose reliability is always an overriding concern of the CPC and whose high command probably attempts to exert some influence on the formulation of domestic and foreign policy, was reminded of its proper place by the downfall of Marshal Zhukov late in October. A number of Chinese generals found it expedient to publish more than routine protestations of their loyalty to the principle of Party leadership on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The "rectification" campaign which had been under way for several months in the armed forces was intensified.[14]

During the winter of 1957-1958, as in that of 1955-1956, many millions of peasants were mobilized on massive public works, such as irrigation projects and the dressing of fields with mud dredged from the bottom of ponds.[15] A half million small industrial enterprises are said to have been constructed between January and May of 1958.[16]

[12] For evidence to this effect, see Tito's Labin speech (*New York Times*, June 16, 1958) and *Newsweek*, August 3, 1959, p. 33.

[13] From this point on, chronology may generally be verified by reference to American Consulate General, Hong Kong, *Current Background*, Nos. 489, 506, 519, 546, 572, and 611.

[14] E.g., the directive by the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army General Staff of November 21, 1957, ordering officers' dependents to return to their native villages to "participate in socialist construction." In general, enlisted men's dependents had never been allowed to live with them.

[15] See Li Hsien-nien's budget speech for 1958 (New China News Agency [NCNA], Peking, February 12, 1958).

[16] *Red Flag* (Peking), July 1, 1958.

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The principle of the Great Leap Forward apparently did not win definitive acceptance as early as the winter of 1957-1958, however. It has been reported that Mao for a time resisted the arguments of Liu Shao-ch'i. These probably amounted to the contention that in view of the internal and external crisis confronting China and the need to enhance his, Liu's, power and prestige to the maximum, so as to assure insofar as possible an orderly devolution of authority at an appropriate time, he must be allowed to sponsor and launch a program embodying to the full his ideas as to how to meet the current crisis. The public effort and sacrifices entailed by this program would be made possible by ideological mobilization and justified by the brilliant results that were anticipated. At the National People's Congress in February 1958, although there was talk of a Great Leap Forward, only relatively modest increases in levels of output were projected for 1958 (see TABLE 1). At the time of this congress Chou En-lai gave up his concurrent post of foreign minister, perhaps in order to devote as much of his time as possible to defending his authority as premier against threatened encroachments.

From mid-February to mid-April 1958, Mao spent much of his time in visiting industrial installations and agricultural areas in various parts of China. He evidently concluded that the public works program of the previous winter had had good results, and that the winter wheat crop would be a large one. These conclusions probably helped to convince him that Liu should be given his head.

IV. THE GREAT LEAP: PHASE ONE

The second session of the 8th National Congress of the CPC met on May 5-23, 1958, in an atmosphere of much greater urgency and secrecy than had marked the first session in September 1956. The major speech at the second session, which was delivered by Liu Shao-ch'i, may be taken as proclaiming the beginning of the Great Leap Forward. Chou En-lai, on the other hand, does not seem to have played any important part in the proceedings. The Great Leap was still in an experimental stage, and Liu was accordingly rather vague as to the form it would take. He proclaimed sizable but (in comparison with what was to come later) not staggering increases in the economic goals for 1958 over those announced in February. He emphasized the enormous and only partly tapped economic potential of peasant labor power and small local industries using local raw materials. He predicted that "In quite a short space of time, industrial plants will dot every part of the country like

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TABLE 1

CHINESE COMMUNIST ECONOMIC GOALS AND CLAIMS
(in millions of metric tons)

	1957 claims	*1962 goals* (Sept. 1956)	*1958 goals* (Feb. 1958)	*1958 goals* (May 1958)
Steel	5.35	10.5-12.0	6.248	7.1
Coal	130.0	190-210	150.7	180.0
Grain	185.0	250.0	196.0	250.0
Cotton	1.64	2.4	1.75	

	1958 goals (Aug. 1958)	*1958 claims* (Dec. 1958)	*1958 claims* (April 1959)	*1958 claims* (Aug. 1959)
Steel	10.7	11.0	11.08	8.0
Coal	300.0	270.0	270.0	270.0
Grain	300-350	375.0	375.0	250.0
Cotton	3.5	3.35	3.5	2.1

	1959 goals (Dec. 1958)	*1959 goals* (Aug. 1959)	*1959 claims* (Jan. 1960)	*1960 goals* (March 1960)
Steel	18.0	12.0	13.35	18.4
Coal	380.0	335.0	347.8	425.0
Grain	525.0	275.0	270.05	300.0
Cotton	5.0	2.3	2.41	2.65

NOTE. These four categories are used because the CPC regards them as the most important indicators of over-all production levels. "Grain" refers to food grain only, not industrial crops. It includes sweet potatoes (the actual tonnages being divided by four before inclusion in Chinese Communist grain statistics) and excludes soybeans. "Cotton" refers to raw cotton.

stars in the sky. . . ." He announced that "all enterprises formerly run and managed by the various ministries under the State Council [i.e., Chou En-lai's cabinet] will, as a rule, be handed over to the local authorities and placed under their management." This would mean in effect placing them, as Khrushchev has done in the Soviet Union, under the control of local committees of the Communist Party, which of course receive their directives through party rather than governmental channels. He referred to a marked but unspecified increase in the level of state investment.[17] Thus, although Liu of course portrayed himself as simply an expounder of Mao's views, it is Liu rather than Mao who must be regarded as the main sponsor of the Great Leap Forward.[18]

[17] In fact, state investment in 1958 approximated 21.4 billion yuan (NCNA, Peking, September 4, 1959), more than half again as much as the amount invested in 1956, the previous peak year.

[18] *Ibid.*, May 26, 1958. During the three weeks that elapsed between the delivery of this speech and its publication, the *People's Daily* published a number of articles by

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Another indication of increased Party, as distinct from governmental, control over the economy emerged from the congress. Two of the cabinet's leading economic planners, Li Fu-ch'un and Li Hsien-nien, were inducted into the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the Party's main administrative body.[19] A similar indication emerged a little later in the year as the Great Leap gathered momentum, in the form of a strong tendency for the Party to take control of statistical work away from the government and manipulate it for political purposes.[20]

The details of the Great Leap have received such extensive coverage in the Western press that only a brief interpretation is necessary here. Its basic purpose and method were to improve Communist China's domestic and international position, in defiance of its weaknesses in technology, technicians, and capital, by maximizing the efficiency and output of the one resource in which no other country can match China —namely, manpower. On the ideological front, superstitions were to be broken down, enthusiasm for the Great Leap and the CPC's hold on the people were to be brought to a new peak by intensive propaganda, and the CPC went so far as to imply that it was "building communism" like the Soviet Union, rather than merely "building socialism" like the other countries of the Soviet bloc. China was to be provided with a network of effective, yet to a degree decentralized and self-sufficient, industrial and agricultural units, the communes, with the aim among others of rendering it better able to survive a nuclear attack should one occur.

In April of 1958 three major manifestations of the Great Leap made their appearance: the virtual dropping of the birth control campaign,[21] a massive attack on traditional popular religion, and a number of experimental "people's communes," the most important of which was the Wei-hsing (satellite, or Sputnik) Commune in Honan. Its name is significant; this was to be the answer, perhaps the only possible answer, to the challenge symbolized by the Soviet Sputniks. From these beginnings the campaign progressed in the third quarter of the year to virtually universal communalization, "native" or "backyard" furnaces

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provincial and local Party secretaries containing similar ideas and paving the way for its publication (see *Current Background*, No. 509).

[19] Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Leadership in China: Succession to Mao Tse-tung," *World Today*, XV, No. 8 (August 1959), pp. 318-19.

[20] "Being an instrument of political struggle and the struggle of production, statistical work must be led by local party committees before its role can be brought into full play and before estrangement from politics and reality can be rectified" (NCNA, Paoting, July 31, 1958).

[21] Cf. Sripati Chandrasekhar, "The 'Human Inflation' of Red China," *New York Times Magazine*, December 6, 1959.

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for producing low-grade pig iron and steel, and greatly increased output goals for 1958 (see TABLE 1).[22]

V. The Great Leap: Phase Two

Although the Great Leap achieved a good deal in 1958, it encountered obstacles and setbacks which were largely predictable, at least by an objective observer. The peasants resented the hard work, the communal mess halls and nurseries, and the occasional segregation of the sexes in communal barracks. The "backyard steel" campaign disrupted agriculture and transport. Initial overconsumption of food in the communes, tolerated or even encouraged by local cadres to sweeten the pill of communalization and to sustain the additional output of energy required from the peasants, as well as to foster the illusion that "communism" was just around the corner, contributed together with the disruption of transport to urban food shortages and a drop in exports to the non-Communist world at the end of 1958. Both the leadership and the rank and file of the armed forces seem to have resented their own contributions of labor to the Great Leap and the program's impact on the rural areas from which most of them came. The Soviet leadership displayed unmistakable signs of annoyance at the excesses of the Great Leap, and in particular at the implication that sooner or later all countries, Russia included, would adopt "people's communes."

Having taken two steps forward, the CPC accordingly began in November and December of 1958 to take one step back. The collectivist excesses of the communes were modified in the direction of permitting the peasants somewhat greater freedom, leisure, and incentives. The communes were overhauled to promote greater efficiency. The formation of communes in large cities was postponed. The implicit ideological claims for the communes were dropped. Most of the "native" furnaces were closed, and their output was admitted to be largely unusable except for local purposes. Preliminary output claims for 1958 were announced, and an even greater Leap Forward, with staggering goals, was proclaimed for 1959.[23]

[22] An excellent discussion of the communes may be found in Albert Ravenholt, "The Chinese Communes: Big Risks for Big Gains," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXVII, No. 4 (July 1959), pp. 573-86. See also G. F. Hudson and others, *The Chinese Communes: A Documentary Analysis of the "Great Leap Forward,"* London, n.d. [1959]. The key official documents on this phase of the Great Leap are the Politburo decision on increased iron and steel production (NCNA, Peking, August 31, 1958) and the Central Committee's decision of August 29 on the communes (*ibid.*, September 10, 1958).

[23] The key documents on Phase Two of the Great Leap are the communiqué of the 6th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, held at Wuchang on November 28-December 10, 1958 (*ibid.*, December 17, 1958), and the Central Committee's resolution on the communes (*ibid.*, December 18, 1958).

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At the same time the CPC announced, under unusual and ambiguous circumstances, that Mao Tse-tung would not be a candidate to succeed himself as Chairman of the People's Republic of China (i.e., as chief of state) at the end of his current term.[24] Mao was said to be giving up the chairmanship—which is not a purely figurehead post, whatever may be the case in other Communist countries—in order to have more time for "dealing with questions of the direction, policy, and line of the Party and state," and "Marxist-Leninist theoretical work," with the stipulation that he might resume the chairmanship in the future "in compliance with the opinion of the people and the decision of the Party," if some "special situation" should arise. The announcement gave no indication as to whom the CPC would nominate to succeed him. Either the choice had not been made, or it was not considered expedient to announce it at that time.

The CPC's view that Mao, although giving up a post of some genuine importance, was not suffering a political defeat or a diminution of real power seems to be essentially correct, although it is not unassailable. To maintain the opposite view, that he was being made the scapegoat for the shortcomings of a program for which he had not been primarily responsible, seems unreasonable, and the explanation must be sought along other lines.

It is likely that Liu Shao-ch'i had been pressing his claim to the succession and, as a first step, to Mao's governmental position against the objections of others, probably including Chou En-lai and large segments of the governmental and military leaderships, who also may have opposed the excesses of the first phase of the Great Leap and may have had a great deal to do with the launching of the second phase. These opponents probably urged that, even if Liu were to succeed eventually to the leadership of the Party, he need not and should not be conceded the additional increment of prestige and authority which would come from his elevation to the chairmanship of the state as well. It would be interesting to know the identity of the candidate or candidates, if any, put forward by the opposition.

As for Mao's attitude, one may suppose that his confidence in Liu's formula for economic development and national self-strengthening had been somewhat shaken, but not sufficiently to induce him to take sides against Liu or block his path to the succession. For Mao to attempt to transmit or bequeath the whole of his prestige and power to Liu or anyone else, to be sure, would be like trying to hand over an open roll

[24] *Ibid.*, December 17, 1958. Section Two of the 1954 constitution fails to specify whether the Chairman is eligible to succeed himself.

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of flypaper. Nevertheless, the process might be less difficult if done by installments; the governmental position could be turned over first, the transfer of Party power being reserved for some propitious time, or perhaps postponed until Mao's death or incapacitation.

Even the first step in the process, however, was rendered difficult by the negative aspects of the Great Leap and the widespread opposition to it. In the face of these obstacles, Liu's elevation required a demonstration, or at least a convincing public affirmation, that the Great Leap had achieved the brilliant results which he as its sponsor had predicted. Accordingly, the preliminary claims for 1958 announced in December were made to correspond closely with the goals proclaimed in August, when the Great Leap was at its height (see TABLE 1). The claims also amounted to an assertion that the levels of output proposed in 1956 for 1962, the last year of the Second Five-Year Plan, had already been attained. Whether or not Chou En-lai realized the true situation, it is very likely that Liu Shao-ch'i and his Party statisticians were aware of, and in fact consciously introduced, a large element of exaggeration in the claims for 1958.

Economic policy during the second phase of the Great Leap was to represent a compromise between what appear to be the views of Liu and Chou, this compromise being labeled as "walking on two legs"[25] and "taking the whole country as a coordinated chess game."[26] The concessions to the peasants in the communes would be retained, but so would the essential features of the commune system. Small industries in the rural areas and other diversions of peasant labor power were to be carried on as far as possible during the slack season, so as not to disrupt agriculture, but the principle of mass campaigns was by no means abandoned.[27] Most of the "native" furnaces were to remain closed, and the most economic of the remainder were to be modernized.[28] Thus the orthodox Stalinist emphasis on heavy industry, which had become blurred in 1958 although large enterprises were admitted to have con-

[25] The phrase is taken from the communiqué of the 6th Plenary Session; cf. "Walking on Two Legs," *Ta Kung Pao* (Peking), May 18, 1959.

[26] "Take the Whole Country as a Coordinated Chess Game," *People's Daily*, February 24, 1959.

[27] Cf. the joint directive by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on manure accumulation (NCNA, Peking, January 28, 1959) and the stress on "mass emulation movements" at the conference of directors of Rural Work Departments of local CPC committees (*ibid.*, February 2, 1959).

[28] Cf. "It is true that the policy of 'small, local, mass' introduced last winter has been replaced by the policy of 'small, modern, mass.' However, it cannot be said that 'small, local, mass' was wrong; on the contrary, this policy has proved to be correct" ("Let Us Put an End to the Theory 'What You Lose Is More Than You Gain,'" *People's Daily*, September 1, 1959).

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tributed most of the alleged heavy industrial output, was restored only to a degree. Additional economic aid was to be sought from the Soviet Union.[29] Chou En-lai and the State Council may have regained a degree of control over economic planning and development, but there was still much emphasis on economic leadership by local CPC committees.[30] A final indication that the spirit of 1958 was far from dead was a directive by the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army for "all officers and men to take part in industrial and agricultural production for not more than two months every year."[31]

Contrary to the expectations of some observers, the time for statistical self-criticism and confession had not yet arrived, for Liu Shao-ch'i's political position remained to be consolidated. The formal decision to nominate him to succeed Mao was taken, although not publicly announced, by the 7th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee, which met on April 2-5, 1959.[32] Soon afterward the State Statistical Bureau published the official economic results for 1958, which tallied very closely with the preliminary claims announced in December 1958.[33] Four days later the National People's Congress convened. In addition to transacting other business, it elected Liu to succeed Mao as Chairman of the state and listened to a speech by Chou En-lai outlining the general nature of the economic compromise already described, but of course reiterating the exaggerated claims for 1958 and goals for 1959.[34]

VI. The Great Leap: Phase Three

The economic compromise and the atmosphere of relative moderation and relaxation in the communes lasted roughly until June 1959.[35] Then they began to give way to a third phase of the Great Leap which may be described as a partial reversion to the spirit of the first.

[29] On February 7, 1959, the Soviet Union committed itself to aid, on a repayable basis, in the construction of 78 major additional industrial enterprises in Communist China between 1959 and 1967.

[30] Cf. the report on an industrial conference in Shanghai in *Wen Hui Pao* (Shanghai), February 21, 1959; and MacFarquhar, "The Leadership in China" (*loc.cit.*, p. 322), which however appears to overestimate the extent of the concessions to Chou En-lai's viewpoint made at that time.

[31] NCNA, Peking, March 13, 1959.

[32] *Ibid.*, April 7, 1959.

[33] *Ibid.*, April 14, 1959.

[34] *Ibid.*, April 18, 1959. Chou's references to the communes and "native" furnaces were decidedly brief.

[35] Cf. Teng Tzu-hui, "Strive to Run the Community Mess Halls Well, Seriously Try to Follow the Principle of Voluntariness," *Hsin Hua pan-yüeh-k'an* (New China Fortnightly), June 25, 1959; Tillman Durdin, "Peiping Continues Easing Communes," *New York Times*, August 20, 1959. Teng Tzu-hui is the chief spokesman for those views on agriculture which are associated in this analysis with the international faction.

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The main cause of this shift seems to have been a wave of severe natural disasters—floods, drought, and locusts—which began to make their effects felt in several parts of China in June. During June and July most of the senior figures in the CPC were away from Peking and were probably touring the provinces in order to assess the crisis and decide on a remedy. The CPC press, characteristically assigning blame not only to nature but to man, began to denounce a tendency toward "rightist-inclined conservatism" and "right opportunism" on the part of "some cadres," language which in Chinese Communist parlance may refer to high- as well as low-ranking Party members.[36] Among the bourgeois errors attributed to these individuals was a tendency to "consider the mass campaigns horrible disasters."[37]

The view evidently prevailed within the CPC, although probably not without opposition from "right opportunists," that the only possible answer to the challenge of nature was an increased emphasis on mass campaigns. Accordingly, an emergency directive on combating natural disasters[38] was soon followed by an announcement that sixty million persons, including a large number of army units, were fighting drought.[39] An earlier decision to reduce the area under cultivation was reversed.[40] There was a general tightening of reins in the communes, which were inevitably in the forefront of the fight against nature.[41] There was a renewed emphasis on participation in communal mess halls and nurseries—which had been, comparatively speaking, in the background during the second phase of the Great Leap—the main purpose probably being to make as many women as possible available for service in the mass campaigns. In industry, too, the mass-campaign approach received increased emphasis.[42]

The disasters, which affected more than one-third of China's cultivated land, were sufficiently serious to compel a downward revision of

[36] E.g., "Overcome Rightist-Inclined Sentiment and Endeavor to Increase Production and Practice Economy," *People's Daily*, August 6, 1959. "Right opportunism" was held responsible for a small "saddle," or dip in production, that appeared in June and July ("Strive to Fulfill the Industrial Production Plan for This Year Ten to Fifteen Days Ahead of Schedule," *ibid.*, October 8, 1959).

[37] "Rightist-Inclined Opportunism Is an Attempt to Open the Road for Reviving Capitalism," *Red Flag*, November 1, 1959.

[38] NCNA, Peking, July 27, 1959.

[39] "Pursue the Anti-Drought Struggle to the End," *People's Daily*, August 14, 1959.

[40] "Plant More Land and Gather More Crops," *ibid.*, June 11, 1959.

[41] Cf. "Recently, inspired by the resolution of the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee, the masses of commune members demanded at general meetings that their production plans be revised upward" ("Strive to Overfulfill the Grain and Cotton Production Plans," *ibid.*, September 3, 1959).

[42] Cf. speeches by Li Fu-ch'un and Po I-po reported by NCNA, Peking, October 26-27, 1959.

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the production goals for 1959, especially in agriculture. If this retreat was not to look worse than it really was, the claims for 1958 also had to be deflated to more reasonable proportions. These reductions were accordingly announced by the 8th Plenary Session of the CPC Central Committee (August 2-16, 1959) (see TABLE 1).[43] In effect the CPC was now predicting virtual attainment of the original 1962 production levels in 1959, instead of claiming it for 1958. The readjustment of goals would also make it easier for the CPC to claim overfulfillment of targets, a desirable psychological device.

Developments since the 8th Plenary Session have been obscure and shrouded in considerable secrecy.[44] The struggle against "right opportunism" continued to be loudly publicized for about six months, so that the existence of continuing differences within the CPC over economic policy can be assumed. That the advantage lay with the views associated in this analysis with the domestic faction can scarcely be doubted.[45] In mid-September 1959 the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff were replaced;[46] this event probably had some connection with the armed forces' attitude toward and role in the Great

[43] The key documents of this session, and on the third phase of the Great Leap to date, are the communiqué of the session (*ibid.*, August 26, 1959) and the resolution on increasing production and practicing economy (*ibid.*). The revised claims for 1958 are undoubtedly far closer to the truth than were the original claims, but they are not necessarily accurate. There is no compelling reason to attribute the whole of the agricultural exaggeration, as the CPC officially does, to inexperience in crop estimation and other statistical work, and to a large difference between the biological crop and the barn crop resulting from diversion of manpower to non-agricultural work. These factors undoubtedly played a part, but they can hardly account for an admitted overestimate of 50 per cent. A large-scale inflation of agricultural figures as a matter of policy, or at least the conscious acceptance at the upper levels of the CPC of obviously unreal figures submitted from below, must have occurred. In either case, the Party leadership was guilty of trying to deceive the Chinese people and the world. The deflation in steel represents a writing-off of the output of the "native" furnaces as unusable in modern industry. The official explanation of these deflations was conveyed to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress by Chou En-lai on August 26 (*ibid.*, August 28, 1959). On August 24 Liu Shao-ch'i delivered a major unpublished speech on the domestic and international situations before the 17th Supreme State Conference (*ibid.*, August 24, 1959), a body over which he as Chairman of the Republic presides ex officio.

[44] In November 1959 the CPC prohibited the export of newspapers other than the *People's Daily*.

[45] The major statement on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist regime was by Liu Shao-ch'i (*People's Daily*, October 1, 1959); in it he defended the Great Leap and defined no existing "left deviation" from it, although he defined both "left" and "right deviations" from several other CPC policies. Chou En-lai's statement (NCNA, Peking, October 6, 1959) included an unusually large number (for him) of favorable references to mass campaigns, an indication perhaps of the pressures to which he has been subjected.

[46] NCNA, Peking, September 17, 1959.

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Leap Forward, but the nature of the connection and the views of the new incumbents on these questions are not clear.[47]

During the winter of 1959-1960, millions of peasants went into the fields once more to labor on massive construction projects.[48] The output figures for 1959 announced in January 1960 claimed slight overfulfillment of the revised targets in all major categories except grain, in which a small underfulfillment was admitted.[49] The goals for 1960, which were not announced until March, when the National People's Congress met, envisaged sizable increases over the 1959 claims in industry, but only modest increases of about 10 per cent in agriculture (see TABLE 1). At about the same time there were reports that the formation of communes in the urban areas, postponed in 1958, had begun in earnest.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Since the beginning of the Great Leap Forward the Chinese Communists have gone further than any other regime, Communist or non-Communist, in relying on mass labor, small plants, ideological manipulation, and police controls as major aids to economic development. This program exceeds and differs qualitatively from the large-scale use of *corvée* labor by traditional Asian regimes, the Chinese empire in particular.

From a purely economic standpoint, there is much to be said for the applicability of these methods to agriculture and many types of capital projects, especially in a country rich in underemployed manpower but poor in capital and technology.[50] Their application to industry, as the Chinese Communists have done to a degree, is much less defensible. The basic inappropriateness of the mass-campaign approach to industry is likely to become increasingly obvious in the future as large new plants, many of them built with Soviet aid, come into production. Nor is the Great Leap Forward, despite the talk by Liu Shao-ch'i and others about an "uninterrupted revolution," necessarily intended to be a permanent phenomenon, even in agriculture. It appears rather to be a forced march designed to raise China quickly to a higher level of economic strength and national power, and to solidify the political position of Liu Shao-ch'i.

[47] It has been announced that the armed forces "voluntarily" contributed 40 million days of agricultural and industrial labor during 1959 (*ibid.*, January 4, 1960).

[48] Cf. T'an Chen-lin speech (*ibid.*, October 28, 1959).

[49] *Ibid.*, January 22, 1960.

[50] Cf. Ragnar Nurkse, *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries*, New York, 1953, pp. 37-47.

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Although estimates of this kind are exceedingly risky, it may be that the Great Leap Forward has upset, perhaps irretrievably, the balance between the influences and views of Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai which had been preserved to a degree in earlier years. Future events, such as the next National Congress of the CPC,[51] may help to show whether this is so and give some indication as to the current role of Mao Tse-tung, the actual extent of Liu Shao-ch'i's power, the future direction of economic development, the relative influence of the Party and government over economic policy, and other such problems which are bound to intrigue anyone interested in the interaction between politics and economics in this incredible country.

[51] Contrary to the normal procedure specified in its constitution, the CPC held no such congress in 1957 or 1959.

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SOVIET FOREIGN AID AS A PROBLEM FOR U.S. POLICY

By HANS HEYMANN, JR.

DURING the past several years, the Western world has been treated to the arresting spectacle of a long-isolated Soviet power bloc emerging, slowly at first and then with increasing momentum, from its autarkic hibernation into the dazzling limelight of international economic competition. The most dramatic aspect of this emergence, no doubt, has been the Soviet adoption of foreign aid to less-developed countries as a useful and appropriate instrument of national policy.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the foreign aid arena was bound to have its impact on United States policy. In a minor way the impact has been a blessing; in a much larger measure it has been a disaster. It has been a blessing to the extent that Soviet aid "competition" has imparted a fresh sense of challenge and urgency to a United States policy that was being rapidly nibbled away by frustration, doubt, and disillusionment. The Soviet leaders, after scornfully rejecting the notion of foreign aid for years, suddenly found it to be an indispensable weapon, adopted it as their own, and thus provided us with a heartening endorsement of the correctness of our course. It has been a disaster, on the other hand, in the more important sense of adding a new kind of fuel to our smoldering anxieties over Communist expansionism, thus further disrupting what little inspired purpose and constructive motivation our foreign aid policies still possessed. To an ever greater extent, fear has displaced hope as the primary basis of our aid policies and the pursuit of a confident, autonomous strategy of our own has been sacrificed to a succession of largely tactical maneuvers aimed at countering the moves of our adversary.

The "new look" in Soviet international diplomacy is now more than half a dozen years old, and we have learned much in the interim about the nature, the attractions, and the aims of Soviet foreign aid policy. In fact, judging by the proliferation of pamphlets, monographs, papers, and reports devoted to the subject,[1] it is perhaps fair to say that Soviet

[1] Among the many useful recent studies are Joseph A. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, New York, 1958; Robert L. Allen, *Soviet Economic Warfare*, Washington, D.C., 1960; Department of State Publication #6632, *The Sino-Soviet Economic Offensive in the Less Developed Countries*, Washington, D.C., 1958; Department of State Publication #6777, *The Communist Economic Threat*, Washington, D.C., 1959; Alec Nove, "Soviet Trade and Soviet Aid," *Lloyds Bank Review*, No. 51 (January 1959), pp. 1-19; *Soviet*

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foreign aid operations are among the best observed, most carefully tallied, and most exhaustively reported of all features of contemporary Soviet foreign policy—and this despite the Soviet government's sensitive and uncommunicative public information policy on the matter.

With the groundwork of fact so well established and so widely publicized, it seems superfluous to provide yet another description of the nature and disposition of Soviet foreign aid. I shall, instead, turn directly to the interpretive task of exploring some of the problems that it poses for the conduct of our own foreign policy.

Since these problems are too numerous to discuss comprehensively and systematically within the limits of a brief article, I shall concentrate on three areas in which United States policy seems to be especially vulnerable: *first*, our tendency to overlook the profound differences that exist between the Soviet and the American conceptions of the role and objectives of foreign aid, and thus to draw inappropriate conclusions for our own policy posture; *second*, our overly apprehensive concern about Soviet "economic domination" and its effect on United States aid policy; and *third*, our pressing need to develop more attractive answers of our own to those features of Soviet aid that account for much of its distinctive impact, and thus to render it politically innocuous. Let us turn first to the differences in conception.

I. Two Conceptions of the Role and Objectives of Aid

One of our favorite pastimes in studying Soviet foreign aid is to compare Soviet aid terms and techniques with our own and to draw sweeping conclusions about the innate superiority of the Soviet approach. Such a preoccupation with techniques can be seriously misleading for at least two reasons: (1) it attributes to foreign aid an unwarranted independent role, distinct from the rest of the foreign policy complex; and (2) it views foreign aid in a political vacuum, devoid of reference to its tasks and objectives.

On the first point, our tendency to attribute to foreign aid a separate and distinct personality is probably due, at least in part, to our need to justify it independently before Congress as a "program." In part, it may

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Economic Penetration in the Middle East, Senate Document No. 58, 86th Congress, 1st Session (prepared for Senator Hubert H. Humphrey by Halford L. Hoskins, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress), Washington, D.C., 1959; W. A. Nielsen and Z. S. Hodjera, "Sino-Soviet Bloc Technical Assistance: Another Bilaterial Approach," *The Annals*, Vol. 323 (May 1959), pp. 40-49; Henry G. Aubrey, "Sino-Soviet Economic Activities in Less Developed Countries," in *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, Joint Economic Committee, 86th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., 1959, Part II, pp. 445-66.

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also be because foreign aid can be dramatized and holds a special appeal for the humanitarian streak in our public attitudes. Whatever the reasons, we have endowed foreign aid with a life of its own and with uniquely magical qualities that are supposed, somehow, to cause it to stand apart from the rest of the foreign policy spectrum. However attractive this notion may be to us, it is important to recognize that it has no relevance to the Soviet scene. To the Soviet leaders, foreign aid is not a "program"; it is a policy tool. Foreign aid is evidently viewed by them more modestly, as simply one of a number of interrelated policy techniques that are not intended to play solitary roles, but are used jointly in support of political aims. Indeed, it is precisely the interdependence and complementarity of Soviet foreign aid and its foreign trade policy that lend the former much of its appeal to the underdeveloped countries. There is nothing particularly spectacular about Soviet aid techniques as such; what makes them attractive to the recipient is the fact that they are nicely integrated with the other elements of Soviet foreign policy as they impinge on him. Thus the image that the Soviet Union has created for itself in the underdeveloped countries, its political leverage and appeal, depend not only upon aid and trade relations, technical-scientific training, and cultural contacts, but upon such purely domestic policy attainments as Soviet success in achieving rapid economic growth at home. In short, the strong political response that has been evoked should not be attributed to Soviet aid as such, but rather to the careful co-ordination of aid with other key aspects of national policy, all designed to project for the recipient country a consistent impression that Soviet aims are compatible with its own national aspirations.

This Soviet ability to integrate its several policy instruments into a consistent whole should be a matter of real concern to us, since our own performance in this regard needs to be improved. In our preoccupation with foreign aid as a special and self-contained institution, we often lose sight of the fact that aid is not the only form of international relationship and that its favorable effects can be easily offset by frictions arising at other points of mutual contact. The impact on a primary-producing country of even the most generous and best-conceived program of foreign aid can be completely vitiated by a single ill-considered act of United States commercial policy, such as raising a protective tariff against the principal export commodity of the aided country. Unfortunately, such inconsistencies are not at all uncommon in American policy. Even within our foreign aid program itself, we often fail to achieve a reasonable degree of integration of its several elements. This

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is most notably true in the case of our agricultural surpluses, which are permitted time and again to disrupt international commercial markets and to compete injuriously with the export staples of underdeveloped countries. These incongruities and conflicts among the various elements of our foreign policy are, of course, not easily resolved; but to the extent that we are interested in developing a bond of community between ourselves and our aid recipients, it is surely more important for us to improve the over-all policy image we project than to concentrate on minor refinements in our aid techniques.

I have cited a second reason why a direct comparison of Soviet and United States aid terms and techniques may be quite misleading: the performance of the two countries, it seems to me, cannot be properly compared except in the context of the tasks posed for each and in relation to the political objectives that each seeks to attain. And the fact is that the tasks and objectives of the two countries differ fundamentally. We are often tempted to point with envy at Soviet aid tactics and to admire their simplicity, uniformity, and cheapness. By contrast, our own programs appear to us outrageously complex, diffuse, and expensive. But the explanation for the contrast is not to be found simply in Soviet tactical brilliance and in unimaginative United States administration; the differences are more deeply rooted in the profoundly unequal aims and tasks of the two contestants. Soviet policy can afford to be simple and cheap because its aims are relatively straightforward and uncomplicated; United States policy cannot help but be costly and complex because our tasks are infinitely diverse and involved.

One of the great advantages which the Soviet Union possesses in confronting the underdeveloped countries outside its own orbit is its almost total lack of entanglement with, and responsibility for, the existing world order that it encounters there. The Soviet leaders are in the enviable position of being able to look in from the outside, so to speak, on a dangerously unbalanced, imperfectly functioning, conflict-ridden system of international relationships, in the stability of which they have no stake and from the disturbances of which they are themselves effectively insulated. While they hold no brief for the system's survival, they also bear no blame for its troubles. From their isolated position of innocence and immunity, they are able to insinuate their aid, trade, and other forms of political communication along well-chosen channels and in a variety of attractively decorated shapes. In each case the immediate aim of the Soviet Union is merely to create a climate, to exploit hostilities, and to procure some political leverage for itself, but the degree

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of its own involvement is strictly limited and any assumption of responsibility is carefully shunned.

How much easier, how much more tractable their task is than our own! While they need only probe and point, we must justify and protect. For, whether wisely or not, the task we have assumed adds up to nothing less than an attempt to preserve the whole precarious system of international order with which we are intimately identified and on which we critically depend. We feel called upon to keep this system of world order functioning in a manner compatible with our own continued development as the kind of nation we are, and we seek to keep it sufficiently flexible and dynamic to accommodate the infinitely diverse interests and demands of the rest of the non-Communist world. Given such ambitious aims, we soon discover that a crisis anywhere becomes our crisis, and failure at any point reflects on us. Our responsibilities, accordingly, are pervasive, the claims on our resources heavy, and our involvements interminable.

Soviet policy is not similarly burdened. In this contest it is favored in just about every sphere. In the *institutional* sphere, the Soviet bloc is not identified with the existing order of rules and procedures. It can at any time attack its imperfections, can proclaim the superior values of its own order, can present an impressive glimpse of its performance from a safe distance, but need never expose it to the full test of practicality and relevance on the spot. We, on the other hand, believe that we must defend the established order, must try to correct its imperfections and keep it viable despite continuous strains.

In the *ideological* sphere, Soviet policy can easily take advantage of the violent anti-colonialism and anti-Westernism that have gripped much of the Afro-Asian world and that seek to tear it completely from its Western moorings. Having a common enemy, Communist ideology can align itself with the forces of "national liberation"; it can identify itself with the symbols and aspirations of patriotic movements; it can cheer them on in their struggle against the "colonial regime of enslavement," and can speed them on their reckless way toward what may well turn out to be a purposeless national independence. When the frustrations that attend the newly won independence become intolerable, communism can point to the full-scale Soviet model as the only way out. The United States, of course, has no comparable opportunities for developing an ideological affinity; on the contrary, our dedication to "free enterprise" as a symbol is more likely to evoke an image of social irresponsibility and exploitation in areas of the world that have never

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experienced the results of a responsible progressive capitalism and have never even conceived of its possibility.

In the *political* sphere, similarly, Soviet policy is unencumbered by the need to promote compromise and to seek settlements. It has no long-run stake in the relaxation of tensions or in political stability. At the present stage of local political evolution, Soviet policy is perfectly willing to aid and abet bourgeois nationalism and even to ally itself with violently anti-Communist regimes in calculated disregard of local Communist Party fortunes; but all the time it will be waiting hopefully for the moment of revolutionary crisis when it can shift its allegiance and help communism move into power. The United States has no such convenient dual prongs of political action. American policy, handicapped as it is by its close link to the *status quo* and by the epithets of "colonialism" and "foreign exploitation" that are hurled against it, must nevertheless try to sustain a reasonably stable political life against heavy odds, and against a Soviet policy that thrives on its disruption.

In the *economic* sphere, also, Soviet policy enjoys important advantages. Imbued as it is with the doctrinal conviction that the present governments in the developing countries will inevitably be overwhelmed by their problems and that they cannot attain true economic development except by adopting the full Communist formula, Soviet policy need not worry about how neatly its aid projects fit into an over-all pattern of economic growth, about whether these projects collectively are enough to close the resources "gap," about the extent to which any particular project represents an optimal investment choice, or about the commercial and financial strains the repayment provisions may ultimately impose on the recipient's economy. This is not to say that Soviet policy has been especially reckless in these matters. Generally speaking, Soviet-financed projects have avoided extravagant foolishness and have emphasized what might be called the prerequisites to economic development—social overhead capital, natural resource surveys, and a wide range of basic industrial projects. By and large, these cannot help but yield real benefits to the recipient countries. But Soviet policy can treat these simply as separate and discrete projects desired by the receiving country, can offer them in small doses, and need never defend them as a Soviet-sponsored development program. Soviet responsibility is limited strictly to the timely completion of its several projects; but in regard to the more speculative question of whether or not the recipient country is pursuing a feasible economic development plan, Soviet prestige is not at stake. Our policy, unfortunately, cannot so conveniently divest itself of responsibility for the larger consequences of our aid. Since

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what we are trying to promote in the developing countries is so immensely more ambitious and complex than the mere creation of an image, since we seek, among other things, sustained progress toward economic growth under reasonable conditions of internal stability, we cannot help but be concerned about the broader problems of the country's needs and resources, its balance-of-payments position, the directions and priorities of its development plan, the size of its military forces, and much else. The inevitable consequence for us is an intimacy of involvement in the recipient's internal affairs, a degree of participation in his decisions about his own economic development and resource allocation that is hardly designed to make us popular, but that commits us to something like a joint undertaking, with shared responsibility for the success of the venture.

Finally, even in the *military* sphere, Soviet aid policy has much the easier task. Since it rejects any notion of seeking military alignments and "mutual security" in our sense of the term, but wishes above all to demonstrate its support of national independence for the emerging countries, it can limit its military aid to the sale of arms and equipment on easy terms, which it is able to do at negligible cost to itself by drawing on its large obsolescent stocks. In this way, Soviet military aid can furnish the symbols of national defense without having to consider their relevance and adequacy to the military requirements of the aid-receiver. The Soviet leaders are happy to include military training and equipment maintenance among the services they offer, but they are careful not to meddle in the recipient's defense policies: they do not try to assess the force goals he might require to meet his military contingencies, they do not tell him what size and kind of military aid he should have, and they do not seek to persuade him that his defense budget is too large or too small relative to his development effort. Our military aid policy, of course, does all of these things, as it must if its aims are to be realized. At least in principle, United States military assistance programs do embrace concrete military goals—to preserve the country's internal security, to enhance its ability to defend itself, and to integrate the country's forces into some sort of collective defense. The adoption of such aims necessarily implies a much more intimate involvement in the policy decisions of the recipient country and imposes on us, in many cases, a much more formidable aid burden.

Perhaps this is laboring the obvious. But it does seem important to stress these basic differences in the political context of the aid operations of the two countries and to underline the painful fact that, in almost every sense, ours is the larger and more difficult task. By the same

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token, it should be clear that invidious comparisons of Soviet and United States techniques of aid are likely to be more misleading than helpful. Often what may be an eminently successful tactic for Soviet purposes is altogether unsuitable for ours. For example, the notion of "aid without strings," whatever that means, is a most fitting slogan for a Soviet policy concerned primarily with the political climate that it can create and with the unfavorable contrasts with Western imperialism that it can draw. Its appeal largely depends on its remaining aloof from the recipient's internal problems and on its ability to reduce its visible "strings" to a minimum. For us, however, "strings," in the sense of conditions concerning economic policies to be adopted by the recipient government, are indispensable to the success of the objectives we seek to attain. The real imperatives for us are to exercise appropriate restraint, to impose only such conditions as are relevant to the technical objectives of our aid, to simplify as much as possible our complex controls and safeguards that are such a constant source of annoyance in the recipient countries, and to avoid using our power to enforce compliance with our own ideological preferences. But to try to adopt an ostentatious pose of "no strings" would be transparently out of character and counterproductive for us.

A similar confusion sometimes enters into our discussion of whether aid should be extended in the form of loans or in the form of grants. The Soviet insistence on low-interest loans as the only respectable form of aid has been widely interpreted in the West as reflecting a brilliant Soviet insight into the psychology of underdeveloped countries. Loans, it is argued, are consistent with the dignity of aided countries, while grants appear *infra dignitatum* and generate an unhealthy relationship between the giver and the receiver of aid; the United States, therefore, should also rely only on loans instead of grants and thus reap the same fruits of greater receptivity and mutual respect. Before we accept this thesis too enthusiastically, however, it may be well to recognize that Soviet policy finds the loan principle to its liking for much more weighty reasons than the mere desire to cater to local sensibilities and self-respect. In the first place, a grant clearly would involve a much greater sacrifice for the Soviets than a loan of the same amount. Hence, extending a credit with provisions for repayment makes the transaction much less costly. Moreover, since the Soviet Union likes the idea of making lavish and profuse *offers* of aid, it finds credits more convenient than grants, since the use of credits acts as an important restraint on the number and volume of acceptances with which it must cope. But most important, since repayment is to be made largely in the goods

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of the recipient country, on terms to be negotiated in subsequent years, the Soviet economy benefits from a return flow of valuable commodities, and can look forward to developing a long-term bilateral trading relationship on which it places a high political premium. In short, the loan instrument is well suited to Soviet aims, and its adoption is much more a matter of Soviet insistence than an adaptation to local preferences. In fact, local preferences are not at all clear-cut on this issue. Afghanistan, for example, which accepted an early Soviet loan, has been insisting since 1957 that all further foreign aid from any source take the form of outright grants. The United States acquiesced, but it took until May 1959 to break down Soviet resistance, and it was largely American competition that forced the USSR into making its first large-scale grant. Cambodia is, if anything, even more insistent on this issue. It is perfectly happy to receive grants from any source and does so with abandon, but it refuses categorically to accept loans of any kind. Even a generous Soviet offer of a very long-term, interest-free credit was rejected on the grounds that an obligation to repay would in some way constitute an abridgment of Cambodia's sovereignty.

There are obviously a wide variety of attitudes and a multiplicity of problems confronting the aid giver in the underdeveloped world, and no easy generalization about the superiority of one contrivance over another is likely to be helpful. For the United States, the grant must continue to play a major role, perhaps not so much in the field of economic development, but certainly in the vitally necessary rescue operations that we have been carrying on in more than a dozen countries under the labels of "defense support" and "special assistance." These are programs not of economic development, but of averting chaos; not of improving living standards, but of keeping them from going under. They make sense only as programs of direct subsidy and outright grant.

For us the problem is not to make a simple choice between the one financial instrument and the other, but to develop flexible new devices, to expand the middle ground between pure loans and straight grants, to develop "soft" lending techniques that will not be haunted by the specter of vast local-currency accumulations. This calls for imaginative adaptation of our own financial institutions, and for this we can hardly look to Soviet gimmicks for inspiration.

It would be a mistake to leave the impression that all of the aid techniques the Soviets have found effective in promoting their own objectives are by that very fact inappropriate for our purposes, and that we can learn nothing from their tactics. On the contrary, some of their methods hold real attractions for us, and I shall comment on these later.

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The point here is simply that we can judge the relevance to us of any Soviet technique only in the light of our own objectives and our own opportunities.

II. The Threat of Soviet "Economic Domination"

The second problem area concerns our apprehensiveness about Soviet "economic domination" and its implications for our foreign aid policies. To avoid any misunderstanding, let it be said at once that the effectiveness of the Soviet aid-and-trade gambit in strengthening the over-all Soviet policy posture in the underdeveloped world is not to be taken lightly. Assuredly, it has contributed in a major way to the drastic transformation of political attitudes in Afro-Asia toward the USSR, in some cases overcoming deep-seated fears and hostilities and establishing some presumption of mutual affinity and good-will. The Soviet leaders must surely regard it as a valuable and versatile new tool of political maneuver, and the West has every reason to respect it for the dramatic role it has played in Soviet diplomacy and for the long-range influence it can exert on the politically articulate elites and, through them, on the policies of the still uncommitted nations.

But there is another more fearful view of the meaning and consequences of the new Soviet policy, and it is this that needs to be examined. It is the notion that greater reliance on Soviet aid and greater participation in Soviet trade will lead the unwary into dangerous economic dependence on, and thus inevitably into political subservience to, the Soviet bloc. It is the view that trade and aid are being used by the Soviet leaders in a calculated fashion to achieve political domination through economic dependence. This view of the Soviet economic "offensive" as a powerful and dangerous weapon of subversion is still widely held in the United States and has contributed to an American policy reaction with a heavily "defensive" cast. We feel called upon to proclaim our disapproval of Soviet economic "expansionism" and seek to dissuade potential victims from allowing themselves to be lured into the trap. We try somehow to block, forestall, or counter Soviet moves, and by our excessive concern with responding to real or alleged Soviet overtures we permit the focus of our own policy initiatives to become blurred. Since a preoccupation with "defensive" policies is hardly conducive to the development of a constructive, autonomous policy of our own, we might ask ourselves how effective such counteraction really is, and whether the reasoning behind it is in fact sound.

As for trying to preclude or contain Soviet economic moves, it should be obvious by this time that such a policy is self-defeating even if we are

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willing (which we are not) to outbid every Soviet offer at every turn. The fact is that economic relations with the Soviet Union often do hold genuine attractions for underdeveloped countries and we should not try to minimize them. First, driven by their strong desire for national independence and "positive neutralism," less-developed countries see in the availability of Soviet aid a welcome means of breaking out of their exclusive dependence on Western assistance and a valuable additional source of development capital. To the extent that the promotion of effective national independence is also a United States objective, there is no conflict of interest here. Second, many of the developing countries are shrewd traders and are not slow to appreciate the bargaining leverage that a Soviet aid offer gives them in playing off one source of funds against another. And finally there is the important attraction of Soviet willingness to deal painlessly with the "transfer problem"—i.e., to accept repayment in the form of the customary export commodities of the recipient countries and, on occasion, to relieve them of burdensome surpluses. Given such attractions, few uncommitted countries will be persuaded by Western assertions that to expand economic relations with the Soviets is bad for them, and few are likely to heed for long our warnings of the dire peril of Soviet domination and subversion. And just how dire is this peril?

To put this question into better perspective, it may be well to recall again that the success of Soviet policy in the uncommitted world depends in a large measure on its ability to overcome local fears and suspicions of Soviet motives and to supplant them with a new image of Soviet political behavior as respectful of national integrity and as abstaining from interference in internal affairs. The Soviet leaders can make this image stick only so long as they are scrupulously correct in their relations with these countries. A serious act of internal subversion in one country or a single instance of blatant economic pressure to compel political compliance could easily destroy the whole illusion, cause a relapse into hostility, and jeopardize the success of the entire policy package. This is not to say that such acts will not or cannot occur, but merely that they would seem to be inimical to the larger Soviet objective of gaining a more enduring role and broader influence throughout Afro-Asia.

From their actual performance to date, it would appear that the Soviet leaders fully appreciate the limitations under which they must operate. By and large, they have been meticulous in not using their economic relations as instruments of political pressure. Their 2,800-odd economic aid technicians spread over 19 underdeveloped countries

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of Asia, Africa, and Latin America appear to be under orders to refrain from any activity that might be misinterpreted.[2] Deliveries under military and economic aid agreements seem to remain, on the whole, unaffected by political events. In fact, one might almost argue that there is an inverse relationship between the extension of Soviet aid and the fortunes of local Communist parties. Egypt, Iraq, India and, most recently, Argentina have, in one way or another, all stiffened their opposition to domestic communism subsequent to the conclusion of aid agreements with the Soviet bloc. The single, often-cited exception to the record of correct Soviet behavior was the suspension of Soviet aid deliveries to Yugoslavia in 1958, but surely this was a very special case of unsuccessful courtship of an erstwhile satellite, a family dispute within the "socialist camp," where the categorical imperatives of political behavior are quite different.

This leaves us with the question of overdependence on Soviet trade and its exploitation by the bloc for political pressure or domination. Again, the immediate impulse is to point to Finland, where subtle Soviet economic pressure succeeded in the winter of 1958-1959 in toppling the Fagerholm government. But Finland is not an underdeveloped country and its vulnerability to Soviet pressure is not the result of Soviet aid or normal commercial trade, but a consequence of the distortion of the Finnish economy by a stringent reparations burden imposed by the USSR after World War II, which left Finland impoverished and critically dependent on Soviet markets for its exports. In any other circumstances, no country would be likely to permit itself to become wedded to such a degree and so irrationally to the markets and products of the Soviet bloc. The Finnish example seems particularly irrelevant to the underdeveloped countries, whose trade is, in almost every instance, overwhelmingly oriented toward the free world and can be expected to remain so. The share of Soviet bloc trade, while rising steeply in some countries, is almost nowhere dominant and in the majority of countries distinctly marginal. There are a few cases, however, of heavy dependence on the Soviet market—most notably that of Egypt, whose cotton sales normally account for about 70 per cent of its earnings from trade and where the Soviet bloc now absorbs almost two-thirds of the entire cotton export. This amounts to a heavy mortgage on the single crop of the Egyptian economy, and one is tempted to conclude that that country's fate is all but sealed. The ability of the Soviet bloc to exploit this

[2] Department of State Intelligence Report #7998, *A Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Bloc Aid Personnel in Less Developed Countries*, Washington, D.C., April 16, 1959 (unclassified).

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dependence, however, is not so obvious. For what counts is not so much how large the share of a country's trade is with the bloc, but the effective alternatives to that trade available elsewhere. For example, an attempt by the Soviet leaders to exert direct economic pressure on Egypt, such as a threat to discontinue part or all of their cotton purchases, might well evoke a strong enough reaction in the West to cause it to step in with offers of emergency aid. The political repercussions of such a move are not likely to be pleasant for the Soviet leaders to contemplate.

I do not wish to overstate my point. The Soviet economic role in such countries as Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria no doubt gives it substantially enhanced political bargaining power and the ability to press for minor political concessions and favorable terms of trade; but it is difficult to see how it could gather sufficient force or leverage to make for political domination. And the major limiting factor would seem to be our own willingness and ability to step into the breach.

Let me add just a footnote to my argument against an overly apprehensive view of the expansion of Soviet trade and aid. I have said previously that economic relations with the Soviet bloc hold genuine attractions for underdeveloped countries. I should now like to suggest that these attractions appear more rosy from a distance than they do on intimate acquaintance, and that it might be of real advantage to the West if the glorious promise of Soviet aid and trade were converted, in as many countries as possible, into the less glamorous reality. A number of countries have by now had second thoughts about their long-term export commitments to the Soviet bloc, particularly when it turned out that these commitments impeded their normal market relations with the rest of the world. Egypt, for example, continues to be plagued by the suspicion that the Soviets are re-exporting its cotton to Western Europe, where it competes with Egypt's own cotton sales. There is some disillusionment with barter dealings and linked transactions and regret for the lost possibilities of multilateral settlements. The disadvantages and limitations of state trading, Soviet-style, are becoming better known: the absence of trade information, the lack of meaningful relationships between prices and cost that act as indicators of advantage from trade, the wide fluctuations and unpredictable discontinuities of trade policy, the appearance of chance surpluses one year and their disappearance the next, the sudden unloading of primary products in the world market with its depressing consequences for the producing countries. Deficiencies and shortcomings such as these are only beginning to become apparent. Soviet policy has been able to minimize their incidence by keeping its operations small and geographically concentrated, and there-

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fore capable of being conducted on a high-level and high-priority basis. But as Soviet aid commitments grow and as Soviet trade becomes more widely diffused and more deeply entangled, these limitations and the rigidity of the Soviet bureaucracy in coping with them cannot help showing up more and more, with the high probability that the Soviet impact will be substantially impaired. From this point of view, at least, there may be a real case for the United States to encourage rather than to contain Soviet economic "expansionism."

Since much of what I have said so far has dealt with the negative aspects, the false impressions, the exaggerated fears of Soviet aid in relation to United States policy, it may be in order for me to conclude on a more positive note, by singling out those features of Soviet aid that apparently account most significantly for its distinctive impact and that pose some of the most striking challenges to our own performance.

III. Challenges to United States Performance

One of these features is the Soviet ability to make really long-term aid commitments. A dramatic example of this is the $378 million Soviet line of credit to India announced last year, which will finance construction of specific major industrial projects contemplated under India's third Five-Year Plan, which will run through 1966. The attractiveness of such a long-range commitment to India is obvious: it enables that country to adjust the Soviet assistance to its own time horizon of effort and permits it to plan on the basis of a firm level of support. For the Soviet Union, the arrangement is also a coup: it enabled it, at very low cost, to capture for itself the bulk of the glamorous "impact" projects and industrial showpieces that are to be erected in India in the next seven years. The consequences for Soviet prestige are obvious. For the United States, our present inability to offer long-term aid commitments is a tragic handicap that makes it extremely difficult for us to provide for the continuity of effort necessary for successful development, and prevents us from giving a country like India a clear advance indication of the level of capital assistance it may reasonably expect from us over its crucial planning period. It would seem that acceptance by the United States of the principle of continuity and substantial easing of the requirement for annual Congressional approvals are matters of the highest urgency for a successful American aid policy.

A second and perhaps even greater attraction of Soviet economic policy has been its willingness and ability to provide an assured market for some of the commodity surpluses of primary-producing countries. For the United States, this is one of the most vexing problems, partic-

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ularly since we have surpluses of our own to dispose of. But what is needed, clearly, is to provide these countries with more secure markets at stable prices for their primary commodities and, more generally, to find ways of minimizing their exposure to the disrupting effects of the market mechanism. The effect of price instability has been particularly acute in Latin America. For Brazil, for instance, assistance by the United States in working out a solution for the tremendous and growing surplus of coffee may be more important than any likely combination of direct foreign aid. But there are no easy solutions; buffer stocks, commodity commissions, clearing houses, food banks, and other storage proposals and stabilization schemes all have their limitations; and perhaps workable long-run solutions will always elude us. Nevertheless, a vigorous United States lead in attacking this vital problem and in developing a range of emergency solutions that can be quickly applied could break the present paralysis on this front, and thus lessen the impact of one of the Soviet's most effective economic gambits.

A third feature of Soviet aid that challenges our performance is the Soviet government's ability to mobilize its best resources and talents in the service of its policy objectives. It can order its goods and people about, and compliance is almost automatic. It does not require a system of incentives to enlist the voluntary interest and action of private individuals and enterprises. It is able to commandeer its leading technicians and enterprises to carry out an aid project abroad without having to guarantee their profits or to cajole them into risking their investment capital. It is able to construct plants and enterprises, impart the technical knowledge necessary to run them, and then withdraw, leaving the ownership vested unconditionally in the recipient country. Thus it can avoid the antagonisms and frictions that are so often aroused by foreign ownership, and is able to draw a pointed contrast between its own support of economic independence and the "imperialist exploitation" of the West. For the United States, the entire issue of how its private resources can be most effectively marshaled for the task of economic development in the less-developed world may well become one of the foremost problems that will face this country over the next few decades. We have only just begun to think seriously about this problem-studded area.

Let me conclude with just one more observation about United States policy that is, by now, anything but novel. It is not at all a parallel of a Soviet aid policy, but rather the exact antithesis to it. I have in mind the importance to us of greater reliance on multilateral approaches, on international agencies, on joint mechanisms, on regional solutions in

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our development assistance programs. The Soviet leaders cannot subscribe to such approaches since the very essence of their policy is to underline the distinctions, to draw the vivid contrasts between their own unique policies and those of the rest of the world. Only bilateralism serves their purposes. For the Soviets to throw in their lot with an international effort would mean the loss of their special identity and the sacrifice of the central purpose of their aid—namely, to exhibit themselves as the sole champions of non-interference and respect for national aspirations. For the United States, on the other hand, a major reliance on international instruments for promoting economic development holds real attractions: it would avoid much of the ill-will and resentment generated in our present bilateral programs against what is considered needless United States intervention; it would lighten the intolerable burdens of our present solitary assumption of the tasks of world guardianship, by encouraging collective rather than sole United States responsibility for preserving international order; it would give notice to the world of our renewed dedication to an affirmative and constructive course; and it could be a most effective way of challenging, in turn, the integrity and sincerity of the Soviet pose.

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WHY THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET IS TOO SMALL IN A DEMOCRACY

By ANTHONY DOWNS

IN a democratic society, the division of resources between the public and private sectors is roughly determined by the desires of the electorate. But because it is such a complex and time-consuming task to acquire adequate political information, the electorate is chronically ignorant of the costs and benefits of many actual and potential government policies. It is my belief that this ignorance causes governments to enact budgets smaller than the ones they would enact if the electorate possessed complete information. Yet these undersized budgets stem from rational behavior by both the government and the electorate; hence they are extremely difficult to remedy. Furthermore, the resulting misallocation of resources becomes more and more serious as the economy grows more complex.

As proof of these assertions, I shall present a model of a democratic society based upon the principles set forth in *An Economic Theory of Democracy*.[1] The basic rules for government and voter decision-making in this model are hypotheses, but the environment in which they are set resembles the real world as closely as possible. Furthermore, I believe the hypotheses themselves are accurate representations of what happens in the real world most of the time. My belief is based upon a comparison of the deductions made from these hypotheses in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* with the actual behavior of political parties in various democracies. However, the deductions made from the same hypotheses in this article are harder to compare directly with reality. Nevertheless, if the reader agrees with me that the basic hypotheses are realistic, it should follow that he will find the conclusions of this model meaningful in real-world politics as well as in the theoretical world of my argument.

This argument consists of the following topics: (1) how the budget is determined in a democracy, (2) the nature of rational political ignorance, (3) the definition of "correct" and "incorrect" budgets, (4) how an "incorrect" budget might arise, (5) significant differences between transactions in the public and private sectors, (6) distortions in budget evaluation arising from these differences, (7) a countertendency

[1] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, New York, 1957.

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toward overexpenditure, (8) the net results, and (9) the increasing importance of the problem.

I. How the Budget Is Determined in a Democracy

According to the economic theory of democracy, each government sets both expenditures and revenue collection so as to maximize its chances of winning the next election.[2] This follows from the axiom that political parties are primarily motivated by the desire to enjoy the income, prestige, and power of being in office. Each party regards government policies as means to these ends; hence it pursues whatever policies it believes will gain it the political support necessary to defeat its opponents. Since expenditures and taxes are two of the principal policies of government, they are set so as to maximize political support. Out of this rational calculation by the governing party comes the budget.

Rationality likewise prevails among voters. They vote for the party whose policies they believe will benefit them more than those of any other party.[3] These "benefits" need not be conceived in a narrowly selfish sense, but consist of any utility they derive from government acts, including acts which penalize them economically in order to help others.

The budget itself is not arrived at by considering over-all spending versus over-all taxation, but is the sum of a series of separate policy decisions. The governing party looks at every possible expenditure and tries to decide whether making it would gain more votes than financing it would lose. This does not mean that each spending bill is tied to a particular revenue bill. Instead all proposed expenditures are arranged in descending order of their vote-gain potential, and all proposed revenue collections arranged in ascending order of their vote-loss potential. Wherever these two marginal vote curves cross, a line is drawn that determines the over-all budget. Expenditures with a higher vote-gain potential than the marginal one are included in the budget, which is financed by revenue collection methods with lower vote-loss potentials than the marginal one.[4]

[2] For a complete explanation of this theory, see *ibid.* The government budget is discussed in chap. 4.

[3] The remainder of this article assumes a two-party system. Its conclusions are also applicable to multi-party systems, but the corresponding proofs are too complicated to be presented in an article of this length.

[4] This explanation of the budget process ignores the effect of government administrative bureaus upon the budget's final size. If self-aggrandizing bureaus were included in the model, each would try to maximize its own income, power, and prestige within the government. Hence it would submit a maximum estimate of its needs to the central budgeting agency (i.e., the directors of the governing party). The bureau might even

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Because of the myriad expenditures made by modern governments, this rule may seem impractical. In the real world, it is true, the governing party does not weigh the vote impact of every single expenditure, but groups them into large categories like national defense. It then balances the marginal vote-gain of spending for each such category against its marginal vote-cost and against the marginal vote-gains of spending for other large categories, such as farm subsidies, education, and social security. Thus, in the real world, the aggregate budget for each category is decided in a manner similar to that described above, even though details of spending within the category may be left to nonpolitical administrators.[5]

It should be noted that the government in our model never asks itself whether the over-all budget is "too large" or "too small" in relation to the views of the electorate. In fact, it never makes any explicit decision about what the over-all budget size should be, but determines that size merely by adding up all the items that more than pay for themselves

enlarge this estimate beyond its real needs in anticipation of the budgeting agency's desire to minimize expenditures. Its inflated requests would be bolstered by assertions that all of its spending would pay off well in votes. Since this process would distort the budgeting agency's information about what expenditures would in fact gain votes, the actual budget would tend to be larger than if bureaus were not self-aggrandizing. However, the central budgeting agency would be aware of the bureaus' inflationary tendencies and would develop outside checks against each bureau's vote-gain estimates. If the governing party failed to make such direct checks with the voters, it would be vulnerable to defeat by more alert opponents. Therefore, the information distortion caused by government bureaus could not be expected to offset the basic tendency for government budgets to be too small.

Another possible impact of administrative bureaus upon the model is their tendency to create situations in which their services are needed; e.g., by building missiles, the defense establishment of country A causes rival country B to counter with better missiles, thereby increasing the need for country A to spend even more money on missiles, etc. Robert K. Merton describes this process in "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy" (chap. 7 of *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill., 1949). Since this characteristic of bureaus raises a whole set of fundamental problems beyond the scope of my model, I have made no attempt to account for it in this study. However, a model is under development which contains government administrative bureaus as a set of actors in addition to parties and voters. It is hoped that this model will shed further light on the effects of government bureaucracy.

[5] Some readers of this argument may object that spending for such categories as national defense cannot be evaluated in terms of votes but must be decided largely on technical grounds. I do not agree. For example, the United States government chose to abandon maintenance of strong conventional forces and stake the nation's entire defense upon the use of nuclear weapons. This decision was made against the technical advice of Army planners. From statements made by leading government officials at the time, it is clear that the decision was designed primarily to avoid asking the electorate to pay for both nuclear and conventional forces. In spite of the fact that every subsequent Army Chief of Staff has bitterly opposed this policy, the governing party has maintained it because the cost of its alternative is politically unpalatable. Thus in the real world, even regarding national defense, major budgetary questions are usually decided by vote possibilities.

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in votes. Similarly, the voters do not evaluate a budget on the basis of its total size but by the particular benefits and costs it passes on to them.

The absence of any specific evaluation of over-all budget size appears to make our original assertion meaningless. How can we say the government budgets are too small when no one ever considers their size in judging them? The answer is that ignorance produces biases in the electorate that cause the government to exclude certain acts from the budget, thus reducing its size from what it "should be." Our original thesis can be more accurately stated as follows: rational ignorance among the citizenry leads governments to omit certain specific types of expenditures from their budgets which would be there if citizens were not ignorant. The fact that this results in budgets that are too small is simply a dramatic way of stressing the outcome.

II. Rational Political Ignorance

In this model, information is a crucial factor. In order to form policies, each party must know what the citizenry wants; and in order to vote rationally, each voter must know what policies the government and its opponents espouse. But in the real world, information is costly—if not in money, at least in time. It takes time to inform yourself about government policy. Furthermore, the number of policies that a modern government has to carry out is vast and their nature astoundingly complex. Even if the world's most brilliant man spent twenty-four hours a day reading newspapers and journals, he would be unable to keep himself well-informed about all aspects of these policies.

In addition to facing this problem, the average voter knows that no matter how he votes, there are so many other voters that his decision is unlikely to affect the outcome. This does not always prevent him from voting, because he realizes voting is essential to democracy and because it costs so little. But it usually does prevent him from becoming well-informed. Beyond the free information he picks up just by being alive in our media-saturated world, he does not see how acquiring detailed political data will make him better off. Thus a rationally calculating attitude about the use of time leads him to political ignorance. This conclusion is borne out by countless polls that show just how ignorant the average citizen is about major political questions of the day.

In this article we discuss three specific states of rational ignorance. The first is *zero ignorance*—i.e., perfect knowledge. In this state, citizens know (1) all actual or potential items in the budget of each party and (2) the full benefits and costs of each item. The second state is *partial ignorance*, in which voters know all the actual or potential items

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in the budget, but not all the benefits and costs attached to each item. Their political perception threshold has been raised so that remote or extremely complex events do not cross it, though the budget itself still does. The third state is *preponderant ignorance*, in which citizens are ignorant of both the items in the budget and their benefits and costs. In this state, citizens' perception thresholds are so high that they are aware of only the individual policies or items in the budget that vitally affect them.

III. "Correct" and "Incorrect" Budgets

My contention is that rational ignorance acts so as to produce an "incorrect" government budget. But what is meant by the term "incorrect" when the government does not seek to maximize welfare? Since I posit no social utility function, how can I say that one budget is "better" or "worse" than another except in terms of its vote-getting power? My answer is that the "correct" budget is the one which would emerge from the democratic process if both citizens and parties had perfect information about both actual and potential government policies. Insofar as an actual budget deviates from the "correct" budget, it is "incorrect." Admittedly, no one has perfect information; hence no one can say what budget would exist if there were no rational ignorance in politics. This fact prohibits use of the "correct" budget for detailed criticism of actual budgets, but it does not prevent generalizations about the tendency of actual budgets to deviate from "correct" budgets because of broad social factors like rational ignorance.

There is no point in denying that the terms "correct" and "incorrect" are ethical judgments. They presuppose that it is good for the citizens in a democracy to get what they want, and to base their wants on as much knowledge as possible. It is not good for them to get something they would not want if they knew more about it. That is the extent of my ethical foundation, and I think it is compatible with almost every normative theory of democracy.

IV. How an "Incorrect" Budget Might Occur

In a two-party democracy like ours, each national election can be considered a contest between two prospective government budgets. These budgets differ from each other in both quality and quantity, but each contains any spending and taxing measures about which there is strong majority consensus. In reality, many factors besides budgets influence people's political choices. However, most of these factors are in some way reflected in the budget, and in the rational world of economic

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theory we can assume that proposed budgets have a decisive role in determining how people vote. Knowing this, each party carefully plans its budget so as to maximize the support it gets, following the procedure described in Section I.

A key feature of this procedure is that the government gives voters what they want, not necessarily what benefits them. As long as citizens know what benefits them, there should be no difference between the actual budget and the "correct" budget. But if there are benefits which government spending would produce that people are not aware of, the government will not spend money to produce them unless it believes it can make them well-known before the next election. For the government is primarily interested in people's votes, not their welfare, and will not increase their welfare if doing so would cost it votes. And it would lose votes if it increased taxes or inflation—which people are aware of—in order to produce benefits which people are not aware of. Many citizens would shift their votes to some other party that produced only more tangible benefits at less total cost—even if they would in fact be worse off under this party.

Thus if voters are unaware of the potential benefits of certain types of government spending, party competition may force the actual budget to become smaller than the "correct" budget. This outcome may result even if voters merely discount certain classes of government benefits more heavily than comparable private benefits when in reality they are equal. Thus complete ignorance of benefits is not necessary to cause a "too small" budget—only relative unawareness of certain government benefits in relation to their cost, which under full employment consists of sacrificed private benefits.

Conversely, if citizens are less aware of certain private benefits than they are of government benefits, or if they see benefits more clearly than costs, the actual budget may tend to exceed the "correct" budget. In either case, ignorance causes a distorted evaluation of the relative benefits of public and private spending. This distortion is carried over into the budget by interparty competition, which forces each party to give voters what they want—not necessarily what the parties think would benefit them. Thus the ignorance of the voters may cause the actual budget to deviate from the "correct" budget.

Whether the actual budget is too large or too small depends upon the specific forms of ignorance present in the electorate. Since ignorance influences voters' thinking by distorting their evaluation of public vs. private spending, we must study the way citizens view these two types

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of spending before analyzing the net impact of ignorance upon the budget.

V. Significant Differences Between Transactions in the Public and Private Sectors

There are two significant differences between transactions in the private sector and in the public sector that are relevant to our analysis. First, in the private sector nearly all transactions are made on a *quid pro quo* basis, whereas in the public sector benefits are usually divorced from the revenues that make them possible. Whenever a citizen receives a private benefit, he pays for it directly and individually. Conversely, whenever he pays someone in the private sector, he receives a corresponding benefit which he has freely chosen because he wants it. No such direct link between costs and benefits exists in the public sector. Taxes are not allocated to individuals on the basis of government benefits received but on some other basis, usually ability to pay. Thus receipt of a given benefit may have no connection whatever with payment for it. And when a man pays his income tax or the sales tax on his new car, he cannot link these acts of sacrifice to specific benefits received. This divorce of benefits from payment for them makes it difficult to weigh the costs and benefits of a given act and decide whether or not it is worthwhile, as can be done regarding almost every private transaction.

There are two reasons why governments do not operate on a *quid pro quo* basis. First, the collective nature of many government benefits makes it technically impossible. For example, take national defense, which is the largest single item of government spending in most democracies.[6] But the benefits of national defense are collective in nature; that is, if they exist for one man, all men enjoy them. This fact makes *quid pro quo* transactions impossible, because once the benefit exists, enjoyment of it cannot be denied to those citizens who have not paid for it. For this reason, voluntary payment cannot be used to finance collective benefits. Since each citizen benefits whether or not he has paid, he maximizes his income by dodging his share of the cost. But *everyone* has this cost-minimizing attitude; so if voluntary payment is relied upon, no one pays. Consequently the resources necessary to provide the collective good are not provided, and no one receives any benefits. To avoid this outcome, individuals agree to coerce each other into payment through a collective agency like the government.

[6] In the United States, defense expenditures by the federal government constitute over 40 per cent of the total spending by all federal, state, county, local, and other government units. This figure applies to 1954 and is taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1956*, p. 401.

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A second reason why governments do not use *quid pro quo* transactions is their desire to redistribute income. In the private sector, benefits are furnished only to those who can pay for them, or through voluntary charitable activities. But most modern democracies have elected to provide their poorest citizens with more benefits than those citizens can afford individually. This goal requires a deliberate violation of the *quid pro quo* relationship; poor citizens get more benefits than they pay for, and their richer brethren are forced to give up more in taxes than is spent on benefits for them. One way to accomplish such redistribution and at the same time allocate the costs of collective goods is to tax on the basis of ability to pay. Thus for both technical and ethical reasons, the benefit principle that prevails in the private sector is largely abandoned in the public sector.

The second major difference between transactions in the private and public sectors is the coercive nature of dealings in the latter. Whereas all private transactions are voluntary, most payments to governments—other than direct sales of services—are enforced by law. Even the receipt of collective benefits is involuntary, since they exist whether a given citizen wants them or not. As noted, coercion is necessary because there is no intrinsic link between benefits and payments as in the private sector. Instead, force supplies this link.

But the use of force makes doing business with the government an all-or-nothing proposition. In the private sector, a citizen can enter into those transactions he desires and refrain from those he does not desire. No such selectivity is possible in his dealings with government. He must pay taxes that are used to pay for many projects he does not want. True, he can avoid taxes to some extent by directing his activities into untaxed areas; e.g., by refusing to buy luxury goods or cutting down the time he works. He can also exercise similar limited selectivity in receiving government benefits. But by and large, since his payments to the government are not related to the benefits he receives from it, he finds himself contributing to things that do not benefit him. The result is that no one ever attains marginal equilibrium in his dealings with the government.

For a citizen, such equilibrium exists when the utility produced by that act of government which is least attractive to him (i.e., the "last" government act on his preference scale) is equal to the utility of the least attractive act he undertakes in the private sector (i.e., the "last" completed private act on his preference scale). Furthermore, there must be no additional government acts that would give him more utility than those now being carried out. Under these circumstances, the individual

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cannot be made better off by shifting resources from the private to the public sector or vice versa, or by any reallocation of resources within the public sector. (We assume he has already allocated his resources within the private sector to his maximum benefit.) This situation corresponds to equilibrium within the private sector as portrayed by classical economists—a state attained by utility-maximizers in a world of perfect competition.

However, even if perfect competition exists, the requirements for attaining perfect equilibrium with a democratic government are highly restrictive. If a majority of citizens have identical preference rankings of both public and private acts, then the government's actual policies will be just what those citizens want (assuming the government knows what their preference rankings are). The division of resources between public and private sectors will be precisely that necessary to assure the majority a state of equilibrium between the sectors.

But, in the real world, people's preference rankings are not identical, so we shall not assume them identical in our model. While almost every man agrees with a majority of his fellows in regard to some policies, he also finds himself in a minority regarding others. It is the presence of these "revolving majorities" that prevents men from attaining equilibrium with governments. The government must carry out a complex mixture of many policies, some pleasing to one majority, some pleasing to another majority, and some pleasing only to a minority with intensive feelings concerning them. It can afford to undertake policies favored only by a minority because it does not stand or fall on any one issue but on the mixture as a whole.[7] If society is at all complex, the government's gigantic policy mix is bound to contain at least one act which any given voter opposes. It is either positively repugnant to him (i.e., it produces negative utility apart from its resource-cost), or else he knows of better uses to which the resources it absorbs could be put. As long as only one such act exists for him, he is out of equilibrium with government. Even if we assume declining marginal utility of income in both private and public sectors, there is always some additional private use of resources (including charity) which would yield him positive utility. There may also be other government acts, not now being performed, which would yield him even more utility than the best private act he can think of. Hence his disequilibrium does not necessarily imply a desire to shift resources from the public to the private sector. It may

[7] Where the government does stand or fall on every issue, as in the French Fourth Republic, it can function successfully only if strong consensus exists among the majority. Otherwise it is continually defeated by "Arrow problems." See Downs, *op.cit.*, chap. 4.

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also imply desire for reallocation within the public sector or even for moving more resources into that sector. But, in any case, there is always some change in government policy that would benefit him. Furthermore, the government is always spending money on projects he dislikes; hence his welfare would be improved if those projects were eliminated and his taxes reduced. *Therefore every citizen believes that the actual government budget is too large in relation to the benefits he himself is deriving from it.* Even if he feels the optimum budget would be much larger than the actual one, he believes the actual one could be profitably reduced "through greater economy"—i.e., elimination of projects from which he does not benefit.[8]

But if everyone feels the government is spending too much money for the benefits produced, why don't political parties propose smaller budgets? How can budgets which everyone regards as too large keep winning elections? The answer lies in the nature of the "revolving majorities" discussed previously. According to the economic theory of democracy, governments never undertake any policies unless they expect to win votes (or at least not lose votes) by doing so. Hence for every citizen opposed to a given act, there are other citizens in favor of it. Elimination of that act would please the former but alienate the latter. Looking at the whole complex of its acts between elections, the governing party feels that including this act gains more votes than excluding it. The party can afford to offend some voters with this act because they are in the minority regarding it, their feelings against it are not as intensive as the feelings of those for it, some other acts will placate them, or for some combination of these reasons. Since citizens' preferences are diverse, every man finds himself thus ignored by the government on some policy or other. Hence everyone believes the government is carrying out some unnecessary acts. But the government is still maximizing political support for itself, for what one man believes unnecessary is to someone else necessary enough to cause him to thank the government with his vote.

[8] This sentence appears to contradict the one preceding it, but in reality they are perfectly consistent. To illustrate, assume that an urban citizen pays $500 per year in taxes toward a government budget which is spent entirely for farm subsidies. Because he has no interest in farm subsidies, he thinks the budget is too large in relation to what he is getting out of it. However, he strongly desires urban renewal, and would be happy to pay $1,000 per year in taxes if the government budget were spent entirely on urban renewal. Thus, in his eyes, the actual budget is simultaneously too large and too small, depending on what alternative it is compared with. It is too large compared with a budget in which those expenditures he dislikes have been eliminated and all others remain the same. Yet it is too small in comparison with a budget in which the expenditure pattern has been changed to what he regards as optimum.

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However, the resulting disequilibrium puts tremendous pressure on the government to reduce the budget wherever it can. This means it will make only those expenditures which produce benefits that voters are aware of, for hidden benefits cannot influence votes. Thus the threat of competing parties prevents the government from giving citizens what is good for them unless they can be made aware of the benefits involved before the next election. Only if a party has immense confidence in its ability to win the next election anyway is it free to produce such hidden benefits, no matter how important they are in the lives of the voters. The more "perfect" the competition between parties, the more closely must the government follow popular opinion, and the more likely it is to include in its policies any errors in that opinion caused by ignorance.

VI. Distortions in Budget Evaluation Arising from These Differences

Having analyzed the relevant differences between transactions in the public and private sectors, we now turn to the distortions they produce in benefit-appraisal. Such distortions are of two main types: underevaluation of government benefits in comparison with private benefits, and underevaluation of government cost in comparison with private cost. In both cases, the distortion occurs in estimating the government's contribution or cost rather than that of the private sector. This is true because the *quid pro quo* relationship in the private sector makes accurate estimation of both costs and benefits almost universal. Of course, some private spending is speculative in nature; e.g., people may attend a play not knowing beforehand whether it will be worth the price of admission. But because each private transaction is voluntary, purely individual in nature, and based on *quid pro quo* relations, the persons making it usually know its benefits and costs in advance (except in cases of financial speculation). The absence of these qualities in public transactions gives rise to two major sources of error.

(1) Remoteness

Benefits from many government actions are remote from those who receive them, either in time, space, or comprehensibility. Economic aid to a distant nation may prevent a hostile revolution there and save millions of dollars and even the lives of American troops, but because the situation is so remote, the average citizen—living in rational political ignorance—will not realize he is benefiting at all. Almost every type of preventive action, by its nature, produces such hidden benefits. People

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are not impressed with their gains from water purification, regulation of food and drugs, safety control of airways, or the regulation of utility and transport prices, unless these actions fail to accomplish their ends. Then, perhaps for the first time, the absence of effective protection makes them aware of the benefits they were receiving when it was present.

In contrast, the immediate benefits of almost all private goods are heavily emphasized. In order to sell these goods on a voluntary basis, their producers must convince the public of their virtues. Thus consumers are subject to a continuous advertising barrage stressing the joys of private goods, whereas no comparable effort dramatizes the benefits they receive from government action. Even private goods with benefits of a remote nature, such as cemetery lots, are advertised in such a way as to make awareness of these benefits immediate.

Furthermore, much of the cost of remote government benefits is not equally remote. In the private sector, the *quid pro quo* balancing of costs and benefits is often attenuated by time-payment plans which magnify benefits in relation to costs. But in the public sector the opposite is true. The major source of federal government revenue—personal and corporate income taxes—must be computed by taxpayers on an annual basis. Even if these taxes are paid by installments, the fact that each taxpayer must sit down and figure out exactly how much he has to pay each year makes this cost very real to him. His rational political ignorance does not insulate him equally from knowledge of government benefits and their costs, but it tends to emphasize the latter.

In some cases, this asymmetry is reversed. Sales taxes which are passed on to consumers are not strongly felt by them because they are spread over time in a series of relatively small payments, and each consumer does not annually add up his total payments. But the intermediate agent—e.g., the retailer who collects the sales tax—does compute the total amount paid. True, he realizes that this cost is borne by his customers in the long run.[9] Nevertheless, both his short-run interests and his ignorance tend to emphasize the government's acquisition of these resources rather than the benefits they eventually provide; hence this acquisition takes on the elements of confiscation.

The confiscatory cast of taxation is an inevitable result of the divorce of costs from benefits and the remoteness of the latter. Whereas in *quid pro quo* transactions each yielding of resources is justified by immediate receipt of benefits, taxation appears to be outright seizure of privately

[9] If competition is not perfect, he bears some of the cost himself. This fact strengthens the argument that citizens are relatively aware of the sacrifices imposed upon them by taxes, even indirect ones.

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produced resources. It thus seems parasitic, rather than self-supporting like other costs of production or consumption. True, a rational taxpayer knows that he receives benefits in return for his taxes, but the remoteness of many such benefits removes the appearance of tit-for-tat balance that is present in private transactions.

In summary, a major portion of government benefits is remote in character compared with either taxes or private benefits. Since citizens are rationally ignorant of remote political events, they fail to realize all the government benefits they are receiving. However, they are well aware of a greater percentage of the taxes they pay and of the private benefits they are sacrificing to pay them. Because of this imbalance, the governing party cannot spend as much money on producing remote benefits as their real value to the citizenry warrants. Every dollar raised by taxation (or inflation) costs votes which must be compensated for by votes won through spending. But when the spending produces benefits that are not appreciated by voters, no compensating votes are forthcoming. Hence such spending must be restricted, or else the competing party will gain an advantage by cutting its own (proposed) spending and charging the incumbents with "waste." True, if the incumbents can demonstrate to the voters that this spending actually produces valid benefits, such charges will be harmless. But such demonstrations absorb resources themselves, especially since the nature of remote benefits makes them hard to document. And since the government is under constant pressure to cut expenditures, it cannot afford to use resources advertising the benefits of its policies. In this respect, it differs from private concerns, which must advertise in order to encourage voluntary purchase of their products. A striking example of this advertising asymmetry is in the field of electric power. Whereas private power corporations advertise both the virtues of their own product and the evils of public power, government utilities cannot even advertise their existence for fear of being accused of wasting public funds.

The outcome is a tendency toward elimination from the budget of all expenditures that produce hidden benefits. Only if the benefits involved are necessary for the survival of democracy itself will the governing party risk losing votes by producing them and spending resources to justify its actions. Even in this case, it tends to get by with the minimum possible amount because it fears charges of "waste" from its opponents.[10] Clearly, this situation causes government budgets to be

[10] This is not to deny that there is a great deal of actual waste in government which justly deserves censure. However, many political charges of "waste" are really attacks on production of genuine—but remote—benefits. These attacks are designed to capitalize

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smaller than they would be if voters were perfectly informed about all benefits and costs, however remote.

(2) UNCERTAIN NATURE OF GOVERNMENT BENEFITS

Closely akin to remoteness is the uncertain nature of many government benefits compared with private ones. Since government must deal with factors affecting society as a whole, the problems it faces are much more complex than the problems facing individuals in their private lives. Many policies undertaken by governments are launched without either control or knowledge of exactly what their outcomes will be. This is particularly true in international relations or fields of rapid obsolescence, such as national defense. Here the future is so beset by unknowns that whether a given policy will produce benefits or penalties is often problematical, and appraisal of the expected value of benefits forthcoming is extremely difficult. In contrast, each citizen in his private life knows of many ways to invest resources which will give him immediate benefits. True, life is full of risks, and the future is unknown to individuals as well as governments. Nevertheless, each person faces a much simpler set of choices in his own life, with many fewer parameters, than does even a local government. Hence the returns from investing resources privately must be discounted much less than those from investing resources publicly.

This situation is not a result of rational political ignorance, but of the uncertainty inherent in any complex situation involving human action. Even the best-informed government experts cannot predict the outcome of many of their policies. They have plenty of current information, but do not understand all the basic forces at work, and cannot predict the free choices of the men involved. This kind of ignorance cannot be removed by greater personal investment in political information.

Again, the outcome is a budget smaller than the "correct" one. Because voters are led by rational ignorance to undervalue benefits from policies with uncertain outcomes, the government cannot count on gaining political support by spending money on these policies. But since it can count on losing support by raising the money, it tends to eschew such policies altogether.

Throughout the preceding argument, it is assumed that citizens' ignorance conceals benefits lost through failure to spend, but does not conceal losses of utility through excessive spending. Perhaps if citizens be-

on rational ignorance for political gain at the expense of the actual benefit of the citizenry.

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came better informed about government policy, they would discover that present policies produce fewer benefits than they had supposed. In that case, increased information might increase their reluctance to transfer resources into the public sector. In other words, they would discover that the actual budget was larger than the "correct" budget instead of smaller.

This objection to our previous conclusion ignores the motivation of the government in regard to expending resources. Essentially, the argument implies that government conceals a great deal of "waste" spending under the cloak of citizens' ignorance; therefore if citizens had perfect information, they would want the government to eliminate this waste. Naturally, in a world of imperfect knowledge, every government makes mistakes, and undoubtedly perfect information would reveal such errors and cause the electorate to desire corrective reallocations. But, aside from this failing, the government has no motive to spend resources without producing tangible benefits. As we have seen, government policies are designed to gain votes by producing definite benefits known to voters. Furthermore, because voters are aware of the costs imposed upon them by government action, government is always under pressure to eliminate policies that do not justify their costs by producing tangible benefits. Hence it is irrational for government to "waste" resources on non-benefit-producing policies, since they lose votes through adding to taxation but do not gain votes by adding to benefits. Such "waste" expenditures would be rational only if (1) the government had a secondary motive of maximizing expenditures *per se* in addition to maximizing its chances for election, or (2) in the process of winning votes, the government spent money to benefit minorities in hidden ways which the majority would repudiate if they had perfect knowledge. The first case posits a government markedly different from the one in our model. Exploration of the behavior of such a government might be very interesting, but it cannot be undertaken in this article.[11] The second case will be dealt with in the next section.

[11] In my opinion, the elected officials of a democratic government are not significantly motivated to maximize expenditures. Their primary rewards are the perquisites of holding an elective office, and their attention and energies are focused upon overcoming the difficulty of remaining in that office in spite of challenges in every election. However, permanent bureaucratic functionaries in large governments do not have their energies absorbed by the problem of retaining their jobs. Hence they can concentrate on increasing their significance through expanding the size and influence of the departments under them, which usually involves increasing the amount of resources they control. Thus whether the expenditure-maximizing assumption enters a model of democratic government depends upon whether government in the model is simply a team of elected officials, or is a team of elected officials *plus* a set of permanent bureaucrats. The impact of the latter assumption has already been discussed in footnote 4.

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VII. The Tendency Toward Excessive Spending

Up to this point we have discussed two states of information in the electorate: perfect knowledge and partial ignorance. We have shown that when the latter prevails, costs of government action will appear more significant than benefits; so the actual budget will be smaller than the "correct" budget. However, there is also a third state of information: preponderant ignorance. In this state, citizens are ignorant of both the items in the budget and their benefits and costs. The budget that results when such ignorance predominates differs radically from those discussed previously: it tends to be *larger* than the correct size because of voters' ignorance of what items are in the budget.[12]

Government action affects each citizen in many ways, touching nearly all the functional "roles" he plays in society. Two important such roles are those of income-earner and consumer. As an income-earner, each citizen benefits when government spending increases the demand for the service he produces and when his taxes are reduced. He suffers when such spending is diminished or when his taxes increase. As a consumer, he suffers whenever government action increases the prices of the goods and services he buys, and he gains when it causes them to fall relative to his income.

Thus government action influences his welfare in both roles, but the two influences are not equally significant to him. Since almost every citizen receives nearly all his income from one source, any government act pertinent to that source is extremely important to him. In contrast, he spends his income on many products, each one of which absorbs a relatively small part of his total budget. Thus a government act which influences one of the products he consumes is nowhere near as vital to him as an act which influences the product he sells.[13] Under conditions of preponderant ignorance, this asymmetry means he is much more aware of government policies that affect him as an income-earner than he is of policies that affect him as a consumer.[14]

[12] However, this is not the only distortion caused by preponderant ignorance. It also encompasses the previously described tendency to create budgets that are too small because voters are ignorant of remote government benefits. The net effect of these two opposing forces is discussed in Section VIII.

[13] Many citizens sell their time and labor rather than an objective product. They are therefore interested in policies which affect both (1) the sale of their labor and (2) the sale of the particular products their labor is used to create.

[14] The classic example of this asymmetry is the tariff. A few producers manage to get government to set protective tariffs at the expense of millions of consumers, even though politicians seek to maximize votes. This is possible because producers are much more intensely interested in their income than consumers are in the individual prices that face them. See Downs, *op.cit.*, pp. 253-57.

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In order to maximize its political support, the government takes account of this situation in planning its budget. It realizes that two excellent ways to gain a citizen's support are to raise his income by giving him something for nothing or to buy what he produces. In some cases, both can be combined in a single act, such as hiring workers to build a public swimming pool which they subsequently use free of charge. But in a society with a complex division of labor, each specific income-earning group is usually a small minority of the population. Therefore government acts designed to please such a group usually distribute benefits to a minority, whereas their costs are added to the general tax burden and spread over the majority. Each recipient of such a boon thus feels he is making a net gain, since his share of the taxes added to pay for this project is much smaller than the benefit he receives. But the government also provides similar projects benefiting other minorities to which he does not belong. The costs of these projects are likewise spread over all citizens—including him—so he winds up paying for other people's special benefits, just as they pay for his. Whether or not he makes a net gain from this process is a moot point.

However, he cannot expect the government to undertake only those special projects which benefit him. Since a majority of citizens would be net losers under such an arrangement, they would vote against it. In order to get them to help pay for acts which benefit him, the government must provide them with benefits for which he helps to pay. Thus the government placates the majority who are exploited by a minority in one field by allowing them to be part of exploiting minorities in other fields.

In this process of "log-rolling," the citizens affected do not enter into direct bargains with each other. The only decision they face is which of the two competing budgets to vote for at each election. All the intervening trading of political support is done within the governing party, which knows that it must present the end result to the voters as a single package in competition with a similar package offered by its opponents. Each voter must then decide which budget provides him with the greatest difference between benefits received and costs imposed. If he receives many benefits from "special-interest" projects, he can expect his taxes to be swelled by the costs of similar projects benefiting other minorities, which the government must undertake to "buy off" the people who paid for his gains. Thus he might be better off if all minority benefits were eliminated and taxes lowered for everyone.

However, the question facing us is not whether budgets will include many or few minority-benefiting projects. It is whether the voters'

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ignorance of what is in the budget will cause governments to increase or decrease the number of such projects, thereby increasing or decreasing the budget as a whole.

As we have shown, when preponderant ignorance prevails, voters are most likely to be aware of those government policies which directly affect their sources of income. Hence they encourage government policies which raise the relative prices of the products they sell. But since any particular type of producer is in a minority in a complex society, these policies will be minority-benefiting policies. This is also true because such policies injure all buyers of the product, and buyers usually outnumber producers. Thus each citizen's perception threshold is most likely to be crossed by minority-benefiting policies involving government spending that raise (or could raise) his income.

On the other hand, government policies that affect the prices of individual goods he consumes will not be as apparent or as significant to him as policies which affect the price of what he produces. But policies that raise his costs as a consumer also benefit the citizens who produce what he consumes. It therefore appears that government can engage in specialized spending that benefits each type of producer without arousing the antagonism of consumers, especially since each consumer receives such benefits himself in his role as a producer. This situation tends to make the actual budget larger than the "correct" one.

However, this appearance is deceptive, for it ignores the cost side of the budget. When voters are preponderantly ignorant about the budget, they do not realize that special benefits are being provided to minorities to which they do not belong. But these benefits raise the general level of taxation, and voters are quite aware of their taxes, since taxes affect them directly. Thus their knowledge of the budget is narrowed down to two major items: government policies directly affecting their sources of income, and those types of taxes which inherently call themselves to every citizen's attention (e.g., income taxes).

As noted, when any minority gets special benefits from government spending, the minority's taxes are likely to go up much more than just its share of the cost of the benefits it receives. If the taxes that rise cannot be concealed from the citizenry, each minority may prefer to eschew its special benefits and vote for a budget which cuts out such benefits and reduces everyone's taxes. But if the taxes that rise are the type that are less likely to cross the citizens' perception threshold (e.g., sales taxes), then each minority may vote for a budget which provides it with special benefits because its taxes do not appear to go up significantly.

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Thus, insofar as taxation can be concealed from the electorate, the government budget will tend to be larger than the "correct" one. Voters will underestimate the costs they are paying for special benefits received, and parties will build this bias into their budgets. However, this tendency does not eliminate the previously discussed tendency toward a too-small budget. Under preponderant ignorance, both forces act simultaneously; so the net outcome in terms of total budget size is ambiguous.

VIII. The Net Results

Nevertheless, I believe the actual budget will still be smaller than the "correct" budget because even indirect taxation is much more apparent than many remote government benefits. As noted previously, whoever collects indirect taxes is aware of their existence even if in the long run he does not bear them himself. He tends to look at them as expropriation by the government of resources he could collect himself, since by raising the price of his product, they reduce his sales and cause him short-run hardships. Furthermore, he attempts to placate his customers for his higher price by identifying that element of it caused by the tax—thus making them aware of it. And if this tax is significant enough to support substantial increases over the "correct" budget, it must irritate many such persons. For these reasons, it is difficult to increase taxation to support "hidden" special projects without arousing opposition. True, policies like tariffs, which raise prices but do not increase taxes, can be used to provide minorities with hidden benefits, especially if the persons whose income-earning suffers are foreign citizens. But when a domestic appropriation of revenues is necessary to support a hidden subsidy, some voters are bound to complain. This fact necessarily limits the tendency for budgets to exceed the "correct" amount.

No such inherent brake limits the tendency for remote government benefits to be ignored. Since most remote benefits stem from preventive action, no one feels any immediate loss when they are not forthcoming. Perhaps particular producers might increase their incomes if government adopted policies that produced remote benefits, but their voices are not as loud as those of the taxpayers injured by indirect taxes. In the first place, they are not suffering "expropriation" of actual private earnings but only loss of potential income, which is rationally less significant because it must be discounted for uncertainty. Second, they are usually few compared with the large number of voters who must be taxed if the budget is to be made larger than the "correct" size. Furthermore, the benefits of preventive action in any field are usually known only to experts in that field, since such knowledge implies the ability

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to predict future events, which in turn demands familiarity with causal relations in the field. Whenever these experts are members of the government, they are primarily motivated to produce votes rather than benefits. But remote benefits cannot produce votes unless resources are spent to inform people about them—and voters are notoriously hard to inform about anything remote. Thus the experts who usually know most about such remote benefits are not strongly motivated to produce them—nor is anyone else.

For these reasons, the two opposite tendencies acting on the budget are not of equal strength. The forces which tend to enlarge budgets beyond the "correct" level are inherently limited, whereas those which tend to shrink it are not. Therefore I believe the budget will emerge smaller than its "correct" size.

Even if the net size of the actual budget in relation to its "correct" size is ambiguous, certain specific distortions in it (i.e., variations from the "correct" budget) can be expected to result from the two tendencies described. They are as follows:

(1) Indirect taxes will be too large in relation to direct taxes.

Corollary A: Governments which depend on direct taxation for the bulk of their financing will find it more difficult to balance their budgets than similar governments which depend upon indirect financing.

Corollary B: Since the costs of inflationary finance are not as apparent as those of taxation, this method will be too frequently used to avoid increasing direct taxation.

(2) Projects which benefit minorities will be awarded too large a share of the resources allocated to government.[15]

Corollary A: Costs of projects benefiting all citizens will be distributed with too many loopholes allowing specific minorities to evade their "normal" share.

Corollary B: Producers as a group will receive a disproportionate share of government spending and policy-protection in comparison with consumers.

(3) In comparison with policies producing immediate and tangible benefits, government policies which produce remote or problematical benefits will not be allocated as many resources as are warranted by their true importance.

[15] This conclusion and many of the ideas in Section VII were developed in discussion with Gordon Tullock, to whom I am much indebted.

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All of these tendencies distort the budget that would prevail if people were perfectly informed. Yet being perfectly informed is impossible, and even being well-informed is irrational; hence ignorance is likely to prevail. Therefore these distortions will probably occur even though a majority would be better off if they were eliminated.

IX. The Increasing Importance of the Problem

As society grows more complex, the role of governmental action becomes relatively more significant. This conclusion applies to all levels of government—local, county, state, national, and international. It results from government's function as a preventer and settler of conflicts among men.[16] Increased social complexity means increased interdependence, which in turn creates more conflicts of interest. Hence the need for more and more regulation, control, and intervention by government in all spheres of action, especially economic.

Social complexity is usually the result of an increasingly specialized division of labor, which also causes higher productivity. Thus societies tend to become richer as they grow more complex. In democracies, this increased wealth is usually distributed to all citizens—by no means equally, but in a generally rising living standard. As men become wealthier, their marginal economic desires shift from material necessities to luxuries and services. Freed from the need to direct all resources to private necessities, they can afford many collective benefits heretofore beyond their means. Thus the need for greater government action coincides with greater ability to pay for it.

However, ability to pay and desire to pay are not identical. We have shown that, in our model economic world, the citizens of a democracy are reluctant to yield their private resources to the government if the benefits to be gained thereby are at all remote from their everyday knowledge. This reluctance is not based on stupidity or irrationality, but on the ignorance in which the average citizen of a complex society is forced to live. He simply cannot afford to be well-informed about all the remote benefits of government action that are or might be important to him. And this ignorance influences the government to refrain from providing him with such benefits. The party in power fears losing to its opponents if it invests tangible resources in less tangible projects, even when it realizes that those projects would benefit the citizenry.

Furthermore, as society grows more complex, the remoteness of possible government action increases. This tendency is most obvious in

[16] This is not the sole function of government, but it is one of the most central.

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international affairs, where economic and technical progress have spread a web of interdependency over the whole world. It becomes harder and harder for even experts to keep well-informed on possible benefits to be gained from government policies, including those on the local scene. In short, society's complexity demands more government action, but it also makes each field of action more remote from the ken of the average man. Faced with a gigantic maze of government agencies, each grappling with incredibly intricate problems, a normal citizen soon concludes that keeping himself well-informed is hopeless. Therefore he wraps himself in a mantle of rational ignorance, insulated from knowledge of increasingly important remote benefits by the increasingly high cost of finding out about them.

Thus, as remote benefits become more important, they become less likely to be attained. Their greater importance is accompanied by still greater remoteness, and this makes governments more wary of devoting resources to them for fear of competition from opponents who advocate more immediate gains.[17] The actual government budget shrinks to an ever-smaller percentage of the "correct" budget, even if it increases in size absolutely. Yet most people do not realize this increasing distortion because they are blanketed by an ignorance of political realities which becomes deeper and deeper as the realities become more significant. This ignorance is abetted by every citizen's belief that the government budget is too large in relation to the benefits he is getting from it, because so much of it benefits others at his expense.

Conclusion

In a democracy, information costs tend to make governments enact budgets that are smaller than they would be if such costs were absent. This conclusion is true even if both parties and citizens are rational in

[17] During periods of rising national income, government receipts will increase without any change in tax rates. Assuming that such increases are not accompanied by an inflation which destroys their real value, the government will have greater purchasing power available to it. It might therefore appear that government could increase its spending beyond the "correct" amount without the voters knowing about it. However, this argument ignores two facts. First, the opposition party serves as a "watchdog" ready to call voters' attention to such tendencies. If the governing party tried to increase spending covertly with these funds, the opposition might defeat it by uncovering the added receipts and promising to return them to voters via tax cuts. Second, voters will realize that their absolute taxes are rising, even if their incomes are also rising. For both reasons, voters will be aware of rising government receipts. Since the governing party has no vested interest in maximizing its spending anyway, it cannot afford to risk antagonizing voters by trying to hide such increments. Hence it will evaluate them by weighing votes, as with any other receipts, and either return them to voters via tax cuts or spend them so as to gain further support. Thus whether the model is conceived of as static or dynamic is irrelevant to its major conclusions.

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their political behavior. It is based on the economic theory of democracy, which treats political parties as part of the division of labor, motivated primarily by self-interest like all other agents in the economy.

Furthermore, if economic growth is injected into the analysis, the tendency for actual budgets to be smaller than "correct" budgets becomes more and more pronounced. As society becomes more complex because of increasing specialization, the governing party is less able to allocate resources to those remote benefits which are of increasing importance to the welfare of the citizenry. It is even conceivable that the growing gap between the actual and the "correct" budgets might precipitate a crisis for democratic government. If the society were suddenly confronted by an external threat heretofore latent, its chronic tendency to underinvest in remote benefits might prove extremely deleterious, if not fatal.

However, such projection goes beyond the limits of my model. I have merely tried to use the economic theory of democracy to draw significant conclusions about democratic governments. This theory has been criticized because it cannot predict the actions of individual men, who play a central role in political events but do not always act selfishly. Therefore, it is said, the theory is useless for political analysis. But if it can reveal underlying tendencies in democracy which operate independently of individuals, then I believe it is a useful theory. In my opinion, it can be used to reach significant, non-obvious conclusions applicable to the real world—especially to the American government. I hope the analysis presented in this article provides an example of such application.

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ON THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF OUTER SPACE*

By KLAUS KNORR

THOUGH only a few years old, the Russian-American "space race" is in full swing and it is clear, even at this early stage of outer space technology, that it will present both countries with new opportunities and new dangers.

From the American viewpoint we are especially interested in these related questions: First, how will outer space activities affect the external situation within which the United States seeks to promote its security and welfare? Second, how can the United States manipulate space developments in order to improve its security and welfare? And third, how should the United States concert its space policy with other elements of its foreign, defense, and domestic policies?

The formulation of an effective space policy presupposes answers to the first question. However, we of course know extremely little about the nature and consequences of outer space technology as it will evolve in the future. Though we must rely on predictions, our ability to forecast developments is exceedingly frail. The precise technological nature of astronautical developments—let alone their political, military, and economic implications—is largely a matter of guesswork, and fanciful guesswork at that. But, since we cannot do without a policy, conjecture we must.

The present article does not attempt to formulate policy. It merely presents some thoughts,[1] necessarily very speculative, on the international implications of outer space developments during the next twenty-five years. To the extent that these speculations suggest answers, these answers should not be taken too seriously, for they may be based on

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[1] The treatment is selective. For example, it neglects much of the current discussion of international space co-operation, a subject on which there is considerable literature; e.g., Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, *Controls for Outer Space*, New York, 1959.

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assumptions that turn out to be wrong. It is believed, however, that some of the questions raised deserve interest and continuing study.

I. The Analytical Objectives

The international system is a system of state actors with certain characteristics—that is, capabilities and intentions—who act within a given setting or arena. During the next twenty-five years, of course, the capabilities and intentions of the actors may undergo many and substantial changes which have nothing to do with outer space activities. We are not speculating here about such changes, although these might impinge very much on the development and consequences of space technology and exploration (as would, for instance, the collapse of the Soviet system of government, or the outbreak of thermonuclear war, or any number of other events). In other words, we assume for analytical purposes that the present structure of the international system will stay roughly the same during the next twenty-five years, although we allow for some gradual changes in the capabilities of actors (assuming that certain recent trends continue).[2] More precisely, we are concerned with possible changes in actors' intentions and capabilities brought about by evolving activities in outer space.

Our question then is: How much will advancing space technology and development affect the intentions and/or capabilities of actors in the system, and hence perhaps also the operation of the system itself?

II. Assumptions

We are concerned with activities in outer space—that is, with developments inaugurated by Sputnik rather than by the first ICBM's. These missiles intrude upon outer space, but in the following we are interested in shots into or from outer space rather than from one point on the earth to another.

Regarding the next twenty-five years or so, I make the following assumptions about outer space developments. Though these assumptions are not wholly arbitrary—they are based on my reading of the available literature—they may turn out to be false predictions. I assume that many kinds of satellites will be developed, and that some degree of travel *within* the solar system may occur, including travel by manned vehicles to, say, the moon and possibly the nearer planets. For what

[2] Thorough procedure would require that, first, we treat the present international system as being incapable of any changes except those resulting from space development (this as the only independent variable); and that, second, we run various *other independent* changes successively through the analysis.

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seems to me to be good scientific and engineering reasoning, I do *not* assume that, during the period, there will be interstellar travel by manned vehicles. Hence, such problems as the following are excluded: the encounter of other than the most primitive forms of life in outer space; and the colonization of other stars, except possibly for small stations on the moon and the nearer planets.

III. The Possibility of a Space Race

It is probable that, in the course of the next two or three decades, the United States and Soviet Russia will run a "space race" very similar to the arms race they are engaged in now. Both races are in a crucial sense research and development contests. In the competitive cold-war situation, military and prestige considerations will impel both nations to press ahead with space activities, with neither being able to afford quitting the race.

Though improbable, it is nevertheless *possible* that one country will outclass the other in outer space. If so, the USSR is at present the more likely candidate for pre-eminence, and this for the same reasons that seem at present to make a Soviet lead in military capability a distinct possibility. Among these reasons are, notably, effective concentration of specific resources (e.g., scientists) on particular tasks that are centrally determined; effective allocation of general resources to the rapid accumulation of certain special resources (again, e.g., scientists); and—according to general impression, though little hard evidence—relatively short lead times in research and development. The chances are, however, that the efforts of the two countries will yield approximately equal national capabilities, i.e., that neither will forge ahead of the other all across the board in space capability.

If pursued with a competitive vigor similar to that shaping recent defense programs, space programs will obviously be very expensive, with research and development expenditures accounting for even a larger proportion of the total than they have in recent defense expenditures, and with a high rate of equipment obsolescence, etc. If space activities are conducted on a large scale and on top (and actually as part) of the arms race, it is clear that only a few countries will be able to muster the resources for effective participation in the outer space race.

For some time to come, the participants will still be the Big Two, augmented perhaps by exploitation of the capabilities of their respective allies. However, national economic capability for participation in the space race is a function not only of a nation's or alliance's aggregate

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economic capacity but also (a) of the proportion of that capacity diverted to space activity (which involves a political decision), and (b) of the efficiency with which the resources so allocated are employed. Thus, a country such as China may become a formidable participant long before the 25-year period is over, while the United Kingdom, for instance, will probably remain a lesser "space power." For the reason indicated under (a) above, Communist China is indeed more likely to emerge as a full-fledged third participant than is a Western democratic country.[3]

This does not mean that outer space activities are likely to be entirely monopolized by the Big Two and eventually perhaps by a Big Three or Four. There will be "fourth countries" all along that will be able to participate in outer space activities on a small scale and will have varying astronautical capabilities for using space. This will be facilitated to some extent by international co-operation. Thus the United States has bilateral arrangements with Britain and Canada for launching their payloads with U.S. rockets. The Soviet Union might similarly assist China and other Communist countries. But a comprehensive and complex outer space system (or series of systems) will be too costly for all but a few nations or coalitions.

There is, of course, one major alternative to an unrestrained competitive race in outer space development, and that is the internationalization or supranationalization of this development under the United Nations. *Internationalization* would permit national activities but subject them to strict international control. *Supranationalization* would mean the exclusive development of outer space activities by a specialized agency of the United Nations. An effective degree of international regulation, including inspected preclusion of military uses, would still permit competition for national prestige but would dampen the motivation for the competitive race. Supranationalization would do away with national rivalry. Should this happen, the pace of outer space development would no doubt be slower than under competitive conditions, even though supranationalization might eliminate some of the duplicative wastes of international rivalry. Presumably, development would be slower because the big nations would be reluctant to allocate as large financial outlays to a United Nations program as they would to national programs. And they would be apt to spend less on international programs because these would serve some of their real or imagined *national* interests (e.g.,

[3] At this point, it is difficult even to speculate about a possible fourth within twenty-five years. Neither Japan nor India is likely to have a sufficient resource base. This would leave some West European *combine* as a noteworthy possibility.

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military superiority, prestige) to a lesser degree than national programs might.

If the development of outer space activities were internationalized or supranationalized, most of the problems mentioned in this article would not arise or would take on a quite different complexion. As a side effect, this would also serve to enhance the position of the United Nations and the chances that other than outer space activities would in time be internationalized or supranationalized. In fact, the history of mankind probably would be grossly different under this alternative from what it is likely to be under the competitive assumption.

For the larger part of outer space activities, however, effective internationalization or supranationalization will probably be shunned by the Big Two. This is *likely* to happen because either or both may hope to outdo the other under competitive conditions and because, even at this early stage, it would be difficult (though perhaps not impossible) to separate outer space research and development from military research and development and to segregate military from non-military uses of outer space; and a decision to internationalize outer space development would therefore presuppose a far-reaching agreement on arms control and arms-development control.[4]

On the other hand, the initial assumptions on scientific and technological (tacitly also economic!) feasibility exclude very powerful pressures toward internationalization. For instance, if it became possible within the envisaged time period for one or several nations to manipulate substantially the weather conditions of other countries, the competitive situation would hardly remain tolerable for long (unless some powerful deterrent inhibited nations from using their weather-changing capability). There would then emerge a strong pressure either toward internationalization by voluntary agreement or toward one power achieving supremacy in the system and becoming the single organizer.

[4] The Russians have made this point repeatedly. For example: "The American proposals on prohibiting the military use of outer space, while preserving nuclear weapons and U.S. military bases in foreign territories, in fact aim not at disarmament, but at a redistribution of armaments. . . . It is all too obvious that such proposals cannot win the support of the Soviet Union and other peaceful countries, which work by deeds and not words alone for disarmament that would guarantee genuine security to all countries, big and small. For it is not the space rocket as such that endangers the security of mankind, but the nuclear warhead which may be delivered by a space rocket, a rocket of any possible range, a military aircraft, etc. Clearly, the disarmament of outer space cannot be divorced from disarmament on Earth."—Y. Korovin, Corresponding Member, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, "On the Neutralization and Demilitarization of Outer Space," *International Affairs* (Soviet Society for the Popularization of Political and Scientific Knowledge), No. 12 (December 1959), pp. 82-83.

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IV. Economic Costs and Gains

The question arises of whether substantial economic implications of advancing space technology might have important international political consequences. Here, the possibilities range from the receipt of vast net gains from space activities, at one extreme, to the economic exhaustion of the main contestants for space supremacy, at the other extreme. My conclusion is that, after about twenty-five years, the more likely outcomes will be far from the extremes and not too far from the middle of the range, at which neither net gains nor losses would accrue from space activities. Over the entire period, the most likely economic outcome is substantial, but bearable, net losses to mankind or to the main rivals for outer space supremacy. (Under the competitive assumption, the economic benefits would tend to be more diffused throughout mankind than the costs.)

While space activities under competitive conditions will be rather costly to the main rivals, costs will surely fall short of anything disastrous. Economic exhaustion, after all, could mean only that costs were substituted for investment to such an extent that economic stagnation occurred, or for private consumption to such an extent that popular dissatisfaction endangered internal political stability. The governments of the Big Two are unlikely to choose such a level of outlays, even though total expenditures on defense and space activities (to some degree inseparable categories) were to exceed current proportions of gross national products.

On the basis of present evidence, on the other hand, it is hard to credit the outer space enthusiasts who promise vast economic benefits. Colonization of other stars is ruled out by the initial assumptions; fantastic transportation costs will rule out anything like "mineral" or "agricultural" exploitation in outer space. Improved weather forecasting through satellites should be a great boon to farming and some other economic activities and reduce losses caused by storms, but in view of all the determinants of agricultural productivity, the eventual net gain, though substantial, is unlikely to be revolutionary. It will compare with the results of pest control. (I do not believe active weather manipulation to be feasible within the period concerned.) Similarly, communication satellites may greatly cut the costs of telephonic, radio, and television communication across and between continents. However, during the next two or three decades at least, these and other economic benefits may not turn out to be *net* advantages to mankind (or certainly to the main space powers); and if there should be net economies, they will

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most likely be marginal in relation to the production of national incomes, or of world income.

The greatest economic advantages from advancing outer space activities may eventually be derived from the facilitation of scientific breakthroughs which lead to vastly cheaper energy. But even if gross energy were virtually costless, it is hard to see how the economic results the world over could be revolutionary. It does not seem worthwhile to speculate about such "windfalls," since true scientific breakthroughs are unpredictable.

V. Military Changes

Conceivably, changes in military capabilities brought about by space technology could profoundly affect international relations during the next twenty-five years. Military representatives have made strong but exceedingly vague statements about the importance of "space power." According to some of them, that nation will become the dominant power on earth which becomes the dominant power *farthest out* in outer space. But as long as the term "space power" is left undefined, this sounds like a nebulous myth, or at best like a mechanical extension of airpower doctrine at its most vacuous.

Among the military questions that could be raised, perhaps the most important from our point of view are the following: (1) Would a lead in space technology by one of the Big Two (later on perhaps "Big Few") confer decisive military superiority over the other (or others)?[5] (2) Would military space power (whatever that means) consolidate or diminish the present or imminent "balance of terror," so far as it is based on a convincing threat of mutual annihilation?

My tentative answer to Question (1) is, on the whole, negative and twofold. First, and as mentioned in the foregoing, it is improbable that one of the main contestants for space power will forge ahead of the other substantially and clearly (meaning, visibly to all) in space research and development in operational systems. To repeat, I also believe that, should the improbable happen, it is more likely to be the Soviet Union which outstrips the United States, unless we manage to improve our research and development performance. Second, at this point it is hard, though not impossible, to foresee military uses of space technology that would be of decisive importance—that, if possessed by only one of the Big Two, would give it clear-cut military supremacy over the other.

[5] For reasons stated above, especially expense, the chances are slim that a smaller country will outflank the Big Two militarily by means of successful and yet cheap research and development in space technology.

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Admittedly, the military value of the use of outer space is likely to be greater if only one power enjoys this capability than if nations are more or less matched in this respect. However, a significant monopoly or anything approaching it seems improbable.[6]

TECHNICAL FACILITIES

The main military uses foreseen at present are three. First, satellites are expected to improve weather forecasting, earth mapping, navigation aids, and communication facilities that are especially important for the effective use of widely dispersed military units. They may improve the functioning of air offense and defense systems. These advances would obviously upgrade military planning and operations, but they would scarcely do so with *revolutionary* military effects. One consequence of better communication—permitting dependable control of dispersed military units by governments and top-level commands—might be a reduction in the danger of accidental war. On the other hand, it has been asserted that space craft might be mistaken by a nation for hostile ICBM's, and thus, in the absence of international filing or registration, that space travel will increase the risk of accidental war. This assertion seems far-fetched. What is in question here is a mistaken assumption of an attack. But would an aggressor fire off *one* ICBM to attack another country? If it did so deliberately, rather than by accident, it would do so for some bargaining purpose, and the shot would then be accompanied or preceded by verbal statements, and possibly by assurances that no full-scale attack was involved. If this is rational behavior for an aggressor, the expectations of other countries would be complementary and this type of danger of accidental war should thus be slight. After all, all countries have a common interest in avoiding an accidental outbreak of nuclear war. Incidentally, the same considerations apply to the possibility of inadvertent releases of, or from, bomb satellites. The danger of accidental nuclear war arising from equipment or communication failures seems great only if salvos, rather than single shots, are involved. That some degree of such danger exists is not, however, contested, especially as long as nuclear retaliatory systems are very vulnerable to surprise attack.

[6] A transitory monopoly is of course likely, in the sense that one country will be first to put a military satellite into orbit. It is improbable, however, that the initial satellites will produce substantial military effects, because their numbers are apt to be small and their performance characteristics relatively imperfect in the early stages of development.

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RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES

Second, there are expected to be reconnaissance satellites for purposes of military intelligence and, particularly, early warning of surprise attacks. The advantages which such satellites will offer are as yet unclear and uncertain. My tentative impression is that these advantages, though also tending to upgrade military capabilities, are unlikely to entail very important changes in military capabilities over the longer run.

At first blush, reconnaissance satellites seem to promise especially great benefits to the United States, which finds it much harder to secure intelligence about the Communist countries than the latter do in gathering information about the United States. However, the advantages appear less striking on second thought. The utility of reconnaissance satellites will depend on when they become operational, on what they will see, on Soviet basing practices, on the kinds of coverage they might give and, of course, on other sources of intelligence.

To begin with the matter of warning time when the opponent has launched a missile salvo, virtually instantaneous warning may be obtained by less elaborate means now under development and apparently nearing completion (e.g., Project *Tepee*).[7] And continuous military surveillance of a country from satellites will hardly give advance warning of an *impending* attack when missiles rather than planes constitute the main attacking force. Knowing that it was under surveillance, an aggressor would not give away his plans by such measures as visible evacuation of urban populations. His inability to do so would, however, tend to increase the aggressor's damage from retaliation and this would tend to diminish the chances of his deciding on a surprise blow.

Advance warning of a missile salvo would offer lesser benefits if a large proportion of our own retaliatory forces were fairly invulnerable to enemy attack. In that event the high probability of mutual destruction would make all-out thermonuclear war less likely. Moreover, our retaliatory forces would then benefit less from an alert preceding action, though the more advance warnings were received, the more the damage to our civilian population would be reduced. At this stage it seems

[7] Even a small increase in warning time after hostile ICBM's have been launched is of great benefit to a vulnerable deterrent force (e.g., planes on soft bases). This advantage may be precious to the United States—particularly by obviating more costly measures for shortening reaction time (e.g., airborne alert)—during a short period in the early 1960's when Soviet Russia has acquired a large force of ICBM's and the less vulnerable *Minuteman* and *Polaris* systems are not yet operational in sufficient numbers. Reconnaissance satellites are also reputed to be less subject than the *Tepee* to degradation by jamming. On the other hand, the reconnaissance satellite may not be operational before this phase of American vulnerability has passed, whereas *Tepee* will be ready in time.

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probable that our retaliatory forces will come to be fairly invulnerable against counterforce attack by the mid-1960's, although whether we will avail ourselves sufficiently of the technological possibilities depends on timely decisions to make the necessary expenditures. Effective reconnaissance satellites will probably not become operational before the mid-1960's.

It also seems doubtful that reconnaissance satellites will afford us good intelligence on missile sites already installed or in the process of being installed—that is, intelligence on certain kinds of military *capabilities*. The expectation of reconnaissance satellites may induce the opponent to install fixed missile sites before these satellites become operational. Once installed, solid-fuel missiles, emplaced in underground sites, and activity on the site can be camouflaged. Knowing himself to be under satellite surveillance, the opponent would seek to install new fixed bases in areas and in ways which would make them hard to detect from outer space (e.g., in industrial and mining areas). Why should the opponent co-operate with our intelligence efforts by, for example, putting new missile bases in virgin territory? He will try to beat our intelligence system and, though he cannot do this without incurring some extra costs, they are unlikely to be substantial. It is also probable that reconnaissance satellites will have low value when it comes to keeping effective track of mobile delivery systems, i.e., submarines, railroads, and barges. For all these reasons, incidentally, satellites would seem to have limited utility as internationally established means for obstructing surprise attack. And the value of whatever intelligence about missile bases reconnaissance satellites might produce would diminish as Soviet retaliatory forces as a whole achieved a high degree of invulnerability against knock-out attack.

Reconnaissance satellites seem potentially perhaps more valuable as a source of advance warning of conventional types of attack, involving considerable troop movements and air force deployments. But it is comparatively easy to get intelligence of preparation for large-scale surface attacks by other means. Satellites would seem to have good intelligence value *during* war. This is obvious in the case of surface hostilities, but it also holds true in the case of thermonuclear warfare, when such satellites might give information on target destruction.

It is also said that through reconnaissance satellites we might garner other types of valuable information—for example, about the Soviet economic system. Though this is likely, the utility of such intelligence operations depends on the yield of other available sources of information, which is rather good for many kinds of data.

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It is possible that, when fully developed, reconnaissance satellites will perform better than it is now safe to expect. But in any event they will function as one of many sources of information. On the other hand, it seems probable that, whatever their military utility, it will probably be greater for the United States than for the Soviet Union, which is able to gather so much military intelligence from American publications and, presumably, from agents in the United States.

BOMB SATELLITES

Third, there is the possibility of firing thermonuclear warheads from satellites (or from the moon).[8] Bomb satellites are feasible scientifically and are likely to be developed. Yet it is difficult now to predict their military properties. Will it be possible to provide them with dependable and sensitive communication systems for aiming and firing shots? Will satellite-launched missiles give less warning time of attack than those launched from the surface of the earth? Will they be more or less vulnerable to destruction than terrestrial launching facilities? Regarding these and other characteristics, including costs, we are at present unable to compare bomb satellites with other delivery systems under development.

Substantial differences in performance and costs could certainly be extremely important. Suppose, for instance, that—as many people now predict—delivery systems on earth become virtually invulnerable to simultaneous attack (for reasons of numbers and diversity as well as hardness and mobility) so that an effective deterrent standoff ensues. Suppose now that bomb satellites are introduced and possess a degree of performance reliability and accuracy that will render delivery means on earth highly vulnerable to attack from outer space. In that event, decisive military superiority would accrue to one power if it alone were equipped with an adequate number of bomb satellites. To repeat, however, it seems improbable, on grounds of technology and competitive endeavor, that one power alone will be able suddenly to introduce bomb satellites of such perfection.

Another problem might arise from popular reaction to the knowledge of bomb satellites passing "over" national territories. Of course, we do not know the nature of these reactions and how they might differ from country to country. The nature of such reactions, and national differences among them, might matter if, for example, a population panicked or became disposed to yield to threats by other countries, thus

[8] Lt. Col. S. E. Singer, "The Military Potential of the Moon," *Air University Quarterly*, XI (1959), pp. 31-53.

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upsetting any existing balance of power. The identification of bomb satellites might present still another, and eerie, problem. Would we know which satellites put into orbit by other nations were bomb satellites? And would other countries know which of ours were of this type?

VI. The Balance of Deterrence

There remains Question (2), which is of course interrelated with Question (1). How may the advent of bomb satellites affect the relative balance of thermonuclear deterrence in the longer-range future? Will it make the balance less or more delicate? Much will depend on the relative vulnerability of retaliatory forces, on earth and in space, to a simultaneous surprise attack that would be effective enough to spare the attacker substantial counterdamage and give him military domination.

At this stage, of course, we do not know how vulnerable bomb satellites will be. Leaving aside such properties as accuracy, reliability, and yield, their military worth will vary inversely with their relative vulnerability. If they were less easily attacked and disabled than launching systems on earth, they could become a sort of "space-borne alert." Yet they may turn out to be vulnerable. Although they will be moving, will they not move like horses on a merry-go-round? The feasibility of an anti-satellite missile certainly cannot be ruled out. On the other hand, such a missile may prove difficult to develop and expensive to produce and operate in adequate numbers, and this latter impediment might be compounded if missile-carrying satellites could be protected by the use of decoys. It may also become technologically possible to make their orbits less predictable. At this point, these questions cannot be resolved and our analysis must proceed on the basis of alternative assumptions.

Whether or not thermonuclear deterrent systems on earth will be vulnerable to a first strike, we do not know either. Arms technology is dynamic and may present us with surprises, and much depends on how different countries avail themselves of the technological possibilities, especially on their willingness to make large expenditures. Looking at the long-range future, however, the technological chances appear at this time to favor relative safety for retaliatory strategic forces—especially if they are composed of interlocking weapons systems of considerable diversity in terms of hardness and mobility, and also if they are made up of large numbers of weapons which an opponent would have to hit simultaneously.

On this assumption, the balance of terror would gain stability which,

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be it noted, is not necessarily identical with over-all military stability. Stability on the strategic level, resulting from invulnerable deterrent postures, may make for instability as far as conventional or limited hostilities are concerned. Conversely, if retaliatory forces remain vulnerable or become so again—thus permitting the pursuit of counterforce strategies—the strategic balance will be unstable, but the fear of touching off a mutually destructive exchange of strategic weapons, when relatively minor objectives are at stake, will tend to inhibit lesser forms of aggression.

In the event that bomb satellites have characteristics of accuracy and mechanical dependability unsuitable for effective attack on the terrestrial retaliatory forces of an opponent, the outer space weapon might still be valuable by adding to the threat against the opponent's population and economy. The greater its own invulnerability and the greater in degree the vulnerability of earthbound systems, the more valuable the outer space weapon would be as an addition to "passive" deterrents. If the safety of the terrestrial components left something to be desired, bomb satellites would add to deterrent safety either by being less vulnerable or, even if equally or somewhat more vulnerable, by adding deterrent diversity, thereby complicating attacks by an opponent and thus upgrading the over-all capability to deter. Conversely, bomb satellites would tend to have little value if the deterrent systems on earth were highly secure. Moreover, if the deterrent worth of the outer space weapon were distinctly marginal, its value would in part depend on comparative costs. Should satellites be much more expensive than terrestrial facilities, it would be more efficient to buy more of the latter in order to increase deterrent capacity. On the other hand, in the event terrestrial systems were highly vulnerable to attack and the deterrent worth of bomb satellites was substantial, or decisive, an unstable deterrent system might be turned into a stable one with possible repercussions on the probability and destructiveness of limited wars, as indicated above. Such stability would be especially strong if the outer space retaliatory system were in the possession of all thermonuclear powers, since this condition, compared with a preceding stage characterized by highly vulnerable terrestrial forces, would reduce the danger of nuclear war being precipitated by accident or pre-emptive intent. In this case there would be an increasing tendency to place the "passive" deterrence system in outer space.

It can be asked whether bomb satellites might come to constitute effective counterforce weapons against retaliatory forces on earth. If the latter had been fairly invulnerable to salvo attack before, the intro-

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duction of the outer space launchers would upset a stable deterrent situation in the event that terrestrial systems were highly vulnerable to the space weapon. This is, however, a most improbable development for several reasons. As already indicated, invulnerability is a function of many factors. It rests not only on the intrinsic protection which each weapon (missile launcher or plane) derives from hardened sites or mobility on land or undersea, but also on the numbers and weapon diversity of the entire retaliatory capability. Invulnerability also depends upon the opponent's capability: on the characteristics of his weapons (performance dependability, accuracy, nuclear payload), their numbers and control, and on the accuracy of his intelligence. Since terrestrial systems are developing delivery accuracies, payloads and, in time, dependability which will leave little room for practical improvement, it is most unlikely that bomb satellites could become decisive on these grounds; and it is equally improbable that they would become incomparably cheaper, and hence more numerous, than terrestrial weapons. Finally, on the assumption that all great nuclear powers develop bomb satellites, an all-out counterforce attack would have to be directed against the opponent's retaliatory weapons in outer space as well as on earth.

The placement of retaliatory weapons in outer space is bound to entail other consequences which are difficult to anticipate. As already mentioned, there may be problems of communication with bomb satellites, of the outer space system going out of kilter, of the identification of military satellites, and so forth. If bomb satellites are not markedly inferior to terrestrial launching facilities in terms of performance and costs, they would seem to offer the advantage that any counterforce attack on one's retaliatory system would not cause incidental, though heavy, damage to one's population and economy to the extent that one's strategic forces were based in outer space.

However, for this very reason, outer space would lend itself to the relative encouragement of military demonstrations and indeed to limited strategic warfare. As long as exchanges of hostile blows were confined to outer space (assuming that this became technically feasible), the penalty for a first strike would be less severe than if such attacks were directed against terrestrial targets, because the attacked nation, not wishing to initiate a mutual destruction of population, would presumably limit its counteraction to outer space targets. This is, of course, tantamount to saying that bomb satellites would tend to add to deterrent capability only as far as attacks on terrestrial targets were concerned. Such developments would introduce a measure of instability

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into the deterrent situation and permit the use of strategic military demonstrations for purposes of political bargaining.

The above considerations are inevitably fanciful. But many of the problems raised will become urgent with the passage of time, and such urgency must be anticipated now, as best we can, if we wish to plan research and development for outer space technology with foresight. Actual developments may bring surprises which will alter present expectations of the military value of outer space activities. At present, however, technological factors justify the tentative conclusion—which we should stand ready to revise in the light of new knowledge—that military developments of *revolutionary* impact are unlikely. Yet because such developments are possible, neither Soviet Russia nor the United States will wish to run the risk of substantial military benefits being monopolized by the other. The continuation of the outer space race is therefore virtually certain. As Lieutenant General Bernard A. Schriever stated recently, "We should get it firmly in our minds that the development of an operational capability in space—that is, our ability to use it in a practical way—is not simply an adventure. . . . My really pressing concern is the direct and immediate importance of exploiting the advantage that space offers to our vital military deterrent posture."[9]

VII. Prestige

Scientific and technological prestige will be a major objective motivating nations to participate in and, indeed, try to excel in space activities. In the present age, scientific and technological achievement is valued highly. And it will be valued increasingly in the sense that, as additional societies undergo modernization, they will modernize the relevant parts of their value patterns. Such achievement is taken as a sign of national "vigor" and—because of the exceedingly close (actual or assumed) relationship between such achievements and military potential, if not military capability—also as the symbol, if not the substance, of military power. Space activities being especially glamorous, considerable advantages of international prestige are likely to accrue to the nation which assumes leadership in this enterprise. The Soviet Union has understood this and derived great propaganda benefits from its early space successes, thus rendering world public opinion still more sensitive to spectacular space activities. Although some American officials, including President Eisenhower, have affirmed that in our outer space activities we should not engage in a prestige race with the Soviet Union, it is clear to others that we are so engaged. Thus Mr. George V. Allen, director

[9] *New York Times*, December 21, 1959, p. 5.

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of the United States Information Agency, declared to the House Science and Astronautics Committee: "... our space program has an importance far beyond the field of the activity itself, in that it bears on almost every aspect of our relations with people of other countries and on their view of us as compared with the U.S.S.R. Our space program may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability to compete with a formidable rival, and as a criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy of emulation by other peoples."[10]

Prestige accruing from activities in outer space is an important factor in the creation and leadership of coalitions[11] and, in democratic as well as in non-democratic countries, in the domestic political strength of governments. Indeed, nations may compete for space stations just as in the past they competed for colonies, even at times (as in the last quarter of the nineteenth century) when colonies seemed hardly to confer any important military or economic advantages except to certain groups. (And there will now be groups, in the United States and elsewhere, which will find space development advantageous to themselves.) Nations then so competed largely because, as the benefited groups successfully managed to suggest, colonies were accepted as symbols of status and power.

The prestige effects may indeed turn out to be the major consequence of outer space activities in the international system. One has only to imagine the impact if Communist China appeared suddenly as the third space power, and countries that are now "neutral" in the East-West conflict were disposed to generalize from Communist space successes about the superiority of Communist technology and of the social and economic system which achieved such competence in one generation. Preoccupation with the prestige effect would be greatly reinforced if leadership in space exploration were widely equated with preponderant military strength, and outer space obviously lends itself to the demonstration of military capabilities. Space success might thus stiffen the negotiating attitudes of governments even though this were not warranted by the hard military facts. The USSR and the United States, and perhaps some other countries as well, may for these reasons continue to vie for outer space supremacy even though doing so constitutes a net drain on economic resources and is of insignificant or marginal worth in terms of real military strength.

[10] *Ibid.*, January 23, 1960. See also the statement by Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary of State, before the same committee, *Washington Post*, January 21, 1960.

[11] Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and the Development of Space Technology," *Proceedings* of the RAND Conference on Outer Space, to be published in the fall of 1960.

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VIII. United Nations and International Regulation

As stated in the foregoing, it seems at present highly improbable that outer space activity will be tightly internationalized or supranationalized, in the sense that all or most of such activity would become the monopoly of an operating specialized agency under the United Nations, an agency which would of course draw personnel and finance from member nations on some such basis as that developed by the International Bank or the International Monetary Fund. For the Great Powers it would be somewhat more economical from the point of view of budget outlays to favor such a non-competitive arrangement; and the great advantage would be, of course, that of minimizing international conflict resulting from outer space activities. However, such a development is highly improbable, because the Great Powers could expect to forgo prestige advantages, possible military advantages, and at least some degree of military privacy, if they internationalized the development of outer space.

However, it is of course possible for the UN or some other international body to regulate to some extent the non-military space activities carried on by individual nations. Indeed, concerning some of these activities, functional regulation and co-operation should confer such obvious net benefits to all that a great deal of international regulation and co-operation is probable, if not certain. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we may expect this to be increasingly the case, the more some combination of the following conditions is given: (a) the purpose of the activity is peaceful (non-military); (b) the activity is very expensive; (c) the activity is not particularly prestigious, but rather routine; and (d) co-operation is an operational requisite (e.g., television).

Such activities as the operation of weather satellites, communication of weather information, the non-military use of communication satellites, and perhaps certain other scientific activities might well be readily regulated. Similarly (and concurrently), some kind of international space code or law is likely to develop concerning at least certain aspects of space activities, such as radio communication, satellite tracking, space navigation, re-entry, accidents, and satellite broadcasting.

Regulation of some aspects of exploratory space travel—manned or unmanned—is also likely to be agreed upon (e.g., registration) as long as international regulation does not seriously interfere with efficient national planning, the acquisition of prestige, or the exploration of military advantages.

International agreement on where outer space begins (and where

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national control over the upper airspace ends) seems to me less likely as long as the balance of national advantage or disadvantage on this matter appears unclear. However, absence of such agreement may not be very important in international politics. The situation in this respect may come to be much like that of disagreement on the extent of territorial waters.

I will not speculate here on the question of whether some outer space activities will be set up jointly by the Great Powers in execution of an agreement on arms control—for instance, the use of satellites for monitoring a bomb test agreement, or action in line with President Eisenhower's proposals of January 1957 for open sky and space control. Obviously, the probability of such joint outer space activity depends entirely on the probability of arms control. However, I would suppose that any international control of military activities would raise appreciably the chances that outer space activities would become subjected to international regulation.

In the absence of international arms control, international regulation of, or co-operation on, certain aspects of outer space activities is likely to become extensive, but will confine itself to a wide range of technical functions and evade the crucial issue of the inspected control of military uses.[12]

IX. Sources of Conflict

On the basis of the criteria suggested above, I doubt that the Great Powers will readily agree on advance regulation of space stations on the moon or other planets. The need for doing so now does not seem to be especially compelling or advantageous. But the prospect for such agreement would improve as soon as some of the critical conditions were clearly met; for example, if it were clarified that a moon station would confer little or no military advantage. The question that must now be raised is whether the lack of agreement or regulation would be conducive to international conflict.

Suppose, in the absence of advance agreement, one of the Great Powers should succeed in establishing a manned station on the moon. Let us also assume that any artificial satellites then in existence added only marginally—and, among the powers, equally—to the strategic capabilities of the big nations, and that these capabilities were fairly invulnerable to attack. This condition would seem to imply that a moon station

[12] This assumption is in line with the modest proposals of the *ad hoc* committee of the U.N. General Assembly—a committee which was boycotted by the USSR. Cf. Jessup and Taubenfeld, *op.cit.*, pp. 260ff.

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would also be of minor military significance. But so presumably would the opposite condition—namely, that artificial satellites were of great military value. In other words, we assume in the following that moon stations would not upset the balance of military capabilities based on earth and artificial satellites. If the United States were first on the moon, the most likely situation to develop would be one resembling that on the Antarctic mass—that is, no claim to sovereignty over the entire satellite. But suppose the USSR succeeded in doing so first, and declared the moon to be henceforth part of the socialist camp and denied to capitalist exploitation.[13] What might happen then?

Of course, if one nation did thus claim occupation of, and sovereignty over, the moon (or a planet)—in a sense establishing a new colonial frontier reminiscent of previous centuries—the claim would be either accepted, ignored, or formally rejected. In the last case, it might perhaps be effectively challenged, then or subsequently, depending on the value of the object claimed, the military power situation on earth, and some residual factors such as world public opinion. Indeed, we may generalize tentatively in the following fashion.

If possession of a moon station were of small value, no exclusive claim to moon sovereignty would be likely to be made, the prestige of getting there first having been secured in any case. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that possession of an exclusive lunar base, or exclusive control over the moon, could be a prize valuable enough to justify waging all-out war over it, even if the challenging power expected to be "victorious" in such a war. If the challenging power expected to achieve military victory without surprise attack (!) and without much damage to itself, it would have decisive military supremacy to begin with; and if the problem arose at all (which is improbable), the challenged power or powers would give in. On the other hand, if the challenging power could not achieve military victory without large damage to itself, the value of sovereignty over the moon would obviously have to be very great for the challenge to be more than verbal.

Let us now suppose that control over the moon is considered, for some reason or other, to be of considerable value. Suppose A claims control over the moon after having established a station there. B will refuse to recognize the claim and will protest it. But if A and B can deter one another from going to all-out war, probably nothing further

[13] I do not mean to say that the Soviet Union would be likely to take this course. Thus far, both the United States and Russia have declared repeatedly that there can be no valid claims to sovereignty in outer space. Though the governments of both countries may be temporizing in this matter, as well as playing up to sensitive public opinion, little advantage would probably accrue, at least during the next twenty-five years, to the first country that made such a claim.

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will happen on earth. This will be true even if B is *marginally* more powerful militarily, in the sense that it would receive a lesser degree of damage than A (marginal superiority being operationally insignificant).

But what if subsequently B also establishes a lunar station in defiance of A's claim to sovereignty? What will then ensue seems to be unpredictable. One possibility, however, is that limited war will occur in outer space, which is in some ways an ideal theater for limited hostilities. Under the assumed conditions, however, the outcome of such limited conflicts would settle only relatively insignificant military issues in outer space. They could hardly settle *basic* issues on earth. More precisely, they would settle issues in outer space which it would be inconvenient, risky, or mutually too destructive to settle on earth.

Another question relates to national reactions to the artificial military satellites of another power (or other powers), be they reconnaissance or missile-launching systems. I am unable to discover any criteria on the basis of which possible responses could be predicted. If I am right in the foregoing—namely, in assuming that reconnaissance satellites will not be very important militarily—then there would be no rational reason other than prestige for a country to consider serious steps against the satellite-launching power, unless public opinion lent a "Sword of Damocles" effect to military satellites and reacted to them sharply.[14] And the prestige motivation would disappear if both powers maintained such satellites.

Similarly, if both Big Powers maintained bomb satellites, there is no rational reason for governments to react to them differently than to missile-launching systems on the surface of the earth, including the oceans. Dangerous situations, however, might arise during the transition period when one nation succeeds in putting military satellites into orbit and the other possesses a strong counterforce capability. The latter might then threaten to use this capability if the military satellites were not abandoned. However, this would be a very risky course of action. It is unlikely to be pursued unless military satellites are considered to be of crucial importance—which the first bomb satellites probably will not be—and unless the lagging power has little confidence of matching the opponent's satellite performance before he gains a dangerous military advantage. And it furthermore seems likely at this stage that retaliatory forces will have become less vulnerable, and counterforce capabilities will have diminished, by the time operational bomb satellites make their appearance.

[14] The "Sword of Damocles" effect was pointed out by Louis Halle.

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There are sundry other kinds of conflict to which the exploration and use of outer space might give rise. For example, how would communication satellites affect international and national propaganda, and, in this respect, the Iron Curtain? Would one country's communication system (civil and military) become so dependent upon communication satellites that this dependency would engender new and important vulnerabilities to hostile action? Outer space activities may generate these and other sources of conflict, but these conflicts either are at present unpredictable or are of a lesser order than those discussed above.

X. Conclusion

At this stage it seems reasonable to conclude, albeit tentatively, that outer space activities during the next twenty-five years are unlikely to produce revolutionary changes in world affairs. There will of course be substantial accretions to scientific knowledge. There should be economic benefits, though probably no economic net benefits for the world as a whole, and still less chance of them for the major space-exploring nations.

Though it is difficult to speculate about military uses, we have discovered only one possible case in which the military results would be truly upsetting: if one space power alone develops an effective counterforce capability by going into outer space. Yet this is the least likely contingency. The most probable contingencies are either that bomb satellites will have little military significance or that they will add to the stability of a system of relatively secure deterrent forces—in which case, again, the control of lesser aggression through the threat of strategic retaliation will lack credibility. For the same reason it is probable that conflicts arising in outer space will not touch off a round of mutual annihilation on earth.

The prestige factor is likely to be of great consequence in international politics, unless the magnitude of national prestige gains, and of their repercussions on international and national balances of power, are minimized by competitive national efforts that will make it difficult for one country or alliance to monopolize outer space prestige. However, conspicuous Communist success, even though shared with the United States, may well benefit the Communist bloc in the eyes of many observers, who will attribute it not to the allocation of special effort and ample resources to outer space technology rather than to alternative uses, but to the excellence of the Communist system as a whole.

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Research Note

THE STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS

Some Remarks on Retarded Development*

By HOWARD L. BOORMAN

"But we should never forget that in Chinese culture we are dealing with a living, not a dead civilization, and that the chief reason for studying its past is that we may better understand its future."—H. G. Creel, *The Birth of China: A Study of the Formative Period of Chinese Civilization***

A RETROSPECTIVE assessment at mid-century might have suggested that the course of Chinese history between 1900 and 1950 recorded only two events of enduring political significance: the first, the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty in October 1911 and, with it, destruction of the imperial system which had lasted for two millennia; the second, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 and, through it, commitment to accelerated modernization and forced industrialization along lines similar to those plotted earlier by the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, assessment of the future might well have concluded, with prescience born of objectivity, that the effect of the Chinese Communist explosion on both Chinese and world politics would merit a major effort on the part of American social science research.

On October 1, 1959, the People's Republic of China marked its tenth anniversary, proudly conscious that in a decade it had grown into the most formidable political and military power of Asia. Domestically, communism has reshaped the contours of the world's most cohesive, conservative civilization. Internationally, revitalized Chinese national power, under Communist control, has signaled Peking's primary foreign-policy goal: recognized status as a major world power on its own terms. Energy in Asia has, however, had but faint mirroring in the halls of private research in the United States.[1] Indeed, partial paralysis has

* An earlier version of this research note was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies in Washington, D.C., in March 1959.

** New York, 1937, p. 380.

[1] The imbalance between private and public research efforts on contemporary Chinese politics has been notable. Since the withdrawal of official American representatives from the mainland of China in 1950, the United States government has consistently

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been the most dominant characteristic of the field which is—or could become—the professional assessment of contemporary Chinese political patterns and processes. As time wastes, the stunted state of contemporary Chinese studies in the United States demands both discussion and decision.

I. Contemporary Chinese Politics in Perspective

During the decade just past, the Chinese Communists have created a unified national government exercising firm control over the entire land mass of China and pursuing national objectives with mobilized resources and disciplined purpose. No similar political situation has existed in China for well over a century. Having attained its initial objective of total power, Peking has embarked upon a massive experiment aimed, whether explicitly or implicitly, at comprehensive political and social transformation. This experiment requires: the reshaping of many of the traditional intellectual values, emotional attitudes, and ethical standards of the Chinese people; the employment of advanced technological methods to develop China into a modern industrial nation; the reorganization of the structure of Chinese society; and the continued expansion and modernization of the military base of power. The implications of this experiment are at least as significant as those of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, both because of the mass of people involved and because China, as a non-white nation, has a psychological involvement with all the non-Western world as well as a political relationship with the Soviet bloc.

Communist China has emerged, in short, as a major factor in the politics of the non-Western world, as an aggressive political entity destined to pose difficult problems of national understanding and national policy for the United States for many years. Yet, in the face of this challenge, the American academic reaction has been more diffuse than decisive. The sensitive political environment in the United States has made Communist China more a fuse for controversy than a subject for inquiry, while government policy priorities, reacting to the direct competitive challenge of the USSR, have focused American attention more on the western than on the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet orbit. Nor has the academic community adjusted easily to the new and complex intellectual issues created by the recrudescence of Chinese power

accorded high priority to research on Communist China. In view of this intensive government effort, the working-out of channels of academic-government communication and liaison would be an important aspect of developing academic work in the field of contemporary Chinese politics.

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under Mao Tse-tung. The social scientist, attuned by methodological inbreeding to the concepts, data, and languages of the West, has generally avoided the political thought and institutions of China. The professional student of China, on the other hand, has been committed by temperament and training to the study of the historical and humanistic depths of Chinese culture rather than of its contemporary permutations.

Prior to World War II, American study of China was in greater part limited to a handful of scholars who had been rigorously trained according to the French sinological tradition. Its field of concentration was primarily ancient China; its stress was linguistic, bibliographical, and philosophical. Its apparatus was composed of particular specialized skills: knowledge of classical Chinese (and, in some instances, of other non-living Asian languages), classical Chinese texts, and classical Chinese thought. Thanks to the scholars of traditional China, we now have some basic understanding of the "Confucian state," the distinctive political entity in which political and social power was concentrated within the formal structure of the imperial bureaucracy and in which the political process was characterized by intramural competition among that portion of the literate elite possessing official status.[2]

Not all the scholars of China, however, were content to remain confined within the traditional sinological realm. Living in a period contemporaneous with the confusion of China following the fall of the imperial dynasty in 1911, they sought to expand their training and to devote their energies to exploration of the patterns leading to this chaos. Because the Opium War marked the beginning of the modern Western impact on China and of the successive infringements on traditional Chinese sovereignty which accompanied that impact, the year 1840 became the convenient starting point for the consideration of "modern" China, and the years 1840-1911—the period of imperial decline—were described as the period of modern Chinese history. In political terms, this "modern" period was an era in which the traditional "Confucian state" had, under the combined influences of foreign penetration and domestic inefficiency, become only a disjointed version of the classical model.

"Modernity," however, is by definition not static, and China has proved even less so. Even as the study of late imperial China was developing as a valid field of specialized study and research in the United States, China itself was changing rapidly in the wake of the 1911 revolution which marked the demise of dynastic China. Yet the transitional

[2] See the comments by John K. Fairbank, "Introduction: Problems of Method and of Content," in *Chinese Thought and Institutions*, Chicago, 1957, p. 13.

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"republican" period was too close in time and too inadequate in documentation to permit analysis; further, the territorial fragmentation of China, its political disorganization, social diversification, intellectual disorientation, and internecine warfare discouraged systematic study. While the intelligence demands of World War II forced virtually all students of China, classicists and historians alike, to consider current problems, it led to little expansion in American universities of the professional study of twentieth-century China.

During the years since 1949, confronted by the spate of events, pronouncements, dialectics, and propaganda emanating from Peking, the historian of modern China has gradually shifted focus in an attempt to embrace the radically new issues posed by the existence of a Chinese Communist government. Yet a number of factors have hampered this leap from the study of late imperial China to the appraisal of contemporary China. There had been no sustained academic effort in the United States to record the details, delineate the trends, and assess the implications of the "republican" period in China; there had been only scant social-science preparation for assessment of the qualitatively new political amalgam which is Chinese communism today, a political system possessed of technological and psychological techniques totally different from those which existed in nineteenth-century China.

The immutability of events indicates, however, that academic reserve—no less than American emotionalism—is an expensive luxury even for our own affluent nation. Neither the tested discipline of sinology nor the newer discipline of modern Chinese history provides a formula for the study of contemporary China. The primary need is for students of contemporary government and politics to take the lead in a fresh assessment of the present structure of power in China and of the probable lines of future political evolution. *Yin-shih chih-i*: new problems require new approaches.

II. Subject, Sources, and Manpower

Few subjects offer the range of practical and theoretical challenges which the study of the politics of Communist rule in China now presents to the social scientist. The intellectual problems involved are inherently difficult; the linguistic and social barriers to Western comprehension are substantial. Expanded work in this field can, however, lead to systematic compilation and organization of the relevant data and to the formulation of hypotheses which may contribute to clearer understanding of the historical continuum which is traditional-modern-Communist China and to more refined analysis in the field of comparative

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politics.[3] Such research development depends, in turn, upon accurate delineation of the subject-matter, adequate control of the sources available for its study, and steady expansion of the body of qualified manpower.

In the case of contemporary China, as in that of the Soviet Union and other Communist states, the concepts of "power" and "politics" require broad interpretation to gain realism and relevance.[4] Some subjects involved in the study of Western constitutional systems (political parties, parliamentary organization and procedure, and public opinion, for example) have no real counterpart in the Chinese Communist system. At the same time, many areas of activity which are only intermittently "political" in the West are, in the present Chinese context, primarily and continuously "political," for they relate directly to the organization and manipulation of power to attain a defined set of national objectives. Thus the student of contemporary Chinese politics must respond to the political implications of subjects which might otherwise be left to the student of economics, sociology, or social psychology. Peking's long-term economic goal—the creation of a socialized China with a substantial heavy industry base—is in essence a political objective, with military overtones; and the international repercussions in Asia of Peking's efforts to generate sustained national economic growth are likewise political, with psychological overtones. The changes in Chinese social structure accompanying the processes of modernization, urbanization, and industrialization have definite political implications. And the interaction of theoretical concepts and practical programs is a constant theme in the political process, for the rulers in Peking are keenly aware of the potent, galvanizing force of ideology as a crucial factor in spurring the development of new types of political organization in the society.

The task of the student of contemporary Chinese politics is further complicated by methodological difficulties created by the fact that the political system under study is inaccessible to the researcher. Now and in the foreseeable future, Communist China must be studied from afar without opportunity for direct observation. Excluded from field work and on-the-spot interviews, the student must turn to the techniques developed by social scientists who have studied the Soviet Union or other parts of the bloc, techniques which have of necessity relied heavily

[3] For a note on recent developments in the comparative politics field, see Lucian W. Pye, "Political Modernization and Research on the Process of Political Socialization," *Items* (Social Science Research Council), XIII, No. 3 (September 1959), pp. 25-28.

[4] See the observations by John A. Armstrong, "Political Science," in Harold H. Fisher, ed., *American Research on Russia*, Bloomington, Ind., 1959, pp. 50-51.

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on the exploration and exegesis of documentary sources and on systematic interviews with refugees or with sophisticated non-refugee observers.

The raw materials for research on the Chinese Communist political system now exist in three principal categories: (a) primary documentary sources released, either in Chinese or in English, from Communist China; (b) secondary documentary sources emanating from the USSR or other bloc countries; and (c) interviews with individuals who have lived or traveled in China and/or with government officials, newsmen, or others who have had recent experience in China, in Hong Kong, or other peripheral reporting posts in Asia, or in the Soviet Union or other parts of the bloc.

Of these three categories, the most important for purposes of political analysis is the first, the documentary data released officially by the Chinese Communist regime and available in bulk in the United States.[5] Indeed, the most notable feature of American academic efforts to study contemporary Chinese politics has been under-utilization of accessible sources rather than paucity of information.[6] Since November 1950, the American Consulate General at Hong Kong has regularly translated a substantial volume of current political news from the Chinese Communist press and periodicals, and the Department of State has distributed these translations gratis to many American universities and libraries. During the same period, a large quantity of Chinese Communist newspapers and periodicals, as well as books and other irregular publications, have been imported into the United States and made available to researchers at the Library of Congress, the Hoover Institution, and leading universities with developed China programs (Harvard, Columbia, California, and the University of Washington, for example).

Significant research does not in any event emerge automatically from the data even when conveniently available and adequately controlled by catalog, index, or bibliography. Ideas can emerge only when the curious mind of the trained individual confronts and reflects upon a body of relevant data selected by him. While opinion may differ as to the appropriate process for producing the desired "trained individual" for social science research on contemporary China, it is at least clear that the short supply of such personnel has been a major factor in re-

[5] Cf. Peter A. Berton *et al., The Control of Sources for the Study of Contemporary China*, a preliminary bibliographical survey submitted to the Conference on Contemporary Chinese Studies, Gould House, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., June 19-21, 1959.

[6] Cf. John M. H. Lindbeck, "Research Materials on Communist China: United States Government Sources," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XVII, No. 3 (May 1959), pp. 357-63.

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tarding growth of the field. During the past fifteen years, American manpower resources for the study of political and social problems in many other non-Western areas (Russia, Japan, India, Southeast Asia, for example, as well as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America) have been steadily developed. As of 1960, however, the supply of social scientists seriously interested in and equipped for work on contemporary China remains exiguous in relation both to the size of China's pre-1949 political problems and to the complex nature of the issues posed by China's present government.

Any program aimed at expanding the reservoir of American manpower qualified for research on contemporary Chinese politics must proceed from the premise that the critical interpretation of the principal data (Communist documents) is a highly specialized craft. It demands, at minimum, some knowledge of the general field of government and politics, some knowledge of modern China, and some knowledge of modern communism.[7] But it also requires a particular epistemological sense. The researcher must develop an awareness that writing does not adequately express language and that language does not adequately convey thought, and he must, therefore, either possess or cultivate an educated skepticism of the printed word and, hopefully, the ability to penetrate vicariously to the level of reality which lies beneath the written label. A veteran German missionary, in discussing the problem of assembling and sifting information coming through legal channels from Communist China, has underscored the importance of experience and insight: "Anyone who has lived long in China reads the news which percolates out of that country differently from those unfamiliar with the country. Of every piece of news, he asks himself in the first place: What does it *not* say? And then, starting out from there, he endeavors to understand what its contents are telling him. But such an approach requires to be learnt and to be tested repeatedly before it can produce useable results."[8]

[7] All students of contemporary Chinese politics must have some basic understanding of the ideological and philosophical framework within which the Chinese Communist leaders think and react. Recent books on the general theory include R. N. Carew Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, 5th rev. ed., New York, 1957; Alfred G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice*, Cambridge, Mass., 1954; *idem*, *Leninism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957; and Herbert Marcuse, *Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis*, New York, 1958. See also Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, and appended bibliographical notes on totalitarianism (pp. 307-14).

[8] Wilhelm Seufert, "The End of Missionary Work in China," *International Review of Missions*, XLIII, No. 171 (July 1954), p. 279. Dr. Seufert was for many years in Tsingtao in Shantung province with the Deutsche Ostasien Mission.

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III. Possible Channels of Development

Recognition of the national necessity for developing a broad-gauged program of training and research on contemporary China is simpler than implementation. While awaiting new initiative at academic policy levels, what channels of development appear most fruitful for those already interested in this new and still largely undefined area of study?

(a) reference tools

Systematic study of any sector of the non-Western world requires the initial preparation of reference tools for use by both teacher and student. A political handbook on the People's Republic of China would, for example, be a useful beginning tool.[9] Such a factual compendium, containing descriptive data on the structure and personnel of the Party and the government and on the international position and foreign relations of Communist China, could be assembled from materials (largely in English) now available in the United States.[10] This handbook could be released in mimeographed or multilithed form and should be revised on a regular basis.

A competent editor could also prepare documentary compilations on specific subjects. If carefully done, such compilations could serve to gain additional control over the bulk of materials now released in English from Peking by Hsinhua (New China News Agency) or translated in Hong Kong, to provide chronological documentation on significant political subjects, and to develop a basis for further focused research. A record of the plenums of the Central Committee of the Party from the 7th Congress (1945) through the 8th Congress (1956) to date would provide a useful recapitulation of the major actions taken by the central decision-making organ of the Party in the critical postwar years.[11] Sim-

[9] This could be a single-country version of the *Political Handbook of the World*, issued annually by the Council on Foreign Relations. See also S. L. Poplai, ed., *Asia and Africa in the Modern World: Basic Information Concerning Independent Countries*, published under the auspices of the Asian Relations Organization by Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1955, and distributed in the United States by the Institute of Pacific Relations.

[10] Relevant data are contained in *A Guide to New China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1953; the *Handbook on People's China*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1957; editions of the *Jen-min shou-ts'e* (People's Handbook), 1950-1958, compiled by the *Ta Kung Pao*; and various issues of the *Survey of China Mainland Press* and *Current Background* series issued by the American Consulate General, Hong Kong.

[11] See the useful works on the Soviet Party Congresses edited by Leo Gruliow, editor of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*. These volumes are *Current Soviet Policies: The Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death*, New York, 1953; and *Current Soviet Policies, II: The Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath*, New York, 1957.

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ilarly, a collection of major documents on Sino-Soviet relations from the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 to date would provide a reliable reference work containing accurate texts to assist researchers in both the Chinese and the Soviet field.

(b) MONOGRAPHIC RESEARCH

A brief survey of American studies on contemporary Chinese politics during the past decade indicates that a useful quantity of work has been completed and published.[12] This work includes the book-length studies by Rostow and his colleagues,[13] Walker,[14] and Tang,[15] and the contributions of Barnett,[16] Theodore Chen,[17] Djang Chu,[18] Greene,[19] Hinton,[20] Michael and Taylor,[21] North,[22] Schwartz,[23] Steiner,[24] Thomas,[25] Whiting,[26] and others.

[12] A useful guide to the literature is Frank W. Price, "Selected Bibliography of Books, Pamphlets, and Articles on Communist China and the Christian Church in China," *Occasional Bulletin* (New York, Missionary Research Library), IX, No. 8 (September 30, 1958).

[13] W. W. Rostow *et al., The Prospects for Communist China*, New York, 1954.

[14] Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism: The First Five Years*, New Haven, Conn., 1955; and *The Continuing Struggle: Communist China and the Free World*, New York, 1958. The second volume is an expansion and revision of the author's "Communist China: Power and Prospects," which appeared as a special issue of the *New Leader*, October 20, 1958.

[15] Peter S. H. Tang, *Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Politics*, New York, 1957.

[16] A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China," in the American Assembly papers, *The United States and the Far East*, New York, 1956, pp. 105-71; *Communist Economic Strategy: The Rise of Mainland China*, Washington, D.C., 1959; and other writings.

[17] Theodore Hsi-en Chen, *Chinese Communism and the Proletarian-Socialist Revolution*, Los Angeles, Calif., 1955; "Rectification of Error and the Error of Rectification," *Soviet Survey* (London), No. 24 (April-June 1958), pp. 27-31; and other writings.

[18] Djang Chu, "Communist China: The People's Republic," in Linebarger, Djang, and Burks, *Far Eastern Governments and Politics: China and Japan*, New York, 1954, pp. 206-53.

[19] Fred Greene, *The Far East*, New York, 1957, pp. 138-73.

[20] Harold C. Hinton, "China," in George McT. Kahin, ed., *Major Governments of Asia*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958, pp. 3-132; and other writings.

[21] Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, *The Far East in the Modern World*, New York, 1956, pp. 453-71.

[22] Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites*, Stanford, Calif., 1952; *Moscow and Chinese Communists*, Stanford, Calif., 1953; and other writings.

[23] In addition to his volume on *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951) and his contribution to the Harvard *Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), Benjamin Schwartz has written widely on the theoretical aspects of Communist rule in China. See, e.g., "China and the Soviet Theory of People's Democracy," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1954), pp. 8-15; "New Trends in Maoism?" *ibid.* (July-August 1957), pp. 1-8; and "On the 'Originality' of Mao Tse-tung," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXIV, No. 1 (October 1955), pp. 67-76.

[24] H. Arthur Steiner of the University of California (Los Angeles) has been the most active member of the political science fraternity writing professional articles on Communist China in recent years. He edited the "Report on China" issue of *The Annals*

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Attempts at comprehensive coverage of Communist China on the basis of our present limited state of knowledge are, however, destined to reach an early point of diminishing returns. Given the state of public ignorance and academic inertia, it has been useful thus far to publish general surveys and short articles on topics of current interest. (Note, for example, the spate of comment on the 8th Party Congress in 1956, Mao's "contradictions" speech in 1957, the initiation of the "people's commune" system in 1958, and the tenth anniversary of the Peking regime in 1959.) The greatest present need is for more research and fewer essays; more concentration, depth, and focus and less *ad hoc* interpretation. In this, as in any other new field, empirical studies on specific problems must provide the indispensable foundation for more mature and critical works of synthesis and interpretation.

The impressive body of monographic research on modern Russia which has appeared in the United States since World War II is a matter of past performance.[27] The greatest immediate contribution which American universities could now make toward the development of contemporary Chinese studies would be the similar encouragement of a wide range of monographic studies primarily descriptive in nature.[28] While the definition of precise areas of monographic work on Communist China requires careful consideration, it may be useful to review the general range of subjects now open and virtually unclaimed.

An organized program of research on the Chinese Communist Party as a key to power relations in China would be a logical point of departure. Studies of individual Chinese Communist leaders,[29] the central

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of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 277 (September 1951), and contributed the paper on "Ideology and Politics in Communist China" to the more recent volume, "Contemporary China and the Chinese," *ibid.*, Vol. 321 (January 1959), pp. 29-39.

[25] S. B. Thomas, *Government and Administration in Communist China*, rev. ed., New York, 1955.

[26] Following his earlier *Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924* (New York, 1954), Allen S. Whiting has devoted consistent attention to the foreign affairs of Communist China. See his "Foreign Policy of Communist China," in Roy Macridis, ed., *Foreign Policy in World Affairs*, New York, 1958, pp. 264-94; " 'Contradictions' in the Moscow-Peking Axis," *Journal of Politics*, XX, No. 1 (February 1958), pp. 128-42; and "Dynamics of the Moscow-Peking Axis," *The Annals*, Vol. 321 (January 1959), pp. 100-11.

[27] Cf. Fisher, ed., *American Research on Russia, op.cit.*

[28] The present paucity of effort is clearly indicated by the listing of doctoral dissertations in political science in American universities given in the *American Political Science Review*, LII, No. 3 (September 1958), pp. 915-30. Of a total of 36 graduate students writing dissertations dealing with Eastern Asia, not one was working on Communist China, North Korea, or North Vietnam. Sixteen were working on Southeast Asia, 6 on Japan, and 6 on India. By contrast, the same listing reported 21 dissertations in progress on the USSR and Eastern Europe.

[29] See Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin*, New York, 1949, for an excellent example of a political

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Party apparatus, the composition and circulation of Party membership, and provincial and local Party organizations would be welcome. Aside from the Communist Party itself, other subjects deserving detailed study include:

(1) the general role of ideology in the Chinese Communist political system and the specific role of Mao Tse-tung's writings;

(2) governmental organization, including the totally neglected field of local government and the gargantuan public administration problems encountered by the regime because of the geographical extent and the size of the population of China;

(3) law, including the political and social implications of the emerging Chinese Communist legal system;

(4) the control, mobilization, and indoctrination of minority ethnic and/or religious groups (Moslems, Buddhists, Christians) for the political purposes of Peking;

(5) the propaganda dimension of political power, with attention to the organization and manipulation of the mass communications media;[30]

(6) the political and administrative aspects of economic planning and management; and

(7) the pattern of official and unofficial foreign relations between Communist China and other countries (Japan, India, Burma, etc.) or areas (the Middle East, Africa, Western Europe, Latin America, etc.).

The steady production of a series of medium-length monographs would provide a strong, self-generating impetus to further research. On many aspects of the subjects suggested above, the immediate need is for research papers ranging, say, from 100 to 150 pages in length, including annotated bibliographies of sources. Such papers are, unfortunately, often white elephants: too long to gain sympathetic attention from the editors of journals, too short (or insufficiently thorough in depth or coverage) to command serious attention from the publishers of scholarly books. Thus the development of methods to support the reproduction and circulation of research results in this medium-length category would be an important practical contribution to the field. With editorial supervision, monographic papers might also be utilized

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biography. Similar extended works on Mao and other Chinese Communist leaders would be of great value.

[30] See the articles by Franklin W. Houn: "The Press in Communist China: Its Structure and Operation," *Journalism Quarterly*, XXXIII (Fall 1956), pp. 502-12; "Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda in Communist China," *ibid.*, XXXIV (Summer 1957), pp. 366-77; "Motion Pictures and Propaganda in Communist China," *ibid.*, XXXIV (Fall 1957), pp. 481-92; and "Chinese Communist Control of the Press," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXII, No. 4 (Winter 1958-1959), pp. 435-48.

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to compile one or more symposium volumes to facilitate public distribution for the benefit of all. Such volumes could be planned either along conventional descriptive lines[31] or on focused lines to deal with selected critical problems which have emerged during the 1950-1960 period.[32]

(c) GENERAL WORKS

The totality which is Communist China is, of course, far larger and more complex than the sum of individual monographic studies which might be devoted to the diagnosis of its component parts. Thus it would also be useful to plan the preparation of analytic works dealing with the larger configurations of the political institutions and behavior of contemporary China.

A major impetus to training in the field would be provided by a general survey of the Chinese Communist system of government and politics to supplement the books now available on pre-1949 China[33] and to parallel those available in the Russian[34] and Japanese[35] fields. Another major need is a study of Chinese Communist foreign policy since 1949, with the subject treated as an independent one and not from the standpoint of United States policy interests and attitudes.[36] Still another critical, and largely ignored, problem is the military component in Chinese Communist power, a topic of historical interest be-

[31] E.g., Harley Farnsworth MacNair, ed., *China*, Berkeley, Calif., 1946. The MacNair symposium still stands as one of the best research compilations in the modern China field, paralleled in utility as a one-volume reference and bibliographical source only by John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

[32] For an example in the Russian field, see Ernest J. Simmons, ed., *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, Cambridge, Mass., 1955. This volume, the product of an extensive collaborative effort, is organized around six broad themes representing major focuses in the field of modern Russian studies.

[33] E.g., Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, *Min-kuo cheng-chih shih* (History of the Governmental System of the Republic), 2 vols., Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1939, 1945, 1946; *idem*, *The Government and Politics of China*, Cambridge, Mass., 1950; Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang Kai-shek*, Boston, 1941; and Franklin W. Houn, *The Central Government of China, 1912-1928*, Madison, Wisc., 1957.

[34] E.g., Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR, 1917-1947*, New York, 1948; Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953; and John N. Hazard, *The Soviet System of Government*, Chicago, 1957.

[35] E.g., Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan*, Berkeley, Calif., 1953; Ardath W. Burks, "The Government and Politics of Japan," in Linebarger, Djang, and Burks, *op.cit.*, pp. 257-541; Chitoshi Yanaga, *Japanese People and Politics*, New York, 1956; Harold S. Quigley and John E. Turner, *The New Japan: Government and Politics*, Minneapolis, Minn., 1956; and Nobutaka Ike, *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey*, New York, 1957.

[36] The most comprehensive survey is by A. Doak Barnett, *Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*, New York, 1960. The analytic articles on Soviet foreign policy and foreign relations by Philip E. Mosely in *Foreign Affairs* and other journals suggest the type of continuing coverage needed for Communist China.

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cause of the unique interaction of military and political elements which characterized the Communist march to power in China between 1937 and 1949 and of contemporary importance because of the geographic and strategic position of China in the present era of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. A study of the evolution of modern Chinese nationalism would be a major contribution to understanding the position of Communist China in the contemporary world.[37] The significance of this subject stems both from the proud, ethnocentric cultural tradition of the Middle Kingdom lying behind modern China and from the fact that, during the past half-century, nationalism has been a constant factor not only in the political sphere but also in the social, economic, intellectual, literary and artistic, and even the educational[38] and linguistic[39] life of modern China.

(d) CHINESE LANGUAGE STUDY

Any student working on contemporary China confronts, sooner or later, the problem of regular contact with Chinese who speak only Chinese. The Department of State has long recognized this fact and has thus always assigned its language students to Chinese-speaking areas, formerly to Peiping and now to Taiwan.

Chinese language study in the universities, however, has lagged seriously in this regard, largely because the principal aim of such study has been to train scholars for research in historical sources. This traditional goal is still necessary and valid. Yet the historical-documents approach does not solve the need for increased training of social science personnel equipped, first, to speak modern Chinese with reasonable cogency and fluency at a level where the communication and discussion of ideas are possible and, second, to read contemporary newspapers, periodicals, and books, particularly those printed in the simplified characters now used in Communist China. Training in the United States, even at the Institute of Far Eastern Languages at Yale (the only non-government center which now offers developed facilities, including modern methods, graded materials, and trained teachers, for contemporary Chinese), is only a preliminary step toward advanced work in the Far East with Chinese who do not speak English. Taiwan provides an important training base in this sequence, and the inter-university

[37] Studies on nationalism in other non-Western countries include, e.g., William L. Holland, ed., *Asian Nationalism and the West*, New York, 1953; Delmer M. Brown, *Nationalism in Japan: An Introductory Historical Analysis*, Berkeley, Calif., 1955; and Frederick C. Barghoorn, *Soviet Russian Nationalism*, New York, 1956.

[38] Cyrus H. Peake, *Nationalism and Education in Modern China*, New York, 1932.

[39] John De Francis, *Nationalism and Language Reform in China*, Princeton, N.J., 1950.

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language program administered by Cornell has made a major contribution in facilitating travel to Taiwan for language study.

(e) HONG KONG AS A RESEARCH BASE

From the standpoint of research on the politics of Communist China, however, Taiwan (as well as Japan) has inherent limitations. The British colony of Hong Kong is still the best point for access, at one remove, to current information on developments in Communist China. For the student of politics and social organization in particular, the intangible "feel" of the China mainland situation is essential for realistic analysis. Hong Kong offers a research base where it is possible, given discipline and discrimination on the part of the observer, to acquire this "feel" of Communist China's living problems, its tensions, aspirations, and frustrations. The colony offers practical advantages as well, for it provides regular contact with an experienced community of observers directly concerned with China (Asian, British, European, and American government officers, journalists, and businessmen) as well as occasional contact with diplomatic and other travelers from China. Hong Kong also offers convenient access to bookshops and book dealers handling current Chinese publications, although the colony does not possess a major library with substantial holdings in the contemporary field.

The potentialities of Hong Kong as a working base could be appreciably increased through the establishment of a compact academic-sponsored research center in the colony to provide administrative facilities (office space, secretarial and interpreting services, and channels for access to research data) for private scholars working on Communist China. Given the approval of the British authorities and the sponsorship of the American academic community professionally concerned with the study of recent and contemporary Chinese affairs, such a research center could fill an important service role. It could greatly facilitate liaison with the individuals and institutions in Hong Kong concerned with contemporary China and would permit the transient scholar to devote primary attention to his central research tasks rather than to peripheral housekeeping and administrative details.

The quest for expanded knowledge of the nature and dimensions of political power in Communist China is a continuing process. It must seek not only a corpus of systematically organized data but also an educated awareness of the nature of political change in China, a sense of the direction of evolution of the society.

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Through the considered intent of its rulers, the People's Republic of China forms an integral part of the Communist world. Yet China is at the same time much more than a sector of the Soviet bloc, and the approach which would view the study of contemporary China primarily as a subdivision of the field of Russian or Slavic or Communist studies is doomed to deformity. At the same time, contemporary China is larger than the sum of the social science disciplines which may be employed in its study. As there can be no bibliography for the life of a people, so there can be no satisfactory compartmentalization of the variety and flux of an evolving complex culture into tidy categories labeled "politics," "economics," or "sociology." While comprehensive change now appears to be taking place at an unprecedented pace throughout Chinese society, the process actually comprises change within continuity. The phenomenon now known as "Communist China" is indivisible from the general stream of Sinic civilization and must be assessed with a due sense of proportion and perspective.

Intuition and experience are thus as essential as rigid analysis. Books and newspapers from Communist China may be studied quietly in libraries far from Asia, and aspects of Peking's political system in operation may be reconstructed in conversations with travelers or refugees. Caution is necessary, however, in utilizing any of these sources, be they printed or oral. Documents largely ignore the human component; interviews exaggerate it. The primary difficulty in drawing an accurate picture of the politics of contemporary China lies in the re-creation in imagination and expression of the realities represented by the flood of official and unofficial words which conspire to delude, if not totally to deluge, the unwary observer. Yet imagination must be tempered with a sober sense of how little we now know, or ever can know vicariously, of the ideas, the fallible individuals, and the mutating institutional forms which combine to create a Communist China—of the true meaning of communism to the tens of millions of Chinese who now, either voluntarily or involuntarily, find in it their destiny.

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Review Articles

DID MARX STOP IN SOUTHEAST ASIA?

By GEORGE E. LICHTBLAU

J. H. Brimmell, *Communism in South East Asia: A Political Analysis*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, 415 pp. $6.75.

David N. Druhe, *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism, 1917-1947, with an Epilogue Covering the Situation Today*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1959, 429 pp. $8.50.

Saul Rose, *Socialism in Southern Asia,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1959, 278 pp. $4.50.

Frank N. Trager, ed., *Marxism in Southeast Asia: A Study of Four Countries*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1959, 381 pp. $7.50.

I

ANY analysis of the political spectrum of South and Southeast Asia in conventional terms of Left-Center-Right tends to be misleading, since most parties in the area proclaim themselves to be part of the revolutionary left. Even though the position of the Soviet-oriented Communist parties is clear, they do not serve as satisfactory political benchmarks in view of the vagueness and elasticity of the programs proclaimed by the various non-Soviet-oriented "socialist" parties. The picture is complicated by the increasingly observable tendency of these parties to shed what they consider the more unpalatable aspects of their Marxist heritage—such as the class struggle, historical materialism, and the dictatorship of the proletariat—in order to stress their democratic character, the compatibility of their programs with traditional and spiritual values, and their differentiation from the Communists. Professor Trager and Dr. Rose, the authors of two of the books under review, are inclined to accept this tendency as evidence that these parties are veering away from Marxism and Leninism to a democratic welfare-state system similar to the programs of the European, now non-Marxist, socialist and labor parties. The evidence suggests rather that they are moving toward some form of closed political system, disclaimers notwithstanding.

The untangling of this confusion requires a careful examination of the programs and political practices of these parties. Most nationalist parties of South and Southeast Asia declare themselves to be revolutionary, socialist, and democratic. Their claim to being revolutionary

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is based on their actual or alleged role in the national liberation struggle as well as on their designs for radical social change. Their socialist pretensions rest on a number of features borrowed both from the socialist parties of Europe and from Marxism-Leninism. Most striking among these are similarities in vocabulary, militancy, a tendency toward centralized political systems, and the manipulation of functional mass organizations. The claim of these parties to the democratic label—usually linked with the term "socialist"—rests on their professed adherence to constitutional, electoral, parliamentary, and judiciary procedures.

Constitutionalism and electoral and parliamentary institutions were the trappings of legality that accompanied the transfer of sovereignty by the colonial powers to their successors. Adherence to the formal institutions of democracy consequently has become the symbol of the legitimacy and progressive nature of the new order. Electoral victories and parliamentary majorities are the marks of success for the newly independent Asian governments. Charges that these are not always achieved in the spirit of democracy are dismissed by Asian nationalists and their apologists with invidious references to capitalism and the necessity for Asians to find their own road to democracy. The Asian leaders have, in fact, sought to concoct new amalgams from elements of traditional, indigenous institutions—such as village government—Western democracy, and Soviet socialism which they variously call "socialism," *jan shakti*, "socio-nationalism," *marhaenism* (defined as Indonesia's indigenous socialism), "Buddhist Marxism," "Islamic socialism," *gotong rojong* (mutual co-operation), *pyidawtha* (national planning), *sarvodaja* (uplift), *Pantja Sila* (Five Principles: nationalism, internationalism, representative government, social justice, and belief in one universal god), and *bhoodan* (land gift).[1]

Such slogans are elevated to the level of national ideologies by the nationalist leaders, reflecting their preoccupation with political verbalization as a substitute for political action. Ideologies, as they have learned from the Marxists, can be used as a tactical device for the attainment or preservation of power. Similarly, to justify its more unpalatable measures, a regime can resort to an aggressive external posture, declaring that imperialists, other reactionary powers aligned with them (i.e., unfriendly neighbors), and sometimes even Communist bloc powers threaten the regime's existence and must be faced by a united nation. With national existence at stake, opposition can be regarded as treason.

[1] *Bhoodan* was originally a movement for voluntary redistribution of land given up by rich landowners, but has since become a political movement for a "democratic society without political parties."

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Marxism, as the political *lingua franca*, provided the leaders of the Asian nationalist movements with inspiration and guidance in their action against the colonial powers and served to associate them as well with the larger anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movements of the Communist and, to a lesser extent, Socialist Internationals. Once independence was won, however, the Marxist vocabulary and mode of thought were no longer helpful in formulating and executing effective political and economic programs. While there remained the faith in salvation that was sustained by the image of Soviet and later Chinese successes,[2] the problem of rational guidance became insurmountable for the new elite, the Leninist model notwithstanding. Of what survives of the impact of Marxism on the nationalist movements, the most alarming aspect has been the exorcism of the spirit of Western democracy together with capitalism, leaving only the forms of democracy as the residual legacy of the West. This has manifested itself particularly in the use and abuse of electoral practices and parliamentary majorities. Political observers of South and Southeast Asia are wont to point to the relative smoothness of elections, the discipline of the electorate, the enthusiasm of the voters, and the absence of pressure on the voters as a measure of the acceptance of democracy. What they often fail to see is the use those in power make of administrative procedures, electoral qualifications, zoning of voting districts, and the role which the ethnic or religious distribution of the electorate may play in the conduct of the electoral campaign.

Elections and administration are interdependent and reflect the ability and willingness of the party in power to permit the recruitment of a reasonably impartial and competent staff that can make the meaning of elections clear to a largely illiterate electorate through intelligent publicity on procedures, and which will provide fair opportunities for voters to register and to vote. This requires both legal and administrative ingenuity and an awareness of the often imprecise and unwritten rules of impartiality which should govern electoral procedures.[3] Yet, the further the new state becomes removed from the tutelage of the former

[2] As Professor Eduard Heimann has pointed out in his article, "Marxism and Underdeveloped Countries" (*Social Research*, XIX, No. 3, September 1952, pp. 322-45), acceptance of the idea of "salvation," both national and personal, which had hitherto been alien to the East, constituted the main impact of Marx on the colonial world. Such salvation was seen to lie in the establishment of a rational, classless, co-operative society following the liberation from colonialism. This was to be achieved under the guidance of an intellectual elite which could understand the objective historical conditions that were prerequisite to winning the revolution and establishing the new society.

[3] For an excellent discussion of these problems on the basis of observations in Africa, see W. J. MacKenzie and Kenneth Robinson, *Five Elections in Africa*, London, 1960.

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colonial power, the more the standards of fairness tend to break down. As the power of the dominant party waxes, elections reflect political contests to a diminishing extent. And in this case tolerance of rival parties does not assure the development of a pluralistic political system with genuine alternatives. Where the dominant party's power wanes, all the irreconcilable forces seek to assert themselves electorally—a situation making for prolonged instability and eventual crisis. Ironically, the Communists seem to have outdone their rivals in their ability to appeal to the electorate in terms of political principles, while other parties tend to rely on personalities, or national, ethnic, or religious pride. The Communists—as a measure of self-protection—are also the one group to insist on a rigorous observance of Western standards of democratic procedure.

Despite the intensity of nationalist sentiment, directed largely at the "imperialists" beyond the border but basically a deeply felt racial hatred of the white man, there is as yet little consciousness of, or loyalty to, the state. Government authority remains a source of deep suspicion, reinforced by the fact that the seats of power are in the cities, which extract their wealth from the countryside at the expense of the peasants who are the bulk of the electorate. Nor are there any large areas of political consensus—other than anti-colonialism—which would normally lend stability to democracy. Thus elections, far from imbuing the voters with a feeling of national loyalty, may in effect encourage opposition by ethnic, religious, or economic interests to governmental direction and national unification.[4]

Another aspect of the dichotomy between formal adherence to a pluralistic political system and the tendency to create a unitary system—a tendency which some parties openly advocate and others are driven to by circumstances—is reflected in the character of the political parties and their leadership. The parties are organized from the top down by a small educated and politically conscious elite. This elite, seizing upon economic unrest, aroused the masses to resistance against the colonial powers, who, in turn, ceded to it political responsibility. However, except for the Communists, the elite rarely set up mass party organizations, being primarily concerned with its own leadership role in the revolution. The outstanding exception in this regard was the Congress Party of India, which has a widely fluctuating "primary" membership currently estimated at from 4 to 5 million. Even this party still retains many essentially elitist characteristics and attitudes, reflected, for

[4] See Werner Levi, "The Fate of Democracy in South and Southeast Asia," *Far Eastern Survey*, XXVII, No. 2 (February 1959), pp. 25-29.

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example, in the fact that it has less than 80,000 "active" members, most of them remarkably homogeneous as to social status and education.

The difficulties that such elitist movements encounter in maintaining popular support in the absence of extensive mass parties tend to increase as the memory of the leadership's role in the independence struggle dims. While electoral campaigns offer opportunities to evoke periodic support from the voters even in the absence of mass parties, the elite needs continuous assurance of the availability of this support beyond elections. But the identification of the voters with the party of their choice weakens after the electoral victory, thereby affecting the coherence of the party, its effectiveness in promoting consent, and its ability to sustain itself financially. In order to overcome this problem, these parties increasingly look for support to functional organizations, such as trade unions, peasant organizations, co-operative movements, and religious movements, whose membership is based on more immediate common interests. And beyond these, even the administrative apparatus of the government is called upon to serve this purpose. The effect is not unlike the role of such institutions in a unitary system. Both party and functional organizations become transmission belts of policy to assure compliance with governmental planning. Their reverse role as special-interest pressure groups which can adjust the grievances of their constituents is kept to a minimum. The particular problem of extending effective mass organizations loyal to the government into the countryside in the face of the traditional rural-urban conflict has been belatedly brought home under the pressure of competition from the Communists, who were made aware of the importance of this issue by events in China.

These organizational problems are not the only ones facing the parties. Perhaps more serious are those created by the political elites themselves. For one thing, by virtue of their Western education, their thinking in terms of Western political problems, their political skepticism, and their elitist feelings of superiority, they find themselves separated and alienated from their own people. Only the Communists have been able to overcome some of these problems through party discipline and the knowledge that they are subject to a higher cause which dictates their rationale and actions. For another, in the absence of accepted rules and traditions of political behavior, the ruling elite tends toward rivalry, factionalism, and the eventual fission of the ruling parties. In part this is due to personality clashes, and in part to the historical accident that for the sake of independence many divergent groups had united within one movement, so that their differences emerged only much later. There are ample instances of this in the Congress Party of India, the

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Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL) in Burma, the Moslem and Nationalist parties of Indonesia, and even among the Communist parties. Far from creating the basis for a pluralistic democratic system, this diversity has tended to exacerbate irreconcilable ambitions. Thus the very character and lack of cohesion of the leading elite become major factors in the breakdown of democracy.

It is no wonder that in such a situation power gravitates to the army leadership, which belongs to the ruling elite but tends to stand apart from its political wrangles, to prevent the breakup of the governmental system. While the army may be able to protect the functioning of the governmental machinery, it is at least questionable whether it can resolve irreconcilable conflicts for prolonged periods. After all, differences over policy are bound also to affect the ranks of the army. Much depends on how united and detached from the clash of issues the army leadership can remain. In both Indonesia and Burma the armies have shown themselves most reluctant to assume political leadership, being satisfied with the role of arbiter, seeing to it that the major conflicting political interests do not resort to civil war. In effect, they are trying to force the solution back into the parliamentary and electoral arena, i.e., upon the very institutions which had broken down owing to their failure to resolve conflict.

Thus in looking upon the crisis of democracy in South and Southeast Asia, it is clear that this is a crisis of political stability. To a large extent, of course, this crisis is endemic, but perhaps equally important has been the effect of the uncertainty of big-power interests and their conflicts in the area since the withdrawal of the colonial powers. On balance it may well be the external factors that will tip the scales. The political trends discussed here reflect more profound difficulties than can be attributed to mere growing pains and periods of adjustment. The seriousness of the problem lies not only in its impact on the general prestige of democratic government, but also in the chain-reaction effect it may have on states gaining their independence in Africa.

II

This reviewer is struck by the suspension of critical judgment of South and Southeast Asian nationalism and its leadership manifested by the authors of the books under review. Far from reflecting detachment, their approach serves partisan purposes. Thus Professor Trager and Dr. Rose treat the topics "Marxism" and "socialism" not in terms of political ideas and realities but as vehicles to prove to their own satis-

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faction that there are forces at work in Asia today which can counteract the drive of Soviet imperialism. Certainly such forces do exist, but this is no justification for glossing over the problems faced by the nationalists. Both authors comment on the impact of Marxism-Leninism on the nationalists, but in the end they hopefully assert that some form of democratic socialism will develop, by which they mean a collectivist society that can compete with the Soviet system but with which the West can live. Mr. Brimmell and Mr. Druhe go so far as to identify Soviet imperialism as the main political problem of their respective areas, denying any distinction between Soviet and traditional forms of imperialism. Not one of the four authors is quite convinced of the potency of a hostile ideology; instead they point to the common political and moral ideals of the Asian nationalists and Western democrats. What they do not admit is that Marxism in Asia has become an ideological tool with which to challenge the West, thus making areas of ideological agreement outside of this Marxist framework largely irrelevant. Nor are they willing to recognize that its dual democratic-liberal and Marxist heritage confronts the nationalist leadership with a growing dilemma.

The standards and institutions inherited from the Western European democracies compete for allegiance with the drive toward a rational collectivist society derived from Marxian ideas compelling the nationalist movements toward increasingly incompatible goals. The attempts at an eclectic compromise in the hope of achieving something new and generating political support have led to concessions to reactionary and irrationalist forces—religious mysticism and village traditionalism—that negate the spirit of both Marxism and democratic liberalism. Even India, which remains the hope of the West in Asia, is not free from the danger symptoms. The threat that the Soviet system will carry the day with its uninterrupted chain of political and technological successes cannot be wished away. There is no doubt that Marx had a tremendous ideological impact on the new leadership of the peoples of the East, although the Marxist roots of the political institutions and attitudes in this area should be examined with caution. The specter of the future is the second coming of Marx to Southeast Asia in the guise of Marxism-Leninism.

It is a reflection of the lack of faith among our own intelligentsia in the future of democracy as a universally applicable political system and of their wishful thinking that we find men like Professor Trager justifying their apologia with the observation that "neither in Southeast Asia nor elsewhere . . . does practice conform to philosophy" (p. 297). The

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experience of colonialism with its inherent injustices is considered sufficient to explain and justify the current national and international policies of these countries. The new leadership with all its faults is held to be progressive because it has not embraced communism. A deeply felt Wilsonian idealism on the part of Mr. Trager and his associates and a strong socialist bias on the part of the two British authors under review predispose these analysts to accept the nationalist independence movement as admirable and basically democratic.

The claim of the nationalist leaders that they are building a socialist society is accepted at face value and judged to be progressive on the grounds that, in countries without an entrepreneurial middle class, capitalism cannot function and that the absence of individualism and a marked class structure permit progressive political experiments. The repressive features of this type of socialism are seen as the price of progress. The nationalist movements are the wave of the future; they must be supported by sympathetic understanding to keep them out of the clutches of the Communists. Sympathy with the wave of the future has led to an acceptance of Marxist jargon as the spirit of socialism, a state-directed economy as its institutional framework, slogans as ideology, and the political processes of these countries as "rational and progressive." In view of the monstrosity of the collectivist systems as practiced in the USSR and China to which the "wave of the future" points, can these terms of approval still be applied to these movements, which combine their collectivism with anti-democratic and anti-Western attitudes? There is only an occasional hint that the local admixture of nationalism, religion, traditions of tribal or village government, and political regimentation may be incongruous with what Marx had in mind, or with the traditions of the Western democratic socialist movements. Was it not precisely out of higher loyalty to their democratic humanism that the Western socialists abandoned their ideology in exchange for an acceptance of the welfare state under capitalist democracy? Should it not be frankly recognized, therefore, that to accept the nationalist movements' own version of socialism as progressive may obscure their tendency toward a Leninist-Stalinist interpretation of socialism?

Dr. Rose in *Socialism in Southern Asia* discusses the "democratic socialist" parties of the area. In order to simplify the task of defining which parties are socialist and which are not, he takes as his criterion participation in the Asian Socialist Conference. He also devotes some space to the First and Second Socialist Conferences and ends with a note on the prospects of socialism in the area. In his introduction he

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briefly mentions the difficulties of transplanting Western political concepts, formulated under conditions of "*laissez-faire* capitalism," to predominantly pre-industrial societies whose problems are less the maldistribution of wealth than the increase of the production of wealth. He finds that in the absence of a strong tradition of individualism and in view of the need to do a great deal in a short time, "socialism, which combines economic planning with political liberty and social welfare, might therefore expect to find particularly fertile soil" (p. 3).

The merits of the book lie less in its analysis, which is rather scant, than in the considerable attention paid by the author to the programmatic and organizational developments of the South Asian socialist parties. The chapters on the parties of India, Burma, and Indonesia provide useful information on their organizational, financial, and leadership problems, but the chapters on the lesser parties suffer somewhat from lack of information and of familiarity. Dr. Rose discusses such problems as elitist vs. mass organizations, and the difficulties the socialists face in maintaining their identity, hedged in as they are between the more nationalist parties also claiming to profess socialism, on one side, and the Communists, especially when they are engaged in united front appeals, on the other. In general, Dr. Rose's studies show that the further a socialist party is removed from the prospect of power, the more it is inclined to insist on a pluralistic democratic system guaranteeing political freedom to the opposition parties. This has led the Indians and Indonesians to drop revolution and Marx from their programs in line with developments among the socialists in the West.

The book ends on the rather optimistic note that British political institutions and the influence of the Labour Party (of which Dr. Rose was at one time International Secretary) on the Asian socialist parties have left a democratic heritage in the former Asian colonies which makes the prospect for democratic socialism a good one. The chances of democratic socialism in the former non-British colonies, especially Indonesia, are viewed with less optimism, owing to the less enlightened policies of their former taskmasters.

Marxism in Southeast Asia, edited by Frank N. Trager, contains four country studies: "Marxism in Burma" by John Seabury Thomson, "Thailand and Marxism" by David A. Wilson, "Marxism in Vietnam" by I. Milton Sacks, and "Marxism in Indonesia" by Jeanne S. Mintz. Professor Trager's contribution consists of an introduction defining the scope of the book and a summation dealing with the impact of what he calls "Marxism" on Southeast Asia. This last section is a telescoped review of international and national Communist efforts in the area,

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plus a few remarks on the socialists and nationalists. According to this book, the impact of Marxism on the political scene of Southeast Asia consists not only of the impact of Marxian ideas, Leninism, Stalinism, and Maoism, but also of nationalism, anti-imperialism, economic and political controls, welfare statism, and even non-Marxian socialism. But to Mr. Trager the derivation of specific ideas from Marx does not really matter very much, since Marx's main contribution to the politics of the colonial world is his philosophy of action. With independence achieved, Marx matters now only to the Communists and even to them he is only marginal. The story ends on a horticultural note: "What appears to be developing in Southeast Asia is a tropical variant of the Scandinavian pattern. Planned economic growth and social welfare, with heavy emphasis on education and cultural regeneration, accompany—or in fact help compose—a philosophy based on Western democracy and Socialism and indigenous nationalism and culture" (p. 299).

The book deals mostly with the political development of the four countries since the beginning of their struggle for independence. Although Thailand does not quite fit into the pattern of the other three countries, having never been under colonial rule and having no indigenous socialist or Communist movement, its inclusion is "justified on the ground that it provides a 'control case' in the light of which . . . Marxism in the other three countries may be more clearly understood" (p. 2). With the exception of Mr. Sacks's contribution on Vietnam, a chapter which stands out by virtue of its thoroughness, the studies are rather pedestrian, contributing little new information or understanding of these countries. While competent and useful as summary accounts, they suffer from a typical malady of the work of specialists, who through sympathetic identification with their countries become apologists rather than analysts. This weakness pertains also to the chapter on Vietnam.

One of the peculiarities of the book is that on points of Communist tactics and strategy and on such key questions as what happened at the 1948 Calcutta Youth Conference, who was responsible for the Madjun revolt, the role of the Comintern in the 1927 revolt in Indonesia, the case of Tan Ling Djie as an alleged expression of the anti-Chinese racial policy of the Indonesian Communist Party, the significance of the 1949 World Federation of Trade Unions Conference in Peking, and the originality of Mao's contribution to Communist strategy, Messrs. Thomson and Trager and Miss Mintz are pontifical without shedding any new light on these matters.

Specifically, in Trager's introduction, Professor John Kautsky's *Moscow and the Communist Party in India* is taken to task for asserting

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that Maoist strategy is an innovation of considerable originality. Mr. Trager declares that Lenin and others had already stated all its essential elements, based as they are on the "united front from below." He dismisses the matter by declaring that he is not interested in the antecedents of Maoism, but only in "Marxism at the operative level" (p. 5). Therefore, he gives no more than a few lines to Mao's four-class strategy of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie, which Professor Kautsky had carefully distinguished from the strategy of Lenin and the Comintern. A Communist strategy that virtually eliminates the class struggle in its classical sense from national party tactics and transfers its validity primarily to the realm of international relations—i.e., the cold war—is surely an important innovation. By substituting for the class struggle what the Communists promised would be the peaceful integration of the bourgeoisie into the socialist society, the problem of political alliances was greatly facilitated. The entire significance of Mao's strategy—which became the strategy of the Communist parties of the former colonial areas—and of Mao's theory of contradictions[5] with which Moscow is at variance, has simply escaped Mr. Trager.

Another topic cavalierly treated by Mr. Trager is that of control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties by Moscow or Peking. Thus the Cominform becomes a "revised version of the Comintern." He offers as proof the fact that Dange and Musso were dispatched from Moscow to lead their parties into rebellion after the establishment of the Cominform and that front organization meetings such as the Calcutta Youth Conference and the Peking WFTU Conference were used merely as substitutes for the old Comintern congresses. These statements are made without any supporting evidence and without any reference to the considerable differences between the Comintern and the Cominform. This reviewer knows of no documentary indication that front organizations have been used to direct Communist parties in South and Southeast Asia. Mr. Brimmell is guilty of similar flights of fancy. In upgrading the Southeast Asian revolts he is also led to attribute considerably greater importance to the Calcutta Youth Conference and other front organizations in the direction of Communist strategy. He, too, sees the Cominform at times as the successor of the Comintern and

[5] This theory postulates the existence of antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. The antagonistic contradictions refer to China's relations with the West, and the non-antagonistic contradictions to the peaceful transition from the bourgeois to the socialist stage under conditions created by the peoples' liberation movement. See Benjamin Schwartz, "New Trends in Maoism," *Problems of Communism*, VI, No. 4 (July-August 1957), pp. 1-5.

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as the guiding light of the revolts, even though he does discuss the considerable differences between the two. In reference to the WFTU, Mr. Brimmell points out that front organizations are propaganda agencies operating openly and thus are not suited for the direction of Communist parties.

Mr. Trager compounds his oversimplifications with the declaration that, at the 1949 WFTU Conference in Peking, the Soviets handed control of the Southeast Asian Communist parties to the Chinese. He adduces this from the evidence that in deference to the pronouncements at this conference all Asian Communist parties adopted the "Maoist line" in their programs. Could it be that the Russians used the occasion of this conference to proclaim Mao's strategy the strategy of all Communist parties in colonial countries?[6] There is no evidence that acceptance of the Chinese line was accompanied by a transfer of guidance; the evidence of the past decade is all to the contrary.

J. H. Brimmell's *Communism in Southeast Asia* covers the development of Communist strategy in Asia from Lenin to Mao and Khrushchev's pronouncements at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956. He deals extensively with the role of the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau and the impact of events in China on that strategy in Southeast Asia. He also presents country chapters broken down according to the major tactical phases of Communist strategy. Despite the book's many and serious defects of analysis and inadequacy of documentation (explained by the author as necessitated by his former role as an intelligence officer), this remains on balance a useful work presenting information not available elsewhere.

Even more than the contributors to the Trager book, the author tends to identify his view with that of the Afro-Asians. Such identification is no longer a substitute for originality. Propaganda becomes analysis, especially when he asserts that Europe's continued dependence on Asian resources for economic survival renders it vulnerable to the Communist offensive in Asia. He makes no pretense about his interest in communism as anything but the manifestation of Soviet strategy and tactics. His definition of Marxism is restricted to the statement that it is "the conscious organization through the instrumentality of the state of the material welfare of the citizenry" (p. 316). To him, Soviet strategy follows in reality the tradition of Russian imperialism. All colonial strategy is explained in terms of undermining the foremost capitalist powers by denying them the resources of their Asian domains. While

[6] See Bernard S. Morris and Morris Watnick, "Current Communist Strategy in Non-Industrialized Areas," *ibid.*, IV, No. 5 (September-October 1955), pp. 1-6.

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this reviewer agrees with Brimmell that the main target of Soviet strategy remains Europe and through it the United States, the impact of Communist pressures on colonial and former colonial Asia can have been intended as little more than a harassment, and hardly a crucial contest for Western economic survival. Even the armed rebellion of 1948, whether part of a deliberate strategy or not, had no more than a limited diversionary effect on the deployment of troops and matériel while the USSR increased its pressure on Europe. In fact, Communist strategy and tactics in Asia affected the fortunes of the nationalist movements and the newly independent governments of the area far more than it did communism's primary targets. Yet, except in the days of Lenin, this effect seems to have remained a secondary consideration.

Despite Mr. Brimmell's inconsistencies and occasional fanciful speculations, there remain the book's generally excellent country studies and straight historical discussion of the development of strategy. In these sections Mr. Brimmell is, oddly enough, far more conservative than in his general sections, for which he reserves his analytical extravaganzas.

Dr. Druhe's *Soviet Russia and Indian Communism* seeks to present the totality of Soviet pressures on the Indian subcontinent from both without and within during the period from 1917 to 1947. The period 1947-1949 is covered in a short epilogue. The reader of this book will be bemused by Dr. Druhe's penchant for political alliterations such as "Bolshevik Brahmin," "wrathful Reds," and "teutonic taskmasters," "British Bolshevism," and "routine Red rituals." The author believes that Soviet intentions toward India follow a well-established historical pattern of Russian imperialism that began with Peter the Great. In view of the Soviet Union's proclaimed ultimate goal of transforming the entire world in its own image, it is difficult to come to grips with this argument. All one can say is that the efforts of both the Russians along the peripheral areas of India and the Indian Communists within it can hardly be described as serious bids for power. Other objectives of Soviet foreign policy always seem to have interfered with a determined pursuit of this aspect of Russian imperialism. For a more satisfactory recent account of this story, this reviewer suggests Chattar Singh Sanar's *India and Anglo-Soviet Relations (1917-1947)*.[7]

To sum up, this reviewer's criticism is based largely on his different view of socialism, democracy, and nationalism, as well as his view regarding the chances of a democratic development in Asia, given the political impact of Russia and China and the ideological impact of com-

[7] Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1959.

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munism—not to mention the material and socio-economic problems of these areas. Considering the dearth of material with which the student of this area had to be content until a few years ago, it is encouraging to see the increasing number of studies of South and Southeast Asia, not only by the authors reviewed here, but also by such groups as the Southeast Asia Program of Cornell University. Especially in the field of Communist tactics, Miss Ruth T. McVey of Cornell has made considerable and thoughtful contributions. It is to be regretted that some of the authors under discussion did not make better use of them. On balance, however, the student of the area will find much of interest in the Rose and Brimmell books as well as in the country chapters of the volume edited by Trager.

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THE NATURE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

By ARNOLD S. FELDMAN

Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (with the assistance of David Gleicher and Irving Rosow), Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959, 533 pp. $10.00.

Arnold M. Rose, ed., *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*, Minneapolis, Minn., University of Minnesota Press, 1958, 691 pp. $7.50.

THE two volumes under review are welcome additions to the surprisingly small number of studies of advanced or industrial societies. In widely dissimilar ways, both books provide information that is much needed. Unfortunately, most of the popular theories of the social system are based on material gathered from the study of small societies: either from observation of small (often minute) groups encompassed by larger social systems, or from studies of the somewhat exotic societies favored by anthropologists. The validity of these theoretical models, when applied to industrial societies, remains problematic; and the information reported in these books suggests a number of comments on this important and controversial issue.

I

It is difficult to imagine two books more different from each other. *The Soviet Citizen* is the summary and presumably definitive report of the study of Soviet refugees conducted by the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. It is a meticulously cautious, quantitative analysis of a sizable number of interview schedules and questionnaires. Although supporting data from additional sources are occasionally employed, most of the book is based on a survey sample.

Each chapter of *The Institutions of Advanced Societies* deals with a different society and is by a different author. (There is also an introductory chapter by the editor, Arnold M. Rose.) The societies included are heterogeneous in size, complexity, and degree of advancement. They range from Finland, Greece, and Israel at one end of the scale, through Poland, Brazil, and Yugoslavia to France, Great Britain, the United States, and Australia at the opposite pole.

The quality of the chapters is equally varied; and those societies that are most "advanced" do not necessarily receive the most sophisticated

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analysis. Indeed, some of the chapters on the smaller or less advanced societies—particularly the chapter on Israel by Eisenstadt and the one on Poland by Szczepanski—are the most instructive and sociologically rich. The chapter on France by Bourricaud is unique in that the principal sources of data are novels, especially those by Stendahl.

Most of the remaining chapters stick close to the standard sources of data—e.g., statistics on population, labor force, and urbanization. Of course, this kind of analysis is extremely useful and important, if for no other reason than that it provides a point of departure for future research. However, it also reveals what is perhaps the most glaring weakness in the attempts of social scientists to investigate the nature of industrial societies: quite often the standardization of analysis obscures the absence of empirically verified conclusions.

For example, most of the authors agree upon the changes in family patterns that accompany industrialization and urbanization—i.e., erosion of the extended family, of parental authority, and of the quality of family life. Such conclusions, however, are distressingly lacking in adequate empirical verification and often seem to result from imposing a widely shared set of concepts upon incomplete and inadequate data. Frequently the changes in the quality of family life are inferred from a positive correlation between urbanization and industrialization and decreasing fertility rates. And though, as Professor Wilbert Moore once pointed out to me, "demography is sex writ large," this inference is obviously hazardous.

The mechanisms through which the extended family performed its functions undoubtedly have been radically changed. The social and geographic dispersion of family units in industrial societies profoundly alters the form in which interchanges of emotional and financial aid among kinsmen can take place. However, this does not mean that the family ceases to perform these functions. Indeed, there is good reason to believe that, within industrial societies, new forms emerge that allow the continued provision of both financial and emotional aid to distant family members.

In regard to many of the societies reported on in this volume, there are pitifully few studies that actually collect data directly bearing on family (or any other) values and norms; and those that are employed are meager both in sample size and in representativeness. When such studies are subsequently compared and used as the basis for establishing more general relationships, the errors present in the original data are compounded, perhaps many times over.

Now, I do not mean to disparage either demographic data or pilot

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investigations. Nevertheless, I am impressed with the danger of transforming tentative conclusions into received doctrine. The exposure of the sizable gap between what available data allow the social scientist to say and what he needs to say about the institutions of advanced societies may be this book's most important and valuable contribution.

II

The authors of *The Soviet Citizen* have made a contribution to the closing of this gap. They claim that their study is unusual and "groundbreaking" in three major respects: (1) it examines ". . . a large-scale industrial society primarily through the people's own report of their experiences and attitudes as they pursued the round of daily living . . ." (p. 3); (2) it employs a systematically comparative emphasis, ". . . using comparable data from other industrial societies whenever possible . . ." (p. 4); and (3) the sample respondents are all refugees from the Soviet Union.

The first three chapters (Part I) of the book are entirely devoted to methodological problems, most of which stem from the nature of the sample. These problems are formidable for a study that attempts to analyze the experiences of typical Soviet citizens, since the refugee respondents are ex-citizens whose experiences with the Soviet system are somewhat dated (World War II), and whose feelings toward the regime are generally hostile.

Inkeles and Bauer employ a wide variety of techniques to control for these sources of error and bias. Most important, they base their interpretations upon the internal distribution of responses rather than upon the over-all level of response. For example, in regard to levels of occupational dissatisfaction, they interpret the observed differences among the various social strata within the sample that show the lower classes to be relatively more dissatisfied than the upper classes (p. 104). However, they do not infer over-all levels of occupational dissatisfaction within the Soviet Union from the levels observed for their sample. In general, the methodological chapters are an excellent illustration of how one solves the problem of data analysis in a manner that simultaneously yields the maximum amount of information and carefully observes the limits imposed by severe sample biases.

Part II of *The Soviet Citizen* examines the major institutions of Soviet society: stratification and mobility, education, working conditions, communication and, in two chapters, the family. Consistently employing comparative materials, Inkeles and Bauer illuminate the points at which

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Soviet society resembles other industrial societies (chiefly the United States) and, of course, the points at which differences appear.

The authors are most impressed with the extent to which the Soviet Union appears to resemble other industrial societies, at least in social structure. More importantly, their analysis indicates that these similarities in social structure are increasing in regard to occupational evaluations (p. 79), mobility rates (p. 831), job satisfaction (pp. 125-28), access to education (p. 141), and the familiar family patterns (p. 224).

Fortunately, Inkeles and Bauer do not succumb to either economic or technological determinism in interpreting these impressive social uniformities. On the contrary, they also point out that such similarities are uniform neither within any single social structure nor across the different structures. For example, the invidious differences between rural and urban occupational rewards and satisfactions are infinitely sharper in the Soviet Union than in the United States (p. 105). And although the patterns of access to education are generally the same in the Soviet Union and the United States, the importance of education is probably greater in the Soviet Union because of the relative absence of alternative or private paths of mobility. Thus the uses that can be made of their educational systems differ in the two societies.

Generally, Inkeles and Bauer argue that the fact of growing structural similarity does not necessarily mean that an equivalent process is occurring within the other social institutions. The crucial theoretical question raised by their findings therefore is: given increasing similarities in the component social structures of industrial societies, what degrees and kinds of variations in other areas of social life are possible, and perhaps likely? This problem will be the major concern of the final section of this article.

Parts III and IV of *The Soviet Citizen* deal with the individual's attitudes toward the regime, and the social divisions that are potential "sources of cleavage." Compared with Part II, these later chapters are somewhat repetitive and superficial. The authors find a great deal of dissatisfaction with and hostility toward the regime, but they leave the impression that most of this can be ameliorated without any profound changes in Soviet society, excepting the deep dissatisfaction with the collective farm system (p. 244). Also, they argue that hostility toward the regime does not lead to alienation; and that alienation is primarily a consequence of personal encounters with the regime's excesses of terror (p. 271).

As one might expect, the most significant social division is between

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Party and non-Party. To some extent, it appears that the strong negative feelings toward the "apparatus" act as a sponge, absorbing hostilities that might otherwise manifest themselves as social class or nationality conflicts.

III

The concluding chapter of *The Soviet Citizen* deals with the traditional, though nonetheless pressing, question: whither now? It begins by juxtaposing the arguments of Bertram Wolfe and those of Isaac Deutscher, though both positions are perhaps unavoidably caricatured. In its most concrete form, the issue between these two positions is whether the changes occurring within Soviet society will lead to a pervasive liberalization of the regime's policies and practices, and ultimately to the establishment of a "typical" industrial society—i.e., one that shares basic institutions, values, and norms with other industrial societies; or whether these same changes are superficial and incapable of altering the regime's monolithic, totalitarian, and profoundly illiberal character.

Having stated two extreme positions, the authors opt for a middle way. They predict the irreversibility of the recent changes in the severe regime-imposed tempo of life, as well as the terror that accompanied it. However, they also predict that the developmental path currently pursued by the Soviet Union will never coincide with that of the United States, though both paths may run parallel for *some* institutions. Finally, they predict that the emergent over-all social system of the Soviet Union is viable and will enjoy increasing, perhaps eventually overwhelming, popular support.

The same problem can be examined at a somewhat more abstract and theoretical level. For what is basically at issue in the arguments about the future of the Soviet Union is nothing less than the question of whether or not industrial societies are all converging upon some common "natural" condition; whether or not they *must* all eventually share a common ontological fate.

Those societies that deserve the adjective "industrial" must have at least a minimum number of elements in common. Technology, the social structure of productive organizations, the distribution of skills among the labor force, and educational content are perhaps the most salient. However, even with regard to these elements, significant variations are possible. Thus the social structure of factories can vary from the manager-dominated organizations of the Soviet Union, through organizations that allocate some power over production to trade unions, to the

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predominantly worker-controlled factories of Yugoslavia.[1] Moreover, the *proportion* of the population that has industrial skills and educational experience is variable even among highly industrialized societies.

In sum, the first source of variation *and therefore of commonality* among industrial societies is the proportion of institutions closely linked with industrialism that remain unaffected by other institutions. Even though the exactitude with which one can specify the required minimum proportion may vary, the violations of appropriate levels can be theoretically identified, and have been empirically observed in societies experiencing industrial development.

The second source of both commonality and variability among industrial societies is represented by those non-economic institutions that seem regularly to accompany industrialism. As mentioned previously, there is at least widespread agreement that industrial societies share a common family system. One might also mention in this regard certain underlying value patterns, such as the desire for upward mobility and what appears to be a widely held desire for a welfare state. The theoretical question is, of course, whether or not these relationships are necessary.

Actually, what are judged to be almost identical institutions often function quite differently in different societies. Inkeles and Bauer nicely illustrate the point in their discussion of the changes experienced by the Soviet family. On the surface, these changes appear to endow the Soviet family with precisely the patterns characteristic of the urban family in the United States, and have been accompanied by increasing recognition of the family by the regime. These facts have led to interpretations that emphasize the ability of family institutions to withstand severe political and ideological hostility. The opposite is more nearly the case, for the regime's recognition of or compromise with the family occurred only after the Soviet family had been "captured from within, by the regime" (p. 230). Thus the Soviet family, according to Inkeles and Bauer, now functions as an ally of the regime, rather than as a challenge to the regime's power. The apparent similarity in the family systems of the Soviet Union and the United States, therefore, does not mean that these two societies are becoming more like one another; there may well be an opposite effect. It appears that industrialism does impose certain

[1] The extent to which workers control factories in Yugoslavia is of course controversial. According to Professor Mandich, author of the chapter on Yugoslavia in *The Institutions of Advanced Societies*, worker control is almost complete. Professor William N. Loucks has indicated that while such control is limited, it remains a significant factor in the organization of Yugoslav factories. See William N. Loucks, "Workers' Self-government in Yugoslav Industry," *World Politics*, XI, No. 1 (October 1958), pp. 68-82.

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limits upon the other social institutions found within industrial societies, but that these limits are sufficiently broad and flexible to permit significant variability in both form and function.

The final source of variability and commonality is the way in which the various institutions of industrial societies are combined with each other, and the persistent strains and tensions that stem from the resulting configurations. Each of the industrial societies contains a number of persistent strains resulting from its peculiar institutional combination. These persistent strains are especially important for any prediction of the future of the society, for they seem to present a hospitable environment for social change, whether it be consciously undertaken or intrusive, and even though the strains may never be eliminated.

Similar social structures, when they develop within different cultural milieus, often produce different kinds of social strains. For example, welfare statism seems to be increasing in many industrial societies. However, this development is almost never free of strain; and the strains that accompany it are different in each society. Inkeles and Bauer point out that in the Soviet Union the emphasis of welfare statism on consumption and leisure conflicts with the regime's drive for capital accumulation and investment in heavy industry, and therefore with the more self-sacrificing and puritanical aspects of Soviet ideology. In the United States, the emphasis of welfare statism on social insurance conflicts with the ideology of individual responsibility as well as with the fears of an all-encompassing federal government. In this instance, it seems that increasing structural similarity is associated with the development of quite different social strains. If such strains are indeed crucial determinants of the direction of social change, they may lead to profoundly different developmental paths. In sum, the differences between industrial societies may increase along with and partly as a consequence of growing uniformities in social structures.

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STUDIES IN REVOLUTION

Theory and Practice

By ROBERT F. BYRNES

Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958, 484 pp. $8.50.
Ralph T. Fisher, *Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1959, 452 pp. $6.75.
E. Lampert, *Studies in Rebellion: Belinsky, Bakunin, Herzen*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1957, 295 pp. $6.00.
Alfred E. Meyer, *Leninism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, 324 pp. $6.00.
Stanley W. Page, *Lenin and World Revolution*, New York, New York University Press, 1959, 252 pp. $5.00.

AMERICAN and Western scholarship on Russia and the Soviet Union has flowered since 1945, particularly in the last decade, and these five volumes are to a degree representative of recent publications in the field of Russian history and government. In particular, they add a great deal to our knowledge of revolutionary theory and of the Soviet government's domestic policies and practices. At the same time, they reflect the shortcomings of our research and writing, and they help to identify some of the main problems which still need determined investigation.

I

The most important of these volumes is clearly that by Professor Fainsod, Professor of Government and now Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Professor Fainsod's *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* is one of the most interesting and impressive studies in the Soviet field which has been published in this country. It is based upon the Smolensk archives, a collection of documents captured by the Germans in the early fall of 1941 when the Communists left Smolensk in such haste that they failed to evacuate or to destroy the warehouse which contained Party documents for the period from 1917 through 1938. The Germans selected approximately 500 files, or 200,000 pages, of these documents and returned them to Germany, where they were captured by American troops at the end of the war. The RAND Corporation arranged for Professor Fainsod to have access to the documents, which provide an extraordinary view of the "processes of re-

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gional and local government in the Soviet Union from the inside." Indeed, they are now the best single source of information concerning Communist Party operations within the Soviet Union available to Western scholars. They can be obtained on microfilm through the National Archives and, moreover, scholars can make full use of an index to the documents which has been prepared at Harvard University and which is available there.

Smolensk Under Soviet Rule is a full and objective description of the organization of authority, the ways in which Party controls operated, and the impact of Soviet rule on the people of the Smolensk guberniya from 1917 through 1929, of the Western oblast from 1929 through 1937, and of the Smolensk oblast in 1937 and 1938. Professor Fainsod has demonstrated great skill in distilling in a clear and logical way the essence from this great mass of Party material. He has let the materials speak for themselves, with extensive quotations, and he has therefore succeeded in giving us an extraordinary view of Soviet rule at the grassroots level. The volume does not provide us with a "representative" picture of Russia, because Smolensk was not an industrial area in 1917 or in 1938, and we learn less than we should like about factories and trade unions, for example, than documents about Kharkov would have shown.

However, from this volume we learn about the inner workings of the Soviet Party, relations between the Party and the Soviet government, relations between the Party and the police, and, above all, the impact in human terms of Soviet rule upon the Russian population. The violence, the ruthlessness, the secrecy, and the inefficiency of Communist rule come through clearly. While this book provides a picture of a highly authoritarian government in operation, Professor Fainsod has handled the materials in such a way that the human side of the rulers as well as of the ruled is revealed. Indeed, Rumyantsev, the little Stalin, who was First Secretary of the Party in the entire area from 1929 until he was purged in 1937, himself emerges as a human being with all the flaws, faults, and failings from which humans everywhere suffer, but with the Communist part of his character predominant at all times. Most studies of the Soviet government emphasize organization and control; this recalls to us the millions of Russian people who lived under the apparatus and the terror.

Perhaps the most important achievement of the Fainsod volume is its description of the successes of the Communists in the Smolensk area, a predominantly rural section (83 per cent rural even in 1939), where the Party was very weak. Indeed, the Party had only 10,657 members in the Smolensk guberniya in 1921, and its strength decreased steadily

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as one moved from the larger cities into the villages. Even so, however, and in the face of enormous difficulties, the Party not only managed to retain control but to carry through the most extraordinary industrialization and collectivization drive in the 1930's, relying upon its political monopoly, terror, the ruthlessness of its leadership, particularly in Moscow, the traditional servility of Russians before authority, and the striking weakness of the opposition.

II

Professor Fisher's study of the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth, commonly called the Komsomol, is a narrative, chronological history of the Communist Youth League, based on the official record of the twelve congresses of the Komsomol which took place between 1918 and 1954. It is an objective, detailed, and impressive piece of research, full of information, and the notes and the appendices are most useful for the student of Soviet government and of Soviet affairs.

The Komsomol grew as effectively as the Party did, rising from something like 20,000 in 1918 to a body of 19,000,000 in 1954. After 1936, the Komsomol was basically an organization for indoctrinating the youth and for creating a reserve from which Party members might be drawn. As those Americans know who have met Komsomol leaders, the organization is directed by mature men and women, and the Party for more than a generation has used the Komsomol as just another of its instruments for rule.

In spite of its great qualities, this book adds relatively little to our knowledge of the Komsomol, as described, for example, in Professor Fainsod's masterly study, *How Russia Is Ruled*.[1] It is based almost entirely upon Komsomol congress records. Thus, it contains very little information from the Soviet press, from Communist Party materials, and from the Communist Party congresses themselves. Moreover, Professor Fisher has not related developments within the Komsomol to the current developments in Soviet history.

III

Lampert's book, *Studies in Rebellion*, is the first volume of a planned trilogy on the history of revolutionary thought in the nineteenth century. It emphasizes the importance of man's rebellious spirit and of three individuals, Belinsky, Bakunin, and Herzen, in the Russian revolutionary movement. As a study of the origins of Russian revolutionary

[1] Cambridge, Mass., 1953.

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thought, it has a strong flavor of sympathy for the revolutionary leaders. Lampert makes no effort whatsoever to establish parallels or contrasts between nineteenth-century ideas and twentieth-century facts—probably a virtue when the continuity of Russian and Soviet development is so much emphasized. However, his book does throw a great deal of illumination upon some of the main differences between the attitudes of Russians and Westerners, then and now, on basic issues, such as freedom and order, the individual and society, progress through violence and progress through evolution.

The essays are accurate descriptions of the views of the men analyzed, with the contribution on Belinsky clearly the most original and the most significant. However, Lampert errs seriously in blurring the differences among these three men, which were often as great as the similarities. Lampert was born in Russia, was educated in Germany and France, and now lives and works in Oxford. His work is influenced considerably by his study of Russian religious thought, especially Berdyaev, although he has little sympathy for religion or for the Russian Orthodox Church. He has obviously also been deeply influenced by recent French and other existentialist thought.

IV

Professor Meyer's book is probably the best American book written in the field of Communist theory. A study of Lenin's thought and practice by various periods of development, it is systematic and scholarly. It is especially valuable because it compares Lenin's ideas with those of Marx and of other socialist thinkers.

The organization of the book is quite clear, much more clear and logical than Lenin's ideas themselves were. The first section is devoted to Lenin's concept of the Communist Party, the second to Lenin's other ideas prior to the seizure of power in November 1917, the third to Lenin in power, and the final section, the most interesting and able, to imperialism, which Meyer defines as "the most interesting, challenging, and lasting part of Lenin's work." Indeed, those concerned today about Soviet policy in the underdeveloped countries of the world ought to read this section of Professor Meyer's volume, for Meyer sees communism as the result of the "dialectics of backwardness," and he argues that Soviet totalitarianism derives basically from the difficulties of industrializing a backward country, even though it is conditioned by communism.

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V

The book by Professor Page, *Lenin and the World Revolution*, is a brief attempt to explain the thesis that Lenin's theories were all "rationalizations designed to mask his personal strivings." Page has sought to explain Lenin's ideas and actions as a screen for a drive for personal power on a world scale, and he sees in Lenin a "compulsive need to dominate, a need that underlay his cold revolutionary fanaticism."

Page concentrates entirely upon Lenin as an individual. He fails to provide a solid foundation for the reader in the Marxist thought which was the base from which all Bolsheviks operated. He not only ignores Marx, but also gives slight attention to Lenin's writings and activities before 1917. Less than 20 per cent of the book is devoted to the first forty-four years of Lenin's life, and the reader is plunged into the First World War early in the second chapter. Moreover, the volume, which tries to prove Lenin's "compulsive will to dominate," reflects no knowledge of psychology or of the vast literature on this subject which specialists in several fields of the social sciences have contributed in the last three decades. Finally, the book is based almost entirely on Lenin's own publications, which surely ought to be the main source; it should, however, have been buttressed by references to the vast amount of information available on the subject and other primary materials, including the main works of some of Lenin's colleagues.

VI

These five books alone do not, of course, provide a solid base from which to make general comments about the quality of scholarship now being completed and published about Russia. However, some generalizations can safely be made from them, and a number of conclusions about Soviet rule and the Russian people also emerge.

The Fainsod volume is especially important because it provides a critical check and proof of the quality of other American research upon the Soviet government. *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* is based entirely upon Soviet documents which no Communists ever presumed would be seen by an outsider. The picture which emerges from this rich collection of documents does not change substantially the description and analysis of Soviet rule pieced together by Professor Fainsod and other Western scholars from published materials, refugees, and a wide variety of bits and pieces of evidence. In other words, the reconstruction of Soviet society based on a kind of detective work has been proved by captured Soviet documents to have been essentially correct.

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This conclusion, which has also been supported by the visits of scholars to the Soviet Union since 1955, is a most significant testimonial to the character of Western scholarship. Moreover, this gives us some assurance that our work on another society now closed to us, Communist China, and on earlier periods of history, such as the Middle Ages, may possess the same kind of accuracy and discernment.

While all of these volumes reflect a high degree of technical skill and objectivity, they all also reflect one of the more serious handicaps of our scholarship, the dullness and difficulty they present even to the interested and informed reader. The style in which each was written is a dreary one, and none has any distinction or flair. All of them use a specialized, technical vocabulary, and each is so highly technical that even the professional would have difficulty reading it for a prolonged period. The Lampert book demands a close knowledge of the personalities involved, and the Meyer volume assumes that the reader has a considerable knowledge of Marxism and of socialism in general. In other words, these volumes reflect the inability of American and Western scholars in general to write for other than scholars and students, and they illustrate the barrier which American scholars have erected between themselves and the reading public. A fearful consequence of this is the gap between the knowledge available in the scholarly community about the Soviet Union and the general ignorance in the country at large.

These volumes also reflect the difficulties involved in research and writing about the Soviet Union. Thus Lampert, working on the 1840's and 1850's, was able to obtain access to all the published materials on the three men in whom he was most interested. This was not the case for the specialists working on more recent developments, where the most significant material, that concerning decisions made within the Kremlin, is almost always lacking, and where many other varieties of data are hardly ever available. Even the Smolensk archives provide very little information on the way in which decisions were reached at the center of Soviet power. They do present some data concerning decisions made by the Central Committee in Moscow, but the key documents were always returned to Moscow and were not among the papers captured.

On the other hand, while many materials are not available, the scholar working on the period since 1917 is often handicapped by the enormous bulk of material, often of little value, which must be analyzed carefully. The Fisher volume, for example, suffers from the immense quantity of material available just from the Komsomol congresses. Professor Fisher spent years examining this evidence, leaving the other quantities available in other sources to research that he or others may undertake later.

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These volumes also provide other insights into the nature of American scholarship. Thus, each one is written in or reflects a highly specialized approach to the subject of interest to the author. For example, Professor Page based his work almost entirely upon Lenin's publications, neglected Lenin before 1917, paid little attention to Lenin's colleagues, and made no effort whatsoever to relate Lenin's ideas to the earlier history of the Russian revolutionary movement. Professor Fisher, at the same time, treated the Komsomol in almost complete isolation from the rest of Russian history from 1918 through 1954. His volume would have been far more valuable if he had related the particular thread he followed to other threads in Soviet development.

Similarly, Professor Meyer paid no attention to the Russian revolutionary tradition, on which some of Lenin's ideas were based. He also neglected the historical context in which Lenin's theories developed, particularly the historical situation in which Lenin worked out his concept of a revolutionary political party. Lampert in his volume provided the ideological setting for the Russian intelligentsia about whom he wrote, but he ignored the political and social background. Moreover, he did not attempt to draw connections between the main currents of Russian thought in the 1840's and 1850's and those of a century later.

Other conclusions emerge also about developments in the Soviet Union. Thus, one is impressed by the weakness of the opposition to authoritarian or totalitarian ideas and systems in Russia over the last century. This is reflected in the 1840's, in the early years of this century and, above all, in the 1920's and 1930's, when a weak Soviet Communist Party was able to triumph over all opposition and to put the Soviet Union into a Party straitjacket. The growth of Party control, one of the most important phenomena of the twentieth century, described brilliantly in *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* and *Pattern for Soviet Youth*, strengthens Meyer's thesis that "Lenin's most conspicuous contribution to twentieth-century politics" was his establishment of the Soviet Communist Party.

The Party's obsession with control is the final theme which emerges from these volumes. The conflict between this obsession, on one hand, and what Fainsod calls "family circles," on the other, is one of the most interesting and crucial themes of the whole Soviet period. Indeed, the Party official, caught between the pressures exerted on him from the top in Moscow and the feelings of the population among whom he must work, is the symbol of the conflict which eternally ravages the Party. However, the Party has always managed to conquer, in large part because of the tenacity and ferocity with which it has emphasized control.

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AIRPOWER IN THE MISSILE GAP

By JAMES E. KING, JR.

Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1959, 423 pp. $6.50.

NEARLY five years ago, in an article in *Harper's Magazine*, Bernard Brodie of The RAND Corporation said: "The old concepts of strategy, including those of Douhet and of World War II, have come to a dead end. What we now must initiate is the comprehensive pursuit of the new ideas and procedures necessary to carry us through the next two or three dangerous decades."[1] Now, in *Strategy in the Missile Age*—a book of great achievement—Brodie reviews his judgment on the classic writers on modern strategy, and concludes that, in general, airpower armed with thermonuclear weapons has made a hash of their theories. To be sure, Clausewitz's dictum on the senselessness of war for its own sake is still persuasive, but, with one exception, he alone among the old masters still has something to say to us. The exception is Douhet, who comes out rather better than he did in 1955. For—wrong as he was on nearly every count in his own day—Douhet "has come into his own" (p. 402), thanks to nuclear weapons, of which he had no inkling when he wrote.

In essence, Brodie says, it is "*the loss of the defensive function as an inherent capability of our major offensive forces*" (p. 225; author's italics) that accounts for the eclipse of strategy as it used to be understood. In carrying out their offensive mission, these forces do not "interpose themselves between enemy and homeland, as armies did and still do wherever the chief burden of fighting is theirs" (*ibid.*). Active antiair defenses over our homeland have their uses—"there is a rough rule-of-thumb principle that no enemy vehicle of attack must be permitted to have 'a free ride' "—but "history . . . thus far suggests that there is always a hole, an Achilles' heel" (p. 202). Therefore, in principle, "barring revolutionary and presently unforeseen advances in air defense, including extensive hardening of targets, an unrestricted strategic air campaign . . . is bound to be decisive" (p. 165).

As Douhet and the USAF say: the bomber will always get through—and now there are missiles. Passive defensive measures, including that "hardening of targets" just alluded to, deserve more attention than they have received, because they improve our ability to "take it" if an attack

[1] "Strategy Hits a Dead End," *Harper's Magazine* (October 1955), p. 37.

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is launched against us. But as for SAC, which is "our major offensive force," the only kind of "defensive" action of which it is capable is a counterair or blunting mission," which depends for its success "essentially on our having the initiative, more specifically, *on our hitting first.* It is not the only requirement, but it is the basic one. It is also the one least likely to be met" (p. 225; italics added). For hitting first means preventive war (Brodie doesn't find the paler version of preventive action, the so-called "pre-emptive strike," any more convincing than do most other critics who have examined it). But—and this is the clincher —*for the United States, though not for the Soviet Union,* preventive war is ruled out by practical (political and constitutional) as well as moral considerations.

It is hardly surprising, in view of these premises, that Brodie's argument is haunted throughout by the conviction that the offensive strategy of preventive war is the best *military* strategy for *both* the great nuclear powers. That he personally rejects the policy of preventive war, on moral and other grounds, is evident and noteworthy. Nevertheless the fact that the choice of preventive war is foreclosed to us but not to our adversary is an Albatross to his own strategic thinking. The alternative military strategy of hitting *back*, though required by our strategy conceived in broader *political* terms, is so second-rate militarily that Brodie seems to have difficulty considering it a rational choice at all. It is this second-rate strategy that he calls "deterrence," of which he says: "the rejection of a preventive war solution has committed us to a deterrence strategy, and we must now prove ourselves ready to pay the full price of such a strategy, including basic adjustment in military doctrine" (p. 176).

On the weapons side, the price of the deterrence strategy that has not as yet been paid in full (there being no suggestion that the destructive power of our strategic forces is inadequate) is the protection of our retaliatory capability. For whereas "Known ability to defend our retaliatory force constitutes the only unilaterally attainable situation that provides potentially a perfect defense of our homeland . . . , a conspicuous inability or unreadiness to defend our retaliatory force must tend to provoke the opponent to destroy it; in other words, it tempts him to an aggression he might not otherwise contemplate" (p. 185).

Of even greater interest to the student of strategy is the "full price" as regards the "basic adjustment in military doctrine." This, according to Brodie, requires forthright rejection of "the wish for total solutions" (the title of Chapter 7, pp. 223-63), including not only preventive war and "pre-emptive" attack, but, in particular, "massive retaliation." The last, to the author, sounds like double-talk for preventive war—"save

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that we have waited for an excuse, a provocation" (p. 257). Anyway, he suspects the famous doctrine is more pose than policy, for while the occasion for it was the threat of local aggression with conventional land forces in the Far East, "no responsible government will opt for massive retaliation except where it conceives its stake in the matter to be absolutely vital" (p. 259).

The argument is aimed primarily at airpower enthusiasts who have "followed Douhet, not merely in . . . broad emphasis on strategic bombing, but also through most of the finer ramifications of his philosophy" (p. 74), ignoring the obvious incompatibility of that philosophy with the basic rejection of preventive war. It is this "offensive-mindedness," this preoccupation with "seizing the initiative and carrying the fight to the enemy," even to the point of addiction to "the ritual of liquidation —the idea that some convulsive and fearfully costly act will justify itself through the elimination of the evil enemy and the need to live in the same world with him" (p. 268), that the author believes has led to the vulnerability of SAC and to partiality for strike-first doctrines such as "massive retaliation," "pre-emptive" strikes, and even preventive war itself.

Nevertheless, the rejection of strike-first doctrines is not quite as definitive as appears in the passages from which the quotations in the last two paragraphs have been selected. For elsewhere the point is made that "we have and will probably continue to have obligations under treaties of alliance which require us to defend our partners with all the resources at our command from nuclear attack." Because of these treaty obligations (and for "other reasons"), the author says, "we need the capability for a first strike, both in spirit and in military power" (p. 270). The paradox of rejecting preventive war while simultaneously being preoccupied with the strike-first counterforce capability of our strategic forces is not, then, entirely the product of enthusiasm for "total solutions." Indeed, it is inherent in the foreign policies the United States government has built upon nuclear airpower and, as such, Bernard Brodie recognizes its inevitability, albeit rather grudgingly.

He seeks relief from the discomfort of excessive reliance upon the first-strike threat by directing attention to a "strategy of limited war," which he treats as a supplement to the main-line strategy of deterrence. For, as he says: "The fact is that if the enemy in his aggressions, especially those outside Europe, leaves to us the choice between fighting a total war or fighting a limited one, the chances are overwhelming that our government will opt for the limited one" (p. 259). And even in the critical case of Europe, "we ought to be interested in developing a

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real NATO limited war capability" (p. 337). However, this too is an uncomfortable strategic choice, forced upon us by the logic of airpower, if not by the illogic of our rejection of preventive war. For limited war today raises an entirely unprecedented problem: the "deliberate non-use of . . . *just those existing instruments which from a strictly military point of view are far the most efficient* . . ." (p. 311; author's italics). Thus because (as Hans Speier may have been the first to observe) limited war is "inefficient war," war in current circumstances would not be easy to limit. And anyway, says Brodie, limited wars "can have little more than the function of keeping the world from getting worse. There is little chance that the basic inherent strength of either the Soviet Union or Communist China can be drained off through wars that are kept limited in any meaningful sense of the term" (p. 409).

Loss of the defensive function of the dominant arm, together with the overwhelming advantage of the first strike, then, make seizure of the initiative the best strategy in Great Power conflict—for the aggressor's elected victim as well as for the aggressor. If the former cannot choose the best strategy, he must be content with the second-best strategy that entails trying to be sure he can strike back in order to deter attack. This calls for major effort to ensure the protection of his strategic forces under surprise attack, for they must be able to survive if his threat to retaliate is to be credible. Meanwhile, he is wise to be cautious, not pretending to embrace military doctrines that depend for their effectiveness upon his taking the initiative, for to do so without actually being free to take the initiative is likely to provoke the very attack it is his deterrent purpose to prevent. By the same token he had best not rely upon nuclear weapons in limited wars, for "between the use and non-use of atomic weapons there is a vast watershed of difference and distinction, one that ought not be cavalierly thrown away, as we appear to be throwing it away, if we are serious about trying to limit war" (p. 327).

This, in brief, is Bernard Brodie's appraisal of military strategy today. It will not be surprising if some of his readers are convinced by it that we are still at a dead end—in the contradiction between the military "best strategy" of preventive war and the political "best strategy" of deterrence. Those who dislike dead ends, who are uncomfortable in the presence of contradiction, or who fear for the safety of the country when its military thinking seems at war with its world outlook, will desire to probe deeper or look farther ahead. And well they may, for Brodie's appraisal is Douhet updated (by adding H-bombs), purged (by rejecting his passion for aggressive total war), and perturbed (by

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the intrusion of strategic missiles that do not fit the airpower pattern). It is thus an analysis of airpower in the Missile Gap: the period during which our bombers are imperiled by Russian missiles while our own missile force is still considered inadequate to the task of deterrence.

The Missile Gap, however, is a temporary phenomenon. Almost certainly it will not be longer than five years before the Missile Age will be in full dominion, with the strategic missile the dominant weapon, the manned bomber dethroned, and the Air Age history. Brodie's own glances in that direction are cautious and inconclusive; it is not his subject. But he has written what deserves to be regarded as the definitive work on the strategic alternatives of the Air Age and his analysis affords us a useful foundation from which to approach the Missile Age. Perhaps by adapting his method to the speculation he has chosen to avoid we may utilize it to crack the door to the future, as he has used it to open the past and present to better understanding.

We begin our search by asking a question: What is the premise upon which the strategy of nuclear airpower has been built? We need not enumerate all the well-known negatives—the decline of the defensive function, the eclipse of the other arms, etc. These are not premises; they are inferences that come later. But the base premise itself is no mystery. It is simply this: *strategic airpower using nuclear weapons can achieve victory by destroying the enemy's airpower before the latter can do unacceptable damage to the home country.* A suitable short title for this proposition is the phrase, *the dominance of the offensive.* Even Douhet, who asserted this premise before World War II, insisted that the future victor must launch an all-out surprise attack to make the premise true. The experience of World War II proved, as Brodie shows, that in terms of pre-nuclear airpower Douhet's premise was false, or possibly just irrelevant. But nuclear weapons have rehabilitated it, with redoubled emphasis upon the decisiveness of the initiative. This is Brodie's restatement: "Today the supreme advantage of the initiative in launching an unrestricted thermonuclear war can hardly be contested, for the side possessing it can hope, reasonably under some circumstances, to obliterate the opponent's power to retaliate" (p. 176).

It is obvious, however, that the Douhet proposition, though it is the foundation upon which airpower strategy for the nuclear era has been built, is really not a premise, but a conclusion. A number of assumptions are hidden in it, including two that are of critical importance, namely, that *the attacker knows where the enemy strategic force is located*, and that *he can destroy it by surprise attack before it can be launched into an attack upon his homeland* (more precisely, that he can destroy

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enough of it so that the damage the remainder can do to his homeland is acceptable to him). If either of these hidden assumptions is false, the Douhet premise itself is false, and the rational justification of a surprise attack (which causes Brodie so much trouble) is lacking.

Neither of the two hidden assumptions is self-evident. In fact, the requirements to be satisfied if they are to be true are quite exacting. After all, they relate to targets located within enemy territory, thousands of miles from the forces that are destined to attack them—targets, moreover, that can be attacked only after hours of flight, during which time the victim of the attack is virtually certain to receive some warning (and may have several hours in which to launch his counterattack), while the attacking bombers must run the gantlet of their victim's anti-air defenses. All this suggests another question, more elemental than that asked a moment ago: What is it that warrants the assumptions that the location of these airpower targets is known and that they can be destroyed in a surprise attack? *It is the fact that strategic bombers must normally spend all but a small fraction of their time upon bases difficult if not impossible to hide because of their size, and few in number because of their cost and the requirements of effective control, which, owing to the assumed unreliability of their active defenses, are believed to be highly vulnerable to nuclear attack.* It is the dependence of strategic airpower upon a comparatively few bases which are believed to be indefensible, the locations of which may be known in advance or, if not, may be found by "armed reconnaissance," that is believed to ensure a surprise attack by nuclear airpower a good chance of success.

It is important to interpret these conditions correctly. Brodie lists three "characteristics of an air force," the first two of which correspond to the rehabilitated Douhet premise. His third is different, and may seem to qualify the premise, for he says it appears that the "natural vulnerability" of a strategic air force "can be critically if not decisively reduced by [passive as well as active defensive] measures that seem to be of reasonable cost" (p. 222). What he means, other than that he is lecturing SAC for persisting in its "offensive-mindedness" in the face of the missile threat, is unfortunately not clear. In a few passages he seems to suggest that what he means by "reasonable cost" is negligible cost (e.g., p. 394). But from what he says in other places one might conclude that the cost of protection for our bombers in the Missile Gap would be "reasonable" even if the price were a considerable loss in first-strike offensive capability (e.g., p. 283). If the latter is a fair interpretation, it seems to reflect the price of continuing to rely predominantly upon bombers after missiles have entered the picture, and to

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suggest that the third "characteristic of an air force" is a recent discovery.

Brodie argues that "hardening" a portion of SAC's bombers—i.e., their protection with reinforced concrete—is a better solution of the problem of their vulnerability to missile attack than an airborne alert. In this he may be correct, though one notes his bearishness on the accuracy of ICBM's, and would require more information than he supplies about the costs and construction times of his bomber bunkers before one could be wholly convinced. But he seems to be overstating his case if he also means to suggest that the Douhet influence, or general "offensive-mindedness," entirely explains past (i.e., pre-missile) neglect of passive measures to protect SAC.

On the contrary, it appears that General Curtis E. LeMay's choice, when he was SAC commander, which was to meet the Soviet *bomber* threat by building more United States bombers (though LeMay probably overstated *his* case, too), was in full consonance with the base premise of airpower strategy. It is not difficult to understand why a strategic air force commander, if he must choose between a force limited in numbers by the cost and time required to protect his bombers and a larger unprotected force, would be likely to choose the latter. For if he were to opt for hardening while his opponent did not, he would expect the latter to forge ahead in bomber strength. Consequently, he must have confidence in his hardening quite inconsistent with his convictions regarding "the dominance of the offensive" if any appreciable sacrifice of numbers for protection were not to seem to him tantamount to deliberate surrender to his opponent any time the latter chose to take the initiative. What recommended itself to General LeMay instead was that he increase his bomber force, in order that its depleted strength, even after a surprise attack, would still be sufficient to penetrate the enemy's anti-air defenses. This was keeping the emphasis on the offensive, where he was convinced it belonged.

Probably both "offensive-mindedness," which Brodie views with such disfavor, and the thought that SAC might actually be called upon to strike first to carry out United States treaty commitments, which he regards with reluctance as an inescapable component of his "deterrence strategy" (p. 277), helped to reinforce the preference for numbers over protection. But what needs to be emphasized here is that there was a strictly rational basis for the preference, reflecting the character of nuclear airpower and consistent with "the dominance of the offensive." This does not mean, of course, that it was sensible to have no passive protection for SAC (or to confine it to limited dispersal), any more

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than it means there was no proper role for active defenses. It does mean, however, once we grant the base premise of nuclear airpower, that the highest priority rationally lies in offensive strength, even at considerable cost in vulnerability of the offensive force to attack.

Turning now to the Missile Age, almost the first thing we notice is the fact that the very character of the new dominant weapons appears to rule out the possibility of a missile power equivalent of the base premise of nuclear airpower. To be sure, the strategic missile itself is inherently as vulnerable as the bomber. But unlike the latter, which has been overtaken by a new development for which it was unprepared, the missile is being introduced into an environment in which warning time in minutes is taken for granted. Even more important, the missile, because of its vertical take-off and other performance characteristics, is adaptable to a variety of deployments. In particular, in a number of these deployments the missile need not be tied to a vast soft-base complex that makes a good target for surprise attack. In consequence the attacker's priority targets of the future will no longer be a few immovable, unconcealable, and vulnerable bases. Instead, there will be a far larger number of targets, mostly missiles variously deployed. Some will be in hardened sites underground, requiring high accuracy and big warheads for successful attack even if the attacker knows their precise location; some will be moving over the surface of the earth or sea, difficult if not impossible to keep track of at all times; some will be roaming beneath the surface of the sea; some may be riding in airborne missile launchers. Of course some of the targets may well be manned aircraft. But it is likely that these aircraft will be few by current standards, and it is possible they may be as thoroughly bunkered as any "hardened" missile (though the fact that the bulk of the retaliation force will be in missiles deployed to diminish their vulnerability may give these planes substantial protection even if they remain on exposed bases).

For these reasons, at least as far as we can see now, the strategic nuclear force based predominantly on missiles is likely to be distinctly underprivileged, compared with its Air Age predecessor, in an aggressive counterforce attack upon the opponent's strategic missile force. Thus, in addition to the "loss of the defensive function," the strategist of the Missile Age is likely also to be concerned with "the loss of the *offensive* function as an inherent capability of our major offensive force," and the *dominance of the offensive*, which has so profoundly influenced strategy in the nuclear phase of the Air Age, is likely to be replaced by the *dominance of the deterrent* (which, of course, is not the same as a return to Clausewitz' day, when the defensive was "the stronger form

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of war). The trend is already apparent. Whatever else is considered in deciding what missile systems to develop, the fact is not lost sight of that it is their primary function merely to exist. Already the rational priority in the case of missiles clearly lies not in assuring that they possess adequate power for offensive employment, but in making them secure. It may even turn out, in time, that active defense, of the antimissile missile variety, has a better future than offensive counterforce. At least a good deal more uniformity in its targets (which are all basically objects plunging through the atmosphere) seems likely.

This elemental contrast between an air force, in its proper environment, and a strategic force based primarily on missiles, in its quite different environment, seems beyond debate. Obviously, in the case of the missile as in that of the manned bomber, there are many other things that must be considered before an adequate foundation for strategy has been built. But if we are to find a strategy for the Missile Age, it seems reasonable to begin our search with fundamentals, just as Bernard Brodie and other students of strategy have done for the Air Age. And if the fundamentals of missile power are different from those of airpower, it is not unreasonable to expect that there will be a corresponding difference in the strategy we judge appropriate.

It will be surprising if this suggestion is not greeted with incredulous protest by the adherents of the reigning school of strategic thought. It cannot be proved, it will be said, that the strategic force of the future will be unable to destroy its enemy counterpart in an offensive counterforce attack, and so long as there is a single iota of remaining *uncertainty*, we dare not assume the risk of accepting the dominance of the deterrent. In reply it may be pointed out that the dominance of the nuclear Air Age offensive could not be proved either. As it has never been tested, we do not know to this day (and we hope we shall never know) just what element of truth it contains. But we are talking about strategy, not geometry. Our premises need only be persuasive evaluations, not demonstrable proofs. In the airpower environment the dominance of the offensive has been considered the soundest guide to planning. Not to have acted upon it, in the minds of those making the decisions, would have meant taking certain avoidable risks of destruction in war. But the fact that it was acted upon did not mean that all risks were avoided. Indeed, this is one of Bernard Brodie's most telling points: the "best strategy" for *both* sides in the nuclear airpower environment is preventive war. One consequence of this is that precisely those military postures and moves that are most consistent with the best strategy—such as multiplying SAC's offensive power while leaving it

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unprotected—are also those most likely to provoke the other side to preventive attack.

It perhaps should be added that to anticipate the change in the basic premise of our strategic thinking does not mean that we must leap to the conclusion that total war will become "impossible." Nor does it mean that we must adopt automatically any of the current theories of "minimum" or "finite" deterrence. Nor does counterforce become unimportant. In fact, the dominance of the deterrent, as the premise of strategy, will be tenable only on the condition that we recognize the inherent vulnerability of *any* strategic target that can be located and attacked in missile warfare, and that we exploit to the full the opportunity afforded us by the variety of dispersed, concealed, mobile, and protected deployments possible with missiles in order to minimize the risk of our deterrent weapons being successfully detected and destroyed. It should not be inferred from the dominance of the deterrent that this will be easy. The premise only asserts what may be reasonably assumed to be the result if both sides behave rationally. To relax and leave the future to our adversary would hardly be rational conduct in the circumstances. One important part of the effort required of us must be the attempt to develop counterforce measures that can penetrate the security of the various deterrent systems, for only by trying and failing can we gain reasonable assurance that the other side will also fail if it also tries. At the same time, we shall need to push relentlessly the search for an active anti-missile defense, for to permit our adversary a monopoly of achievement in this field would not be less disastrous.

There remains the strongly held conviction that the new premise cannot be accepted, regardless of its persuasiveness, for psychological reasons. We must not, it is said, encourage the natural complacency of the American people. Even more undesirable, according to some opinion, is the impact upon the morale of the military. We are reminded of the suggestion that morale considerations, rather than any real expectation of pulling it off, account for the concept of the "pre-emptive" strike in the military thinking of both the United States and the Russian air forces. It will always seem paradoxical to some people to insist we must run hard to hold our own. But at least there is no novelty in the idea that armed forces are developed and supported, not only to be used if needed, but also, and more importantly, so that the need will not arise. Nor are the military likely to be more frustrated by the effort to maintain forces that are frankly deterrent than they are now by the schizoid experience of counting on taking the initiative they know they are quite unlikely to be permitted to take.

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It may be asked, however, as the effort required to maintain the security of the United States in the Missile Age seems likely to be no less burdensome than that called for in the past and at present, whether a national strategy built on the new premise is likely to be any different from that built on the old one. This is of course the question that requires examination by students of strategy. Superficially at least, it would appear almost certain that the change will have decided effects, not all of which will be favorable to our side. For example, in the Missile Age we can hardly expect to rely as heavily as we have done in the Air Age upon the threat of offensive strategic action in international crises—even to carry out our treaty obligations. By the same token the risks of total war arising out of peripheral crises may be considerably diminished, and this could mean that limited wars will not seem quite so futile as Bernard Brodie suggests they do today.

Meanwhile the problem of United States strategic security during the transitional stage into the Missile Age is being approached from an orientation that is fundamentally that of the Air Age. Long-range missiles carrying nuclear warheads are appraised mainly in terms of the unprecedented threat they offer to bombers sitting on their bases. Also the missiles themselves are thought of as targets for strategic attack in very much the same sense that the enemy's air bases are thought of. This is all very well as far as it goes. We do need security measures appropriate to the transition. We do need a strategy for the Missile Gap. But as we advance into the future, the question must be raised whether any strategy dominated by Air Age thinking is likely to serve.

It is equally important, however, not to forget that military strategy is a contingent art. To be sure, its claim is modest: it recognizes the limits imposed upon itself by the performance characteristics of weapons systems that exist or will exist when current developments have run their course (ignoring those that might have been created if other possibilities had been pressed). Thus military strategy freely admits its own transient character. Even so, the modest claim may be misleading. For what strategy actually reflects, often enough, is not the facts themselves but an accepted interpretation of the facts. If, for example, airpower developments had taken a different turning a decade or more ago, so that by 1957 intercontinental bombers had been given the capability of vertical take-off, or by some other means had been made free of vast soft bases, the premise of airpower strategy might have evaporated even before the strategic missile came on the scene. But the "dominance of the offensive" did not permit this turning, which ought

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to suggest the possibility, among others, that while strategic thinking is transient it may also be tyrannous. The experience may comfort the strategist of the future, as no doubt it has consoled the strategist of the past, by assuring him that his speculations need not be futile. It should also alert his critics.

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POPULATION AND WORLD POLITICS

By HAROLD J. BARNETT*

Philip M. Hauser, ed., *Population and World Politics*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958, 297 pp. $6.00.**

THE book which prompts this article is a remarkably good one, given the state of our social science art. Within its 300 pages are readings that could form the basis for an intensive seminar on long-term aspects of "world population—world economic welfare and development—world politics." This is its very substantial merit. Its twelve eminent authors have identified and briefly discussed all the major, and most of the minor, aspects of this important subject. The book has weaknesses, too, most of which reflect not any shortcomings of the contributors, but rather the condition of the social sciences on this subject. We have so many pieces of information, so many hypotheses, "partial equilibrium" analyses, suggestions, and bits of wisdom and truth. And we have so little capacity to encompass and understand the implications of the question, "What do population trends portend for world politics?" Let us, however, utilize a portion of the material assembled in this volume to attempt a small step toward simplification and greater understanding of the problem.

I

The first "simplifying" proposition that one derives from the volume is this: barring nuclear war, world population will continue a substantial rate of increase to the end of this century; and the rate will be higher in poor nations than in rich ones. Thus we can assume a population increase ranging from 1 to more than 2 per cent per year in different parts of the world, and a global rate of increase of from 1 to 2 per cent. By the end of the century, the world population of 1950 will have doubled; and in some poorer countries the population will have more than doubled, even tripled. This interpretation is a gross oversimplification, of course; yet I think it is the one most sensibly drawn from the book's excellent demographic articles.

* The author is indebted for critical comment to his colleagues, D. Felix, J. L. Fisher, I. B. Goodman, H. Jarrett, C. Morse, and H. Perloff.

** "This volume comprises selected public lectures and the papers introducing Round Table discussions of the Thirtieth Institute of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation, held at the University of Chicago, November 24-28, 1954."

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The next proposition I derive may be harder to swallow. It is that the major, primary influences of these population trends upon world political relations will operate through the variables "economic welfare" and "economic development." This is a strenuous reduction. When it is made, no *primary* political significance is assigned to the facts that the ratio of colored people to white will greatly increase; that the Communist and Free World demographic balance may change greatly through population increase; that East and West population ratios may also change; that, conventionally, population is viewed as significant in war potential; and so forth. Yet the volume supports this simplification: two thirds of it are devoted to "World Population and Resources" (Part I) and "Populations, Levels of Living, and Economic Development" (Part II), and only one third is devoted to "Population Policy and Politics" (Part III). In a book whose title is *Population and World Politics*, the majority of articles address population and economics.

The third simplifying proposition identifies the pre-eminent world political problem for the next generation or two: how to achieve widespread survival of democratic governments (and avoidance of thermonuclear war) until such time as economic advances or other developments in Russia and China dilute their totalitarianism and hostility.

Next, we draw from the text the major way in which world politics depend upon economic welfare and development: (a) If levels of output in major, economically aspiring, non-Communist nations (e.g., India) advance at a goodly pace—say, an annual increase in per capita output of 2 or 3 per cent or more—then these nations are likely to reject Communist leadership at the ballot box, and to resist armed *coups d'état.* (b) But if levels of living do not so advance under non-Communist leaders and democratic governments, then these governments may fall. There will be a strong tendency for these nations to succumb to Soviet- or Chinese-sponsored, internal Communist pressures, subversion, and force. And such developments, particularly when they involve armed actions, would so disturb competitive coexistence—the present uneasy peace in Free World-Communist relations—as eventually to precipitate thermonuclear war. There have been an uncomfortable number of "near-misses" in the past decade and a half.

From this string of assertions, we arrive at the crucial nexus by which population will, as a primary force, affect world politics. Does the Free World have the economic capability and will to afford steady advance in levels of living to peoples of the major, non-Communist, poor nations in adequate response to their learning of, and aspiring to, their rich neighbors' economic welfare, in longevity, health, education, and goods?

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If the Free World has these abilities, then international peace can, on the whole, be maintained. Otherwise, internal political pressures in these major poor nations are likely to generate wars into which major Free World and Communist nations will eventually be drawn, in "world war."

The key question in the relation of population and world politics in my oversimplified model thus concerns the interaction between population growth and economic advance in the poorer nations of the non-Communist world. The question appears again and again in the volume under discussion. The remainder of this article will deal with it exclusively.[1]

II

In classical economic doctrine, the outlook is dismal for sustained welfare improvement in the poor, densely populated countries. The Malthusian reasoning is that output per head is subject to diminishing returns from population increase, owing to absolute limits of land availability. The Ricardian innovation twists the vise tighter: long before the limiting Malthusian ratio of land to population is reached, diminishing returns per head are experienced as population increases, because the economic quality of unused resources steadily declines. And, finally, beginning with W. J. Jevon's major contribution on coal a hundred years ago, natural resource depletion is viewed as seriously aggravating these tendencies toward diminishing economic returns.

Modern economics has advanced considerably since the classical contributions. We no longer believe that, for a growth analysis, the social production function is adequately described by the statement, "Output is a function of natural resources, labor, and capital." We now know we have to add to the right side of this equation, "and the changing socio-technical characteristics of the society"—in short, "technology."[2]

[1] The question can also be concluded to be a key one on premises other than the ones I have used—e.g., purely on grounds of economic welfare. The best full-length treatment of this matter—an outstanding one indeed—is A. J. Coale and E. M. Hoover, *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Princeton, N.J., 1958. I use some of the Coale-Hoover data below. An excellent article-length treatment is F. A. Mehta's "Economic Implications of Demographic Growth in India," *Economia Internazionale*, November 1955.

[2] We know this, but, except in occasional advanced courses, we rarely teach it. If we ignore change in technology, then we can say all kinds of interesting things. For example, the first partial derivative of output with respect to each factor is declining, and the second is negative—this (loosely stated) is the law of diminishing marginal returns to each factor. And then if we adopt the notion of constant returns to scale (if all factors increase by 50 per cent, output will increase by 50 per cent), our interesting results increase. We can now show that the classical economists were indeed

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The addition of a technology variable is a very important innovation. If technology becomes a variable in the model, then, still assuming population increase, we can experience *increasing* returns per head through time. Technological change and capital additions as influences tending to increase output per head may now be viewed as engaged in a "race" with the ever more powerful influence tending to decrease output per head—the fixed quantity of natural resources.

This, I think, is the most widespread contemporary view among social scientists, and even more among the public, the press, and public leaders. On this reasoning, the outlook for advance in economic welfare in poor, densely populated countries is one of uncertainty. In this uncertainty, moreover, there is an overhang of pessimism—a fear that the race may be a losing one. The increase in population is so inexorable and compound-interest results so frightening; the fixed land seems so immovable a barrier to increasing productivity of labor, and operates with ever stronger force; ever faster improvement in production technology seems so difficult to sustain; and, conventionally, capital increments themselves are viewed as subject to diminishing returns.

Yet the careful reader of this book, particularly the essays by Woytinsky, Hagen, and Spengler, and of the Coale-Hoover volume cited above, will find the prevailing view contains two errors. While they are of degree, they are nevertheless very significant. First, natural resources are *not* the pivotal element, in the classic sense. If they were, we should in fact be less uncertain and could be optimistic. Second, the rate of gross capital formation *is* the crucial question. Uncertainty concerning its magnitude is large. And capital need is related to timing of fertility rate changes in such a way as to give cause for pessimism, *unless* the democratic nations recognize the relation. Further, the difficulty is rather greater in countries with natural resources of relatively inferior quality, in that these require greater capital investment for their utilization. These points concerning natural resources and capital merit development.

III

Until fifty or a hundred years ago, the greater part of final output was agricultural goods—food, fibers, timber, game, etc. Advance in economic welfare involved increase in outputs of these goods. And output largely depended upon uncontrolled natural processes—sunlight,

right. Since land is fixed by definition, marginal returns from mere additional doses of labor and capital decrease—a nice dilemma for India, Indonesia, China, or indeed any country.

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rainfall, temperature, and so forth—impinging upon surface natural resources. "Fixed agricultural land" was a serious barrier to expansion of such outputs. Further, the ability to economize land input was limited by the manner in which these products, once extracted, were processed and fabricated for consumption. If the economy processed these gifts of nature at all, it was a gross *mechanical* shaping: grain was separated from stalk, hide from meat, timber sawed to size, fibers combed, twisted, and woven. Note the dilemma. Were not the usable acres limited, even under optimistic assumptions of fertilization and reclamation? Further, the land coefficient—the input of land acreage required per unit of output—could at very best be reduced only slowly, if at all. And there seemed to be limits beyond which reduction could not be conceived. Was there not a limit to the rice plants which a field could bear? Long before this limit was reached, would not the intensity of cultivation take its toll in reduced yield relative to the labor input?

We have inherited these views of nature and natural resources and the economic generalizations that derived from them. Yet it may be that they, and the analogies by which the classical law of diminishing returns is "demonstrated" to be approximately descriptive of today's long-term growth reality, are hopelessly archaic. With technology now viewed as a variable, what has happened in advanced nations to the *meaning* of final goods, the *methods* by which they are produced, and the economic *definition* of natural resources is so profound as to make the original, grand Malthusian and Ricardian generalizations virtually useless for understanding contemporary long-term economic growth.

The meaning of final goods has changed. For example, more than 90 per cent of the increase in real gross national product in the United States since 1870 has been of non-agricultural origin. The method of transforming materials into final goods is hardly at all a purely *mechanical* one. It is, to a considerable degree, a chemical process. And, as a result, the natural resource input has become to a major degree the basic molecular unit of chemistry. And this has major economic significance. It changes radically the social production function term of "natural resources" for societies that have access to modern technology and capital. That variable should now in some sense read "tons of matter, atmosphere, water, and temperature"; and it should look more at contained molecules of iron, magnesium, aluminum, coal, nitrogen, and so forth, and at their naturally existing chemical combinations, than at acres of land.

The same global limits which concerned Malthus and Ricardo still exist, of course; the earth is still a body of 4,000-mile radius and a 100-

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mile-deep atmosphere, with most of its surface under water or ice. It still has the same rotational spin, the same orbit, and the same receipt of about two quintillion horsepower-hours of solar energy per year. But the original classicists erred in their neglect of technological change in their growth models. And we err too, and less justifiably, if, in the obvious context of changing knowledge and technology, we view natural resource availability as an invariant magnitude in the social production function.

The notion of diminishing returns owing to the fixity of natural resources contains some specific errors for analysis of long-term economic growth and socio-technological change.

First, the term "natural resource" cannot be defined for economic analysis except with reference to a particular state of technology. For example, seawater magnesium, uranium, and taconites once were not economic resources and now they are.

Second, simple changes in our knowledge of the natural environment change the economic magnitudes of natural resources. Middle East oil, Venezuelan and Labrador iron ore, and the new bauxite reserves could not be viewed as natural resources until they were discovered.

Third, the Ricardian static assumption that natural resources will be used in declining order of economic quality is not, for a dynamic world, a general truth. For example, historically our energy supplies have been brush, wood, and dung; then peat; then coal; then oil; then gas; then atomic energy. Viewed with hindsight, this is not the order of declining economic quality. The order of our use of major structural materials has been, first, wood and earth; then such metals as tin and copper; then iron and masonry; then aluminum and magnesium; then plastics. Is this an order of declining economic quality? Even in agriculture, the United States order of acreage use progressed from the East westward to fertile California; and, as Carey pointed out to J. S. Mill, from mountainside and hill to valley and delta. The point is that one can define economic quality, and use in order of economic quality, only for fixed conditions of technology and knowledge. If changes occur—if the barrel is turned over, and new barrels appear—man's likelihood of using natural resources in order of declining quality becomes highly uncertain.

Finally, we observe the interesting phenomenon that many new resource technologies utilize very extensive, frequently ubiquitous, resources—seawater, taconites, clays, lateritic ores, porphyries, atmospheric nitrogen. Such "plateaus of quality," if very extensive, are an impor-

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tant exception to the Ricardian generalization concerning monotonic decline of resource economic quality.

The import of all this for our topic is that the problem of economic growth of those larger poor nations on which, we have alleged, world peace depends should *not* be viewed in major degree in Malthusian-Ricardian terms of a fixed natural resources barrier and diminishing returns. There was once genuine fear of world starvation from lack of nitrogen—shortly before the process of fixing atmospheric nitrogen was discovered. Not too long ago, on this reasoning, it seemed impossible that China's land mass could support more than its 400 million people. It now supports over 600 million, and China's rate of output growth under its totalitarian regime is the highest among major nations of the world.

IV

The reformation of the received view of the role of capital in economic growth has progressed further than that of the role of natural resources.

One major factor has quieted the ghost of diminishing productivity of capital in a changing world: no modern economy ever invests capital funds in equipment for the average technology already in use. Allowing for technological change, the effect of capital investment on economic growth is not only always "labor saving" (i.e., reduces labor input per unit of output). It is also very often "capital saving" (reduces capital input per unit of output). In general, modern development economists would agree that the output-increasing effect of the introduction of capital is very strong, and that the "law of diminishing productivity of capital," which we usefully teach in static theory, does not describe the capital-output relation in a technologically advancing economy. For our problem, then, it is suggested, we should not be concerned that capital investment will lose productive force as capital accretions are made.

The second aspect regarding capital, largely implied in what was just said, is that capital plays a role somewhat greater than that envisioned in classical growth models. Capital is uniquely the *carrier* of new technology. A poor nation is limited in economic ability to adopt advanced technologies and improvements in knowledge (which are freely available from the advanced countries) by the scarcity of capital funds. Moreover, unfortunately, there is a special problem, in that the funds for capital formation must be, to a substantial degree, in the form of, or convertible into, foreign exchange, since the advanced capital instruments must come from the already industrialized nations.

Note also this important further twist in the direction of intensified

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concern for the role of capital: we depend upon increase in knowledge and technological change in the utilization of natural resources to release us from the bondage of "fixed natural resources," not merely as a force working against an ineluctable economic scarcity of natural resources, à la Malthus, Ricardo, Jevons, and conservationist doctrine, but as a device to prevent the scarcity from ever appearing at all. And thus capital investment becomes to an even greater degree the indispensable ingredient of economic advance, and equally the practical limit to advance.

Let us consider next a situation in which the significance of capital is obscured by the aggregative social production function cited earlier. To do so, we decompose the capital aggregate. One element is productive instruments, such as power machinery in the factory or mine, railroads, and electricity-generating stations. Assuming that additional labor is available, these capital items do not have a uniform capacity to generate increased output. The ratio of incremental annual output to new capital investment, for example, is high in such industries as electronics, textile weaving and dyeing, and housewares production. And the ratio—the output generated per dollar invested—is low in such industries as mining, metal manufacture, railroads, and public utilities. We note, then, that effort to create basic industries that provide environment and underpinning for industrialization unfortunately involves a nation in very heavy investment in the industries that are capital intensive. Even in our own country in the nineteenth century, for example, where the domestic saving rate was quite high, our great railroad system was financed in considerable part by English investment, and investment was enticed by fraud and misrepresentation.

Capital shortage is aggravated by the fact that other elements in the capital aggregate are of a type which, for practical purposes, are "nonproductive," in the sense that they are without immediate ability to generate productivity increase at all. Examples of such capital items are investment in much of children's education, provision of city sewage and street facilities, public health and hospital facilities, public housing. In effect, such investments are consumer-oriented and tend to improve consumer welfare directly, without providing visible ("pocket") income, and without increasing industrial productivity. They reduce the capital investment in industrial expansion. And yet, for the underdeveloped democratic nations, they are not fully discretionary.

We may now join these observations, in which capital requirements are viewed in a disaggregated way, to two phenomena particularly

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characteristic of the low-income countries under consideration. One is urbanization. The other is high fertility.

For a variety of reasons, industrialization and economic advance in contemporary and recent historical societies go hand in hand with the process of urbanization. And urbanization generates intense requirements for capital. In the congestion of an urban setting, outdoor and casual latrines cannot be permitted because of the dangers of disease and pestilence. Thus capital for sewage investment is required. Similar needs affect the water supply—the stream is either no longer nearby, or not fit to drink, and capital must be invested to rectify the situation; medical facilities—certain diseases must be controlled for fear of urban epidemics, and capital must be invested in hospitals and medical personnel; types of public works employment—men with primitive tools can construct roads or larger works in rural settings, but less successfully so in cities, so capital must be allocated to construction of public works; food storage and protection—the individual's own construction of a barn or cellar is possible, and adequate for safekeeping, in the rural setting, but not in the city, so construction capital is needed; education—its complete lack or *ad hoc* provision is far less disturbing in the countryside than on city streets, so school facilities and personnel must be invested in; housing—rural huts not much, if at all, better than packing crates are tolerable (perhaps because not seen), but packing crates for city dwellings become intolerable, and capital must be invested in apartment houses and tenements. Yet most of this capital is without immediate output-generating effect, and significantly reduces the capital available for industrial "productive" efforts.[3]

Finally, we must consider the fact that the rapid population growth in the low-income nations with which we are concerned is due to (a) sharp declines in mortality (particularly infant and child mortality) and (b) continuation of high fertility rates. The effect of this phenomenon, of course, is greatly to increase the total number of people. And, thereby, for any target figure on volume of capital per head, and output per head, the total capital requirement is greatly expanded. If insufficiency of capital is already the limiting factor on advance in output, the damage is obvious.

[3] The brevity of the argument in this and the two preceding paragraphs could lead to the inference that there is little or no value in public welfare services. This is not intended. The intent, rather, is to differentiate these allocations for urban "consumer capital" from investment that *directly, immediately, and substantially* improves labor productivity. The latter investment immediately provides higher levels of output and rate of output growth, and eventually provides much higher levels of consumer income and welfare.

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But even more serious for the prospect of increasing productivity and industrial output is the effect on age distribution, which is to increase more than proportionally the size of the dependent, non-working population. This increase in the fraction of the population unavailable for productive work—a fraction which must be supported, but which cannot contribute—reduces advance output per capita in two ways. First, each 100 members of the age group in the labor force now support perhaps 75 dependents, whereas with lower fertility the figure would be about 50. Second, the requirements for support of dependents in an urban society are highly capital-consuming. Because of these consequences of the age distribution, a larger share of output must go for consumption, and less is available for investment—less can go for directly increasing labor productivity in industry. Nor is this problem transient—merely a matter of a few years, until the children reach productive ages. The children become workers, it is true, but if fertility rates persist, they also rather quickly become parents. The adverse ratio of workers to dependents continues, and so does the drain on capital for purposes other than increasing the productivity of the labor force.

V

The argument of this article can be summarized simply. Rapid rates of population increase in the major, economically aspiring, non-Communist nations imperil their economic progress, and this in turn threatens world peace. The economic difficulty is not significantly related to the classical conception of limited natural resources and diminishing returns attributable thereto. The difficulty is primarily due to limitation of capital needed to exploit technological advance. A problem to begin with because the poor, non-totalitarian nation finds it hard to save, it is rendered most acute by two other phenomena: the drain on capital supplies for purposes which do not directly improve industrial productivity, such as cultural education; and the drain incident to converting agrarian economies into urban ones. Finally, to this is joined the dilemma that present high fertility rates add consumers to the society relatively faster than workers. This reduces per capita incomes and thereby the volume of savings. The size of the fertility-capital problem is indicated by the Coale-Hoover finding for India: per capita output could increase more than twice as fast in the next two generations from the single influence of a 50 per cent reduction in fertility rates and its effect on population numbers, age distribution, and capital formation.

Relevant suggestions for policy in the United States and other rich

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nations are quite obvious, I think. First, we should make birth control devices, literature, and education available without limit and without cost to those governments and peoples in foreign countries who desire them for use in reducing fertility. Second, we should expand our economic assistance—capital goods and Point Four help—to much higher levels.

Finally, it might be useful if publicists for birth control would present their case in terms of immediate and continuing economic benefits rather than on the basis of Malthusian doom. The latter argument no longer holds water, and it is extreme in its call for virtual cessation of population growth. The valid argument, on the other hand, asks only for moderation of fertility, and for capital assistance from the wealthy nations. And offers hope, as indeed there is.

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